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Marley was dead to begin with.
- Charles Dickens
To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere 
(Preface to 1969-74 Plan)
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Prefato ry  Reflectio n
Today there is no consensus on economic strategy for the next decade in Africa - not even 
quite a consensus on the absence of one. But it is clear that Structural Adjustment is no 
longer seen by a majority of actors as an adequate medium to long term strategy. Even for 
rehabilitation of collapsed economies in war ravaged or collapsed states there is grave doubt 
that the model of cutting excessive demand and cutting back the (often nearly non-existent) 
state is contextually relevant.
That position of uncertainty poses challenges. Not least is the loss of security because no 
functioning conventional wisdom to extol, to fine tune or to condemn exists - a loss to true 
believers and amenders, to 'yes but what more', as well as to root and branch, critics. It also 
raises the danger that discourse on the question of what strategic agendas are needed now will 
continue to focus on Structural Adjustment and its strengths/limitations, successes/failures. 
That type of responsive, rather than proactive, discourse has been a major weakness of 1981- 
95 advocates of nominally alternative strategies. While understandable on the part of African 
governments with no strategic options not requiring at least temporary enhancement of net 
resource transfers and no chance of getting term with broad acceptance of the Washington
Consensus for SA, this turning of Africans from prop rs to responders has been
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decapacitating and demoralising. It is even more counterproductive now that the consensus is 
breaking up.
The basic problem any new strategy must confront is Sustained Economic 
Underperformance at least since the mid 1920s and more directly relevantly during the entire 
1960-1995 post colonial period. There have been periods of rapid growth for a number of 
countries and over 1975-79 for Africa as a whole, but these are the exceptions, not the broad 
pattern and most relate to "vent for surplus" or "opening up booms" or to exceptionally 
favourable international economic contexts. The first cannot usually be repeated and the 
second are most unlikely over 1991-2001 unless Africa's export structure is not merely 
adjusted but radically transformed in makeup as well as volume.
Underperformance has characterised all three phases of strategic consensus: Planning (1960- 
79), Crisis Coping (1980-85) and Structural Adjustment (1986-1995). Because late colonial 
and early independence planning of the 1950s and 1960s followed near stagnation in most of 
SSA over 1925-45, this underperformance was not recognised at the time. The apparent full 
recovery from the first oil shock and the focus of subsequent debate on SA served further to 
obscure this underlying secular challenge. Arguably it relates to policy but - judging by its 
persistence over time and across apparently very different policy patterns - not in any simple 
way. Almost certainly it relates to inadequate and relatively worsening resource endowment, 
not so much in the sense of natural resources (albeit most of SSA is not well endowed on that 
criteria) as to created infrastructure and labour productivity (health, nutrition, education) 
endowment. The latter - unlike the former - is at least in principle alterable over one to two 
decades by strategy and policy - vide Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Slovenia, etc.
However, underperformance is a slippery term - relative to what? In the immediate post­
war period the estimated ceiling for poor country growth was put at 2Vi% to 3% a year or 1% 
to V/2% per capita. That judgement - which was in retrospect excessively pessimistic, even 
for much of 1945-69 Africa - was heavily influenced by long periods of similar growth by 
industrial economies during the 19th Century and by the 1925-1994 near stagnation of most 
poor economies. In addition it underestimated the decline in mortality rates and consequential 
increase in population growth. But more recently the World Bank's 1981 Agendas For 
Action estimated attainable growth in SSA over the 1989s with optimum policies at 3.5% 
assuring a) moderately favourable terms of trade evolution and b) doubling of net resource 
inflows. If the latter was not met 2.5% was the ceiling and the actual (deteriorating) terms of 
trade pattern would knock that down to about 1.5%. Further, nobody would assert optimal 
policies (in Bank or, indeed, any terms) were practised by all of SSA throughout the 1980s.
Yet growth in the event averaged above 2% for the decade approaching a 3% trend in its 
second half. On these tests SSA has not under performed secularly.
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The official target growth rates of most SSA countries have hovered around 6% a year 
throughout all three successive strategic consensus periods. For no period has SSA (or a 
majority of its component economies) ever met that target and only in the mid 1960s and the 
second half of the 1970s has it regularly exceeded half of it. By that standard the 
underperformance has been endemic and abysmal.
Contrast with other regions also shows underperformance (with some exceptions, e.g. the 
latter half of the 1970s in respect to Latin America and the Caribbean) with China, India, 
Northeast and Southeast Asia all achieving rates which, since 1980, have been at least twice 
SSA's.
On a more narrowly technical test it can be argued that the resource requirements for socio 
and political economic sustainability of any proactive strategy in most of SSA do, in fact, 
cluster around 6%. The key use demands are:
• restoration and improvement of physical infrastructural
• upgrading of the human resource base (access to basic services)
• reducing fiscal and external (or savings/investment) imbalances
• allowing enough personal consumption growth to restore late 1970s (or earlier) per capita 
'peaks', reverse the trend to increasing proportions of absolutely poor households and 
provide incentives for learning (productivity) and entrepreneurship.
Since neither external transfers (aid plus investment) nor terms of trade gains are likely to 
boost total resource availability growth above output growth, it is hard to see how a rate 
under 6% is sustainable even if the danger in 3% to 4% cases may be implosion rather than 
explosion. In that context the World Bank's projection of a maximum attainable rate of 4% 
for SSA as a whole well into the 21st Century - optimistic as it may be in one sense - appears 
alarmingly low.
This paper:
a. reviews the ongoing end of Structural Adjustment as we have known it;
b. notes elements toward strategies widely canvassed;
c. explores underperformance and its causal elements;
d. looks in more detail at selected topics;
e. points toward possible strategic packages for the next decade.
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II.
Stru ctur al  A djustm ent  At Tw ilight
Structural adjustment is fading into the sunset with no bright happy morning to follow. 
Already the World Bank - its most coherent analyst, paladin and grand master - say "We no 
longer speak of structural adjustment".
True some latecomers to the SA consensus are unaware of this - as with mega tankers to 
change the course of received development doctrine takes time. But the wheel is already 
being turned (perhaps in several directions at once) and to debate future SSA economic 
strategy in terms of continued or amended structural adjustment would be a relatively sterile 
exercise. Today, just as 1975-79 (of the fabled 5% GDP growth trend) was the last stand of 
old style African economic planning which perished in the harsh world of 1980-85, so too
1985-90 can now be seen as the high noon of Structural Adjustment and its death sentence as 
written in the failure - apart from the special early case of Mauritius - to provide a continuing, 
let alone accelerating, dynamic beyond an end to economic free-fall and partial stabilisation 
through reduction of some imbalances. The World Bank does learn from experience. It has 
now decided SA is not an adequate strategic framework for economic transformation in SSA.
This is not to say that the Bank (or even most of its critics) would accept that Structural 
Adjustment has in any total or general sense been a failure compared to preceding ad hoc 
crisis non-coping. Most practitioners and independent analysts would not deny that it has - 
when practised seriously and with a modicum of good luck - recorded significant 
achievements:
1. In a majority of cases serious SA programmes have halted or reversed economic free- 
fall within one to three years; and
2. Less uniformly allowed restoration of a 3% to 5% GDP growth trend (i.e. halted per
capita as well as overall decline);
3. With some structural improvement on external account (largely from less astoundingly 
unsound exchange rates) despite very poor external market trends.
4. Reduced fiscal imbalances - largely through enhanced revenue from growth and 
augmented programme oriented foreign transfers de facto for import and budget support, 
not actual real expenditure reductions;
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5. Created a somewhat more systematic scrutiny of economic policies and particularly of 
those relating to enterprises and subsidies (public and private).
Given the state and trend of most SSA economies in 1981 those are not negligible 
achievements.
What structural adjustment has not achieved is also reasonably broadly documented and 
agreed:
1. breakthroughs to 6% overall and 3% per capita trend output growth needed to 
reduce public services, savings, poverty and fiscal gaps at the same time;
2. upgrading to trend rates of growth of food production of 3% to 3.5% to allow 
improved nutritional security and lower dependence on staple food imports;
3. recovery of gross fixed investment to the 25% (15% net) levels needed to sustain 6% 
output growth paralleled by even less impressive recoveries of domestic savings (public 
and private) to the 15% to 20% levels not uncommon prior to 1980;
4. reversal of the falling proportion of people with access to functional basic services
(health, education, water, agricultural extension, market access) with high social and 
political as well as present human welfare and future productivity and competitiveness 
costs;
5. reversal of the rising proportion of SSA households existing in absolute poverty and, 
indeed, the absence of coherent articulated approaches to increasing 
production/productivity by poor people;
6. providing a set of functional strategic guidelines from initial stabilisation, imbalance 
containment and limited recovery to economic transformation of structures of production, 
exports, access to basic services, agricultural productivity and income distribution,
7. and - by no means least - failing utterly to secure near doubling of real net official 
transfers (which in fact declined over a third per capita over 1980-1995) or substantial 
writedown of external debt overhang. The Bank has in fact given up on the first - 
though through 1989 it was a linchpin of its modelling - and has yet to achieve substantial, 
generalised progress on the second which gradually (faute de mieux) replaced it on the 
agenda after 1990.
To say this is not to assert structural adjustment caused these problems - certainly they were 
even more marked during crisis non-coping free-fall periods. Nor is it to say that after 1985 
the Bank failed to respond to poverty, basic services, environmental concerns by attempting to
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graft them on to the balance restoration/sustainable imbalance management core o f structural 
adjustment. But the failures cited must be solved if transformation/ development are to follow 
on from adjustment/imbalance reduction. Failure to achieve substantial general results and the 
tendency for graft on programmes to be small, enclavised and marginalised do set time and 
depth limits to structural adjustment's potential future even more than to its past actual 
accomplishments. It is to the Bank's credit that it is among the first to recognise these 
realities.
The loss o f faith over 1990-95 that structural adjustment could be transformed into a long 
term strategy to focus on substantive goals (e.g. absolute poverty reduction, overall physical 
infrastructure renewal plus modernisation and extension) while holding on to its procedural 
foundation of reducing and managing imbalances (e.g. elimination of gross currency 
overvaluation and massive subsidisation - by state or consumer - of non-viable production) 
had several interacting components:
1. the plateauing of several 'flagship' programmes (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania), with setbacks 
and recoveries but no forward momentum toward transformation, and the brittleness of 
others (e.g. Kenya);
2. revival of the Bank's early doubt that a basically short to medium term balancing, 
liberalisation, growth restoration strategy could be a frame for incorporating other 
elements. It had never been fully convinced despite the effort to synthesise the two in 
1989 (Sustainable Development). The poverty focus in SAP resulted from outside 
pressure spearheaded by UNICEF and the ecology component from similar pressure by 
Northern NGOs. Both linked to genuine Bank concerns that "structural adjustment 
programmes which rend the fabric of society cannot be sustained" in a context which - at 
least for the Bank - mandated all external assistance being via Consultative Groups 
responding to Bank/Country proposals mode around a rolling three year SAP framework.;
3. growing "donor fatigue" because procedural strategies have limited political sex appeal 
unless they pay off dramatically and fast;
4. paralleled by growing recipient fatigue from what was perceived as "creeping 
conditionality without end" plus - with apologies to T. S. Eliot - "the rising cry of the 
people - Resign! Resign!! Resign!!!" as a majority saw no substantial and/or sustained 
recovery either in household real incomes or access to basic public services (health, 
education, water, agricultural extension, roads, law and order);
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5. and the dramatic failure to deliver of what should have been the 1990s two flagship 
programmes. Zambia's over five years showed an average 3.5% a year decline in output 
per capita - not much worse than 1975-89 but not much better. Zimbabwe's outturn was 
an even worse per capita decline following a 2% plus real per capita growth trend under 
the 1984-89 domestic structural adjustment programme. Certainly two droughts - one the 
worst in a century - impacted the economy and admittedly the IMF (and increasingly 
Zimbabwe's Treasury) were far less concerned about the fabric of society than the Bank. 
Nonetheless, neither Zambia nor Zimbabwe has helped S A's image - the latter being the 
first case in which it has apparently sent an economy into free fall instead of halting it.
III.
Forw ard  To The Pa s t ? 5 Y ears Plans and 5 W eek  C oping
The basic need is not to centre dialogue on how to reform structural adjustment - even the 
Bank no longer views that as a viable way forward. Still less is it appropriate to spend much 
time on arguing whether it should ever have become the dominant strategy - it did. Further, in 
the contexts of actual or impending free-fall and total external (plus not insubstantial internal) 
lack of faith in marginally revised previous policies (or non-policies), it is as hard to see now 
as it was in the 1980s what actual alternatives existed.
This is not to argue that alternatives might not have been analysed, articulated, documented 
and sold - both at home and externally. APPER and AAFSAP were in principle such 
alternatives - at least up to a point. Their articulation (especially in APPER) and analysis 
(especially in AAFSAP) were neither fully coherent nor particularly impressive. National 
support was notably uneven - and on average low - while ability to gain international 
credibility was near nil both at the APPER/AAFSAP level and even more at that of national 
alternatives to internationally designed/approved SAPs. The last point is a telling one - any 
African initiative requiring substantial net resource transfers (public or private, 
concessional or commercial) requires credibility in the eyes (and pockets) of resource 
providers or it is in practice non-operational.
The real issue is what next? Neither academic nor agency nor government, African nor 
external dialogue has reached anything approaching a consensus either in strategic terms for 
SSA nor in terms of articulated operational ones for any country. For once the word 
experiment has some validity - the degree of tentativeness and testing is much higher and 
applies in more countries than usual. The beliefs in the primacy of the political kingdom, in 
five year plans, in state leadership in production, in any external deus ex machina through the
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magic market, and/or in accountable transparency as a magic wand have all passed into history 
at continental level even if each still has its true believers and most remain entrenched among 
one or more countries' decision takers.
At two levels this can be creative. First, the records of the past decade and a half strongly 
suggest the need for strategic redesign as a necessary condition for structural transformation. 
Neither more of the same nor muddling through has a high objective probability of working 
whatever title is applied. Second, the absence of certitudes can create a type of discourse 
potentially more conducive to finding sets of partial answers and, perhaps, to seeing that single 
'big answers' for all economies at all times are likely to be quite simply big mistakes. The 
record of such solutions is rather reminiscent of the 1970s "heavy industry" debate in which 
one participant tartly pointed out that while proponents variedly linked heavy to closeness to 
raw materials, to linkages to other sectors, to plant and machinery, to size of plant and even 
literally to weight of output, all the proposed heavy industries - public or private - seemed to 
be premised on heavy present direct losses justified by somewhat lightly argued externalities or 
future clawbacks.
However, at another two levels strategic uncertainly or incoherence are much more troubling. 
First, because economies and states do exist here and now, it is not possible to suspend 
either policy or resource allocation while designing and agreeing on - much less fine 
tuning - strategy. Delay in choosing can be as costly as a wrong choice especially when the 
present situation and trends are clearly unsatisfactory. Second, there is a consensus for 
examined, interrelated policy and resource allocation strategies which - if correct - places a 
premium on getting most of the right components in approximately the right 
relationships as a matter of urgency.
IV.
E lem en ts  T ow ard  An  A genda (A g endas?)
Guide posts and elements toward an agenda - or perhaps different strategic agendas? - exist.
What is lacking is a strategic vision linking them in any integral, articulated way or even
testing whether all are compatible with each other.
• Public Expenditure Review (PER) in broad principle to avert unsustainable 
(unfinanceable without inflationary or exchange rate crises) imbalance, to identify 
inefficiency (including low priority uses) and to improve coordination is not, in principle, 
contentious. In practice, however, Bank PER teams (unlike micro and sectoral ones) tend 
to award an almost exclusive priority to macro monetary balance narrowly defined to be
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achieved by cuts even when these cuts raise unit costs by reducing efficiency - a context 
suggesting top priority should go to resource mobilisation with cuts in output of goods or 
services a last resort;.
• Ultra Liberalism (Southern Cone or Mexico 93-94 strategy) of resolving fiscal and 
external imbalance via sky high real interest rates which deter exports and increase the 
current account deficit in order to cut inflation below global levels (to claw back 'achieved' 
overvaluation) and to attract external investment (in goal long term productive, in practice 
footloose financial) is an IMF fashion (and also, despite recent doubts, a Reserve Bank of 
South Africa one). Many African Central Banks have adopted it enthusiastically despite 
the early 1980s Chilean and 1994-95 Mexican examples. Admittedly it has been a relative 
success in Uganda, but not in Kenya or Tanzania and is a potential economic time bomb in 
South Africa. The cost to exports and to long term investment can be very high and so 
soon as investors are worried about the exchange rate an unmanageable outflow is 
certain..
• Liberalisation in the sense of reducing state regulation, intervention, prevention and 
subsidisation is broadly agreed in principle. The practical issue are how far/how fast. In 
certain cases - massive exchange rate overvaluation (including that created by Ultra 
Liberal intervention) the case for liberalisation relatively rapidly - and for avoiding 
interventions recreating the problem! - is clear-cut. In others quite complex issues arise: 
is ending all safety regulations on public transport vehicles (as Mozambique did at one 
point) prudent economic liberalisation or an abdication of a state duty to protect life and 
limb? The impact of liberalisation on business persons is far more problematic than 
usually understood - first they like predictability and detest change and second 
liberalisation to them means ending rules impeding and subsidies costing them while 
tightening rules protecting and enhancing subsidies to others benefiting them. Thus the 
apparently paradoxical collapse of (already shaky) entrepreneurial "animal spirits" in 
Zimbabwe in response to rapid 1990-92 liberalisation.
• Market Leadership (or Dominance) clearly means seeking to respect, to study and to 
manage in tune with market forces, but in some cases goes on to neo-laissez-faire justified 
on "invisible hand" principles. Whatever the virtues of an unregulated market, Smith's 
"invisible hand" (competition among large numbers of small, relatively equal sized actors 
with minimal market power) is not very relevant to SSA today - except perhaps to make a 
strong case for anti cartel legislation in South Africa as advocated by its new Minister of 
Finance. In fact intervention, like liberalisation is in the eye of the beholder. The IMF 
and - to a lesser extent the Bank - have been very strong advocates of state intervention in 
respect to exchange rates (directly or via interest rates) and government wage rates
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(holding them below market levels judged by medium and large private enterprise scales). 
No policy can be literally non interventionist (unless totally ineffective) and given the 
minimum necessary government expenditure level (by the 1989 World Bank checklist 
about 35% of GDP if modest provisions are made for debt service, law-order-defence and 
administration) the macro impact and the sectoral impacts of resource raising and 
expenditure are necessarily large. The real issue is how and when to manage markets, 
how tightly and with what tools, i.e. in that respect SSA issues are not different in kind 
from those facing any government.
• Downsizing the state is more a slogan or a platitude than a guide to action. There is a 
broad consensus for reducing the state role in production, other than public services and 
public utilities (which are an area of debate), and probably for its virtual elimination at 
small enterprise level and -except for fallback enterprises to underpin competition and/or 
provide price floors/ceilings (e.g. buyer/seller of last resort grain enterprises) - in trade. 
Beyond production for general sale, there is some agreement on reducing both low priority 
activities and those in which the state has no evident comparative advantage. Which these 
are is less agreed, as is the potential for publicly funded/contracted out services (e.g. 
rubbish collection) and 'mixed ones' (e.g. secondary and tertiary hospitals). The Bank's - 
relatively middle of the road - position amounts to calling for a narrower range of 
activities, performed more efficiently (in output per unit of input), with broader access 
and increased overall resource allocation absolutely and (at least in 1989s Toward 
Sustainable Growth and most sectoral missions' reports) proportionately to GDP. That 
is, perhaps, not a set of goals particularly transparently captioned "downsizing". 
Privatisation is a related topic with contention more over how, how fast and why than 
whether. Actual auction sales seem unlikely to optimise future investment or output and, 
in most cases, to have limited fiscal gains beyond ending the need for budgetary subsidies 
and/or state mobilisation of investment funds. Negotiations centring on output, 
investment, export commitments tend to be long drawn out and opaque but can be far 
more strategically important. For example placing Zambia's copper industry in hands 
capable of financing and managing a doubling of output over 5 to 10 years for which the 
public sector has neither the financial mobilisation, the technical nor the entrepreneurial 
resources is crucial but can not be achieved by a public auction nor by any other fully 
transparent process.
• Public Service Reform began as an exercise in numbers (and real emoluments) crunching. 
This proved relatively futile in saving funds, but quite expensive in diverting attention, 
wasting time and reducing real output per (increasingly underpaid) worker. While some 
bilaterals still support that approach to downsizing, present directions are toward root and 
branch reform/reconstruction relating professionalism and productivity to targeted
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levels of specified state functions with pay levels adequate to achieve productivity - 
probity - professionalism and with numbers a consequential not a driving variable.
Judging by Ghanaian and Tanzanian experience, such exercises take five to seven years 
after simple cutting approaches are rejected. The fuller the pre-action study the longer the 
delay in initial results. The home grown, make a start (but highly professional in 
instigation and management) exercise in Ethiopia has led to initial, apparently successful, 
steps within three years, but the Tanzanian domestic/Bank partnership one is on course to 
take up to seven because almost all major actions are to follow complete analysis, 
formulation and political debate/adoption.
• Efficiency is a universally promoted slogan which usually has some objective correlative. 
Because efficiency is an adjective, it is necessary to examine pronouncements and 
programmes to discern what the implicit noun is. The most generally accepted 
(acceptable?) definition would be reduction in unit input to output ratios for 
comparable quality outputs plus elimination of non priority outputs. In practice 
reduction of nominal (or price adjusted) expenditure is often substituted which is logically 
- and operationally - incorrect as output per unit input as well as output quality may fall,
e.g. underpaid teachers having to 'cope' (therefore often absent) and with few if any books 
or teaching materials not surprisingly achieve poorer ratios of pupil years to course 
completions combined with significant quality declines (as perceived by subsequent 
educational institutions and employers) so that the true unit cost of primary education may 
well rise as a result of inefficient cost cutting.
• Human Development is partly an alternative title for human investment and partly an 
attempt to provide an alternative (UNDP's Human Development Indicator) or multiple, 
complementary alternatives (UNICEF's much more disaggregated child and maternal state 
of welfare/ill-fare indices and targets) to GDP per capita. The first and last approaches 
can lead to quantifiable targets incorporatable into an overall socio-economic strategy. 
WTiether the second can is much less clear - the HDI is even more a black boxed experts' 
perception than GDP and one less readily related in an operational way to specific targets 
to be achieved by specific strategies and policies. At the other extreme, the disaggregated 
indices of UNICEF are eminently targetable but very hard to integrate into an overall 
macro economic or macro social strategy except by the method of setting minimum targets 
for a series of variables and iterating to achieve a viable macro balance. That approach 
was followed in some 1960s and 1970s planning exercises - e.g. those of Tanzania - but 
requires rather more (and different) economic component indices and targets than are now 
normally used in macro balance formulation.
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• Public Services/Basic Services are related to human development in the sense that 
proponents of the latter are usually strong backers of high priority to the former, arguably 
on occasion at the expense of enough infrastructural investment and production friendly 
policies to make use of the human capital gains or to sustain the entitlement (household) 
side of food security whatever happens on the overall agricultural production and 
importation side. There is little debate over the necessity of the state (including local 
government) being the main provider of basic services in Africa nor much more about 
its being the largest operator, complemented with significant domestic social sector and 
smaller private sector inputs. Nor is the core of universal access target basic services: 
primary and adult education, primary and core secondary plus educational/ 
preventative health services, accessible pure water, agricultural extension, access by 
income and safety net to adequate nutrition the subject o f much divergence of view. 
Whether certain other areas, e g. peri urban and rural sanitation, low cost housing, 
electricity are either generally or in some contexts core basic services is much more 
debated. South Africa includes all three albeit with the last two contracted out to 
enterprise producers and with very substantial user charge components in intended 
resource mobilisation. On the core services - except water - the user fee debate has 
become sterile. Some user contribution (perhaps 20% in primary education and health 
services) can be achieved if a) a quick, accurate exemption system for absolutely poor 
households can be devised; b) payments stay at basic service unit level and can be seen to 
improve quality and/or quantity; c) both payment systems and source provision are user 
friendly. If the funds are indeed to be centralised and allocated in the main budget, indirect 
taxes are much more cost efficient sources (and usually relatively positively redistributive 
when contrasted with basic service user fees) and probably normally less politically 
problematic (e.g. a 20% increase in the tax on beer versus a $0.25 health service contact 
fee). The basic case for co-financing has to be made in terms of user participation in 
design, operation and review, not in terms of tax collection for which it unlocks few new 
resources and is massively administrative personnel and cost intensive relative to returns 
(and to alternative revenue raising).
• Good governance - like efficiency - is rarely opposed by anybody, but has widely 
divergent meanings. In a macro economic strategic context (the current World Bank 
perspective since resiling from early 1990s flirtation with broader democratisation 
modelling) it includes: a) transparency so that how resources are used is determinable; b) 
accountability so that errors - whether of judgement or of probity - can result in penalties 
and c) providing for hearing users in the broad sense (including enterprises as well as 
households and social groups) and making decision takers and implementers in some 
regularised, non-violent way subject to the need to alter radically user unfriendly policies 
and/or be removed for pursuing them. Technically this clearly requires improved (in
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quality, speed of availability and accessibility) accounts and independent audits as well as 
serious pre policy proposal (and especially pre budget) consultation complemented by post 
proposal debate. The problems of SSA are certainly different in degree (less accountants, 
less independent auditors, weaker consultation processes, few technically competent and 
politically independent parliaments, more personalised kleptocracies or neo Platonic 
dictatorships). Whether they are in kind all that different from other regions is more 
problematic.
• Analytical and policy formulation competence is an agreed component for strategic 
improvement. However, a) there is a tendency to concentrate too narrowly on very high 
level personnel and not on (usually much weaker) middle level gaps at data and draft 
option collection and presentation levels which lower top level efficiency; b) assuming 
analysts can induce political decision takers to act in ways decidedly adverse to their (or in 
some cases their constituents') perceived interest and/or c) begging the question of what 
the likely outcome of such a process will be - or rather assuming it will be the policies the 
proponent of capacity enhancement would now propose on its own It also tends to 
overlook two key reasons for general - albeit by no means universal - African analytical 
and formulation decline since 1979 despite a larger professional pool and greater time to 
have gained experience. The first is low (often derisory) pay leading either to work 
diminishing (or corrupting) coping mechanisms or to exodus from public service and 
often from the country, while the second is the shift from African formulated proposals, 
subject to debate with and amendment to compromise with external actors, to 
external, teleguided or subliminally external model based proposals with only very 
secondary African response in terms of negotiable modifications. As the World Bank - 
like a growing number of Africa intellectuals - has come to realise, the absence or 
perceived absence of programme "ownership" has a devastating impact on analysis and 
formulation by reducing its marginal value and by sapping morale in addition to its more 
evident consequence of political support base fragility.
• Implementation capacity - in terms of service delivery personnel, working procedures, 
institutional structures receives relatively substantial micro and sometimes sectoral 
attention and a general "priority" tick but without systematic articulation back toward 
micro - operationality. Four problems have become apparent with expert- especially 
expatriate expert - driven programmes. They:
a. are inadequately contextual historically, politically and in respect both to constraints 
and to opportunities;
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b. concentrate disproportionately on those - usually very senior - personnel with whom 
the experts are in regular contact at the expense of user contact level basic service 
providers;
c. in an attempt to buy off vested interests and to avoid ill charted political minefields - 
are too marginal when, in contexts of gross inefficiencies and extreme scarcity of 
qualified personnel, radical restructuring is likely to be necessary for qualitatively 
significant gains;
d. underplay the importance of bureaucracy - i.e. standard procedures to allow the 
routine 90% to 95% of activities to be dealt with promptly and consistently at lower 
and middle level while freeing higher level personnel to concentrate on design, policy, 
review and complex cases instead of being clogged with routine matters (in one case 
allocation of department car time and signing of petrol orders by the National 
Director).
There is some evidence national approaches with significant political decision taker input 
can perform better. For example, Ethiopia's civil service reform has concentrated on pay, 
professionalism, career structures and simple productivity checks for contact level service 
providers (initially in education with health now in progress). Mozambique's now national 
massive retraining of primary school teachers - delayed from 1975 to 1993 - was 
spearheaded by two Provincial Governor/Director of Education initiatives taken in their 
Provinces and only subsequently adopted by the Ministry, while on macro economic 
institutional restructuring Finance and Planning were coordinated/semi-integrated under 
one Minister and the duplicative and confusion producing Ministry of Cooperation was 
scrapped, whereas earlier UNDP provided studies proposed only marginal rationalisations 
in each of Finance, Planning, .Coordination and Foreign with no clear lead role nor 
practicable coordination mechanisms, apparently because of an inaccurate belief anything 
more would be politically impracticable. That belief was true in the short run, and perhaps 
in terms of external team proposals, but not over the medium term and in response to 
domestic senior public servant and political decision taker pressures because the problems 
of competitive duplication were permanent but the objections to change were much more 
transient and dissolved following peace and an election.
• Peace and Security is a universally stated point but rarely an articulated one. The
cost o f wars - highlighted initially by SADCC, UNICEF and ECA studies - is accepted.
So - perhaps less prominently - is that of high levels of social disorder and retreat of law 
and order short of war. In principle the survival to rehabilitation to development post-war 
continuum is also accepted, but it is not usually related in any coherent way to macro 
economic - or even macro political economic - goals. The governments of Mozambique,
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Ethiopia and - in a slightly different context - South Africa are notable exceptions in 
making such linkages. Given that about 20 African countries with over 250 million 
persons are in war - intense civil disorder - post-war patterns and several more are on the 
verge of entering at least the disorder phase, this appears a major conceptual as well as 
practical failure on the part of economists. Linked is law and order in the women in the 
field or the man in the shop's sense of ability to go about daily life without violent 
interference by anyone and with police/courts who do halt violence and act against 
violators with some efficiency and probity. The radical reaction against colonial "law and 
order states" - perhaps always more fervent at intellectual levels - has faded with the 
realisation that while law and order is never enough without it there is not likely to be 
much else.
• Physical Infrastructure restoration, modernisation, transformation is an area in which 
only minor disagreements as to pace and private sector role exist. Early SA - because of 
stress on fiscal imbalance reduction - had an uneven record (e.g. high priority from the 
start in Ghana but not in Kenya). Since 1989 the Bank has cited physical infrastructure 
and health/education as the sectors in which SSA resource allocation, primarily by the 
state, should double over a decade if competitiveness (at home and abroad) is to be 
achieved. The low level of debate on dominant state roles in most cases probably flows 
largely from the limited private sector interest - beyond telecommunications and South 
Africa - in the sector. Where public utilities are reasonably efficient in service delivery, 
profitable and can be financed on investment account via genuinely additional lending to 
the state (or the public enterprises) - e.g. electricity in East Africa - this is a pragmatic 
acceptance of reality. Where none of those characteristics apply - e.g. electricity in 
Nigeria - either radical public enterprise reform or partial sector opening up to private 
investment (beyond self help backup generators installed by users) would seem to deserve 
more attention. The trade-off is between potential efficiency and probity gains on the one 
hand and higher expected rates of return and risk premiums on the other - a balance highly 
sensitive to projected levels of cost overruns, corruption and inefficiency (financial and/or 
supply delivery) by public enterprises and regulators/licensers of private.
• Education and Health (with nutrition sometimes linked, albeit that topic seems to fit 
better under the poverty rubric) are now seen as priorities at two levels universal basic 
coverage and "centres of excellence" in tertiary education and research. A not atypical 
Bank review of a structural adjustment programme states "The challenge now is to 
improve the quality and coverage of education, health and nutrition, especially for the 
poorest." Contrary to popular impression, recent Bank global and SSA health studies call 
for broader state roles and more spending - only South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius are even near its proposed public sector coverage, resource
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allocation and quality guideline levels on macro data and these conceal highly unequal 
access and quality in South Africa, Namibia and - to a lesser extent - Zimbabwe.
However, agreement on priority - interestingly especially on universal access to basic 
services at no cost to absolutely poor users - does not result in clear articulation to agreed 
priority needs. External funders - not least the Bank - still place disproportionate weight 
on buildings and equipment and, often, virtually none on paying teachers, nurses and 
medical technicians (who in several cases receive $20-35 a month or well under half the 
household absolute poverty line) an adequate wage to achieve professionalism and 
productivity. Nor is the weakness of primary service provider training - especially in 
primary teaching - fully recognised as a programme and funding priority in those countries 
in which it is most severe (e.g. Angola, Mozambique). This somewhat skewed vision 
interlocks - at least at basic service levels - with the "user charge" debate. In many cases 
simple building and furniture construction and maintenance (including staff housing) plus 
provision of food (for staff, students, patients) would be more payer friendly, and probably 
more state budget friendly as well, than cash fees. Ethiopia - whose public service reforms 
are totally home grown - has begun selective use of housing provision (free or low rent) in 
rural areas and small towns; Ghana's functioning rural dispensaries have dispensers who 
receive food, help with growing food and sometimes house repairs in addition to (possibly 
in excess of) fees. Water is less commonly bracketed with health and education - albeit 
UNICEF and UNDP are exceptions and in Eastern and Southern Africa it is very high on 
users' (or potential users') priority lists. Still less common is focus on its gender impact - 
rural water collection often engrosses a very large share of women's and girl's time. In this 
case, because of rural time and urban low income area cash (to water peddlers) savings, 
potential user fees look more promising than for health (where point of use fees come 
when income is lowest) or education (where cash payment now for future higher earnings 
has a definite 'to him whose family hath shall be given' bias).
• Participation is a fairly general priority at slogan level. Reality is more than slightly 
different - or at least selective. For the World Bank and Ministries of Finance the main 
thrust is user (or at any rate non central government) participation in paying. This may 
well be useful - indeed necessary - in some cases and partnership arrangements in health 
and (less frequently) education between the state and the domestic social sector work well 
in several countries (e.g. Ghana, Namibia, Tanzania) and are being explored elsewhere 
(e.g. Mozambique). But it is hardly the whole of participation and to lead into broader 
user involvement requires keeping the finance at a local level and making service providing 
units user accountable. At the other extreme philosophically syndico anarchist bodies (e.g. 
Medicins Sans Frontieres - France) and hard line evangelising ones (e.g. World Vision) 
want to see the state out of basic services and - in practice - to substitute themselves as 
Platonic guardian experts. While the services may be very welcome (both examples are
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technically competent and dedicated) it is unlikely many ordinary Africans view them as 
participatory. Except for some State-Church (or occasionally Mosque) "joint ventures", 
participation in design, decision, operation and review - as will as funding - with serious 
user accountability is very unusual and has little applied academic or political base, despite 
domestic social sector (especially some women's groups, co-operatives and trade unions as 
well as churches and mosque) backing.
• Gender as an issue - or rather gender conscious design, pre implementation evaluation, 
operation and review - initially entered effective African development discourse from 
Northern NGOs and their influence on Nordic-Netherlands-USA-Canada bilateral agencies 
and subsequently on the World Bank. Before that African women's voices were rarely 
heard and their organisations even more rarely taken seriously. However, the catalytic 
external intervention has now linked to the - always present - potential African base to 
become an endogenous element. There are two very different approaches: a structure of 
women’s projects and institutions headed by a Ministry and a broader seeking to 
channel gender concerns into main line programmes. The record suggests that the 
first leads to underfunding and marginalisation ("dolls for the girls" as one critic put it) 
while the latter - unless overseen by powerful political backers and a serious analytical and 
gadfly unit - may have no impact at all. Articulation is frequently abysmal since 
knowledge of the complex multiple gender divided household time, work obligation, 
income retention right and supply (expenditure or provisioning) obligation budgets of 
African households is very rarely available in detail and still less frequently used by senior 
government officials centrally or locally. Nor are the gender implications of universal 
access (disproportionately beneficial to previously underrepresented), providing food and 
emergency jobs to earn for food to women, nearby water and fuel access (provisioning or 
buying being almost wholly on the female side of the gender division line) been adequately 
recognised, explained or acted upon.
• Ecology (or Environment - Physical and Human to use a broader and more ordinary 
African friendly concept) is another case in which initial - late - entry into development 
discourse in Africa was fuelled by bilateral agency and World Bank response to Northern 
NGOs. In this case the merging of this impetus with pre-existing African concerns is still 
tenuous and uneven. The reality that poverty (as well as greed and, indeed, much more so 
for poor people) erodes ecology because poor people cannot afford to do otherwise is 
inadequately grasped, even conceptually, let alone operationally. So is its complement - 
massive environmental protection (whether restoring tree and bush cover or guarding 
animal reserves from poachers) will not happen unless the desired actors gain by it.
An increasing awareness - among governments, donors, conservationists and even NGOs - 
does exist but one uncertain and incomplete enough that, to date, no articulated
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programme covering water - soil - vegetation - wildlife has been evolved at national level. 
The potential for contracts - e.g. reafforestation, bio diversity reserve protection, non-use 
of ozone layer killer chemicals for the costs of those programmes plus national ecological 
priorities, e.g. anti-desertification, air and water pollution reduction - with the North to 
help meet its priority global eco targets (ozone layer, global warming, bio diversity 
preservation, anti desertification) has not been explored seriously from either the donor or 
the African side.
• Poverty - or rather "poverty alleviation" or "absolute poverty reduction" - is a pervasive 
theme in World Bank analysis, operational directives, country papers (e.g. Mozambique 
has had two Priority Poverty Policy papers to its Consultative Group - both joint 
GOM/Bank products) and, much less uniformly or coherently, country programmes. The 
same can be said of some - not all - bilaterals and almost all UN Agencies (especially 
UNDP and UNICEF) and NGOs. Professional analysts - expatriate and African - are 
generally less at home with this priority and especially with articulating it to interact with 
other macro economic priorities. African government positions are very mixed. Some 
do have coherent anti poverty strategies - e.g. Mozambique and South Africa; more give 
clear priority to policies and resource allocations intended to reduce poverty but do not 
appear to have an integrated analytical or operational approach - e.g. Tanzania and 
probably Namibia and Botswana although the implicit strategic parameter set is clearer in 
their cases. A large group focuses on universal access to basic services (whose absence is 
a poverty component in common sense terms and ordinary African perceptions even if it is 
not captured by Household Budget Surveys) with tenuous - if any - links to 
complementary policies to enhance production by poor people. A not inconsiderable 
number show no evident political concern about or priority toward reducing absolute 
poverty. That a group is not limited to collapsed states and kleptocracies - e.g. Angola 
and Uganda fall into it, perhaps because of war time and post war survival priorities, as 
well as the Sudan, Zaire and Sierra Leone. In the cases of strategic analysis it is broadly 
agreed that three components are key (in ascending order);
a. safety net access provision (SNAP) both for survival in the case of natural calamities 
or man made catastrophes to make livelihood reconstruction possible (the dead have 
no temporal future) and to alleviate poverty for structurally poor households;
b. universal access to basic services (UABS) to increase present as well as future 
productively and welfare;
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c. production by poor people (PPP) access enhancement whether by improved physical 
and market infrastructure or wage employment friendly policies (e.g. labour intensive 
construction) or agricultural research focused on innovations user friendly to small 
farming households or financial mechanisms accessible to small and micro enterprises.
In practice the first two components have received far more attention and resources than 
the third and - despite its evident logic - relief through development linkage and 
coordination is a fairly recent concept and one still foreign to most external official 
resource providers and most (not all) African governments. That pattern replicates an 
earlier era's African strategic weaknesses - massive expansion of health and education 
services without parallel development of ways by which most households could raise their 
incomes (and not incidentally by doing so finance the UABS drive through indirect taxes 
on enhanced purchases). PPP tends to be even more ghettoised than gender related 
programmes (though in some cases larger) and it is hard to escape the impression that the 
World Bank, most bilaterals and most African governments do not really believe 
absolutely poor households can increase their output/productively enough, soon enough, 
to be a serious part of macro economic answers to present crises. Mozambique 
Reconstrucao proposals of 1993 took an opposite view and presented worked through 
sectoral and macro linkage estimates to defend that position, but failed to secure serious 
donor attention (let alone funding) whereas isolated, small employment creation and rural 
revival projects do get funded but as add ons to main resource allocations to large scale 
economic activity largely serving and employing less poor people.
• Transformation appears on most priority lists whether the World Bank's or those of 
ACDESS (African Centre for Development Economic and Strategic Studies) or IFAA 
(Institute For African Alternatives). However, despite its undoubted power as a 
mobilising slogan, it is rarely clear what the objective correlatives implied are (correlatives 
in the plural since one doubts they are the same in the Bank's model as in either ACDESS' 
or IFAA's). The possible common theme is a need for radical restructuring - especially 
of production, external trade (exports and imports), labour productivity, income 
distribution, the SNAP-UABS-PPP trio. Whatever else they have achieved or not 
achieved, Structural Adjustment Programmes have with rare exceptions (and these 
largely restoring past levels or dynamics as in Ghanaian gold mining and wood processing) 
have - at most - affected these structures marginally. In that sense transformation is an 
assertion that fine tuning and incrementalism within present economic structures (in real as 
well as monetary terms) is not and cannot be made to be adequate. That proposition 
appears correct - and lies at the base of the Bank's shift first to core S A plus and now to 
post SA. However, until it is articulated country by country and sector by sector, it is only 
symbolically functional.
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• Economic regionalism is a current priority agenda item in only one or one and a half sub- 
regions - Southern and, perhaps, Eastern Africa. The cases for integration are not 
seriously challenged, albeit neither the World Bank nor the ADB finds it easy to relate 
them to lending policy with about 1% clearly related to regionalism and 2% to 3% if 
projects conceived in regional linkage terms are included. Political and intellectual 
pronunicamentos are common - as they have been for a third of a century. But only in 
Southern Africa (now very much including South Africa) and via the SADC (Southern 
African Development Community) process have a political economic vision articulated to 
a - somewhat loose - cluster of sectoral policy packages and major projects achieved 
priority ongoing attention and resource allocation. Whether this is because SADCC is 
distinctly African and non-traditional (both as to initial focuses including food security and 
in recent initiatives to tackle interstate water rights tensions and allocations and to redefine 
security to include causal factors in a potentially operational way) or despite it, is debated. 
What is beyond doubt is that a vehicle for pursuing a broadening array of commonly 
perceived interest (including legitimate/elected governance, however loosely defined) has 
been forged and had the political sex appeal to be strengthened by the emergence of the 
New South Africa even though economic self protection against the Old had been its 
political leit motif for its first decade (as SADCC). In Eastern and Southern Africa the 
COMESA group has - more conventionally - attempted a trade and payments barrier 
reduction led integration process with some success, but has never gained comparable 
political mass partly because of an ill advised, personalised tendency to denigrate and to 
mount take-over bids for SADCC/SADC. Elsewhere in Africa - with tantalising but 
narrow and usually ephemeral exceptions - integration and regionalism have bleak records 
and are not closely linked to, nor influential on, national strategies.
• Macro economic good housekeeping (the author's term based on the Greek parent word 
for economics-aeconomia meaning good stewardship o f a household especially, but not 
only, its economic aspects) to preserve the unsustainable imbalance reduction gains of 
Structural Adjustment by aiming for budgetary, price (including exchange rate), wage, 
investment, savings, external account, basic services and nutrition balance and monitoring 
results leading to timely action to correct divergences before they lead to crises is 
perceived as necessary in one form or another by virtually all analysts. Whatever other 
lessons 1979-95 offers one is clear - early correction of growing imbalances before 
unsustainability threatens freefall is less damaging and faster than putting off 
corrective action until deep seated, full fledged crises have emerged. The World Bank an 
pre 1990 ECA, neo-liberal economists and radical African alternative academics are in 
agreement on that point. Debate centres on speed, timing, degree of risk of overkill to be 
accepted and appropriate instruments (e.g. whether 50% to 100% real interest rates 
imposed on government paper to suck in footloose financial capital - as frequently
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advocated/imposed by the IMF - is good housekeeping or exactly the reckless, short 
sighted folly of which - by different instruments - many SSA governments have been 
accused). In part the debate turns on contexts and perceptions - small, very open 
economies with low reserves, limited policy instruments and easy access to external credit 
only when they do not need it, arguably need to act faster on impending imbalances and to 
impose shorter bridging periods than larger more financially secure ones. The argument 
that this is unfair to small, open, weak economies (African or other) is valid but 
prudent housekeeping requires recognising realities - however unfair. That is a case 
for pressing for the IMF to end its abdication of its primary charter duty - providing 
bridging finance to adjust to or ride out exogenous shocks - but not one for using 
resources as if such restoration had, in fact, been achieved.
Whether all of these elements should be included and if so whether as driving forces or 
supporting elements is not agreed. Nor are there consensi either on sequencing and timing or 
on how much historic and other contextual factors should alter the makeup of strategic 
packages at any one time or over time. For example, has the tendency of SAPs to become 
more differentiated and less uniform in content and, even more, emphasis been a strength or a 
weakness?
Stanley Please's answer that the core requirements in strategy formulation and operation are:
1. to ask the right questions
2. to identify the key strategic components correctly
3. to have most policies reasonably close to an optimal range
4. and none precisely in the wrong direction as well as of a faulty order of magnitude
5. with secondary adjustment of policies and relationships routine, but massive 
uncertainty creating and dynamic halting 'back to the drawing board' exercises few 
and far between
is a healthy breath of realism and processual contextuality as well as a potentially operational 
check list. But it is usable only after agreeing on key components and directions.
Finally the discourse - official and academic, African and expatriate - has tended to put very 
httle emphasis on the socio political and socio economic processes of building broad, deep 
nd durable support bases for strategic change and for sticking to it. How to convince 
preneurs has received some attention - albeit the degrees of caution, of intense disquiet 
J ncertainties and of violent resistance to those aspects of liberalisation with specific
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negative consequences for particular enterprises have usually been grossly underestimated vide 
the weak and lagged response of enterprise and household investment to changes logically 
welcome to investors and even to negligible responses to several years of sustained output and 
- at least apparently - market growth. Equally there has been some attention to 'buying off 
potential opponents - especially public servants or enterprise employees "redeployed" into 
unemployment - often disingenuously labelled poverty reduction. But an almost unquestioned 
faith that the self evident validity of new strategies and the speed with which they would pay 
off widely and visibly would create its own support base has dominated much of the discourse.
The implicit Says law of political economic support - supply of good policies creates its own 
demand - and of an inversion of Gresham's Law - a good policy drives a bad policy out - 
require at the least, sceptical examination. One weakness of Structural Adjustment - 
especially beyond the few years during which ffeefall is halted and a modest revival secured - 
is precisely its lack of political sex appeal, perhaps especially starkly underlined in the 1996 
Benin election. Only a strategy which does assume central (public or private) planning, a 
policy illusion unconquered by experience (like a money illusion unconquered by inflation) and 
a passive, direction accepting public (as voters and as producers) which also acts productively 
and enthusiastically can logically treat broad understanding, acceptance and support as trivial. 
Those conditions are not consistent with flexibility, participation, market responsiveness nor 
with free and fair contested elections. This study can hardly attempt to provide answers to 
this bottom line political challenge - but it is important to pose the question.
This is especially true because in SSA the danger of over commitment of resources - in the 
sense of a national set of priorities allocations exceeding attainable levels of resources 
available for allocation - is especially acute. For example an economically as well as politically 
viable strategy for South Africa would appear to require 6% to 8% growth annually in total 
available resources. Unfortunately even with the political and economic structural adjustment 
attained over the past two years the realistic trend growth rate on present strategy is perhaps 
4%. The three simple answers to closing the gap are unsustainable economically as well as 
politically:
• allocating as if the 6% to 8% were available (or putting blind faith in external resource 
flows whether derived from investment expectations, foreign assistance, or high interest 
rates to suck in footloose financial capital) can lead only to unsustainable imbalances, 
stagnation or worse, tears and socio-political crises guaranteeing growth;
• concentrating entirely on output facilitation and enterprise freeing is unlikely to provide 
the infrastructure and skills needed for sustained competitiveness and, therefore, to fail in 
its own terms. Further by implying near nil growth in personal consumption and real 
wages, together with very slow improvement in access to basic services, it threatens
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political sustainability not simply at electoral level but also at that of achieving industrial 
relations in which the normal nexus of higher real wages linking in a positive spiral with 
higher productivity can be attained to replace its notable - though readily explicable - 
historic absence in apartheid South Africa;
• focusing on universal basic service access, physical infrastructure, housing and better 
industrial relations/productively in the large enterprise sector might generate 6% short 
term growth, but would be likely to do so only with unsustainable fiscal and external 
imbalances and - ironically - to bypass the lower income small and household enterprise 
sector productively and pay crises.
That this ultimately political economic problem can be posed so readily for South Africa does 
not mean South Africa is unique or even unusual in SSA. Rather there has been more analysis 
and discourse - extending well beyond government and university circles. The R and D Plan is 
an imperfect attempt to provide enough rapid and visible gains to poor people (including 
productively gains with positive macro linkages) to allow otherwise politically corrosive 
prioritisation of present output enhancing measures to finance medium term basic 
services/human investment and real wage/labour productively breakthroughs. But it is a 
serious effort, broadly in the right direction, flowing from asking the right question and 
listening to answers from a broad range of persons and groups. Its recent incorporation into 
the Ministry of Finance is - in the actual context - evidence of mainstreaming and coordination 
with other strategic goals. Most SSA states have yet to embark on that process in any serious 
sense. As originally envisaged, Ghana's PAMSCAD was a similar, if less ambitious, exercise. 
But its conversion into particular programmes and institutional structures resulted - probably 
unnecessarily, certainly expensively in political terms - in loss of a coherent political economic 
vision and of significant involvement of potential beneficiaries in design or revision.
V.
A R ecord  O f Un d er per fo r m a n c e: 1925-1995
Africa - especially SSA - has a poor overall growth record for at least three quarters of a 
century. The instances of spectacular growth - e.g. that of Ghana's cocoa/timber/gold 
economic core over 1891-1911, later replicated in the Cote d'Ivoire over 1960-1974 - are 
usually limited in space and time and represent initial "opening up" or "vent for surplus" 
booms which have then plateaued. The early 1920s may have been characterised by more 
general growth - in the context of more opening up and its Francophone "mise en valeur" 
parallel - but from the mid-1920s commodity and global recession, and later wartime transport
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and external finance constraints, led to negligible or negative growth beyond household self 
provisioning (so called subsistence). The 1950s efflorescence of colonial policy did produce 
fairly substantial physical infrastructure, output growth and human investment gains but from 
a very low base and by 1960 under pressure from the end of the Korean War commodity 
boom. The relevance of this period to detailed analysis of the present or future is probably 
fairly low. The broad record is relevant if only to demonstrate that independent African 
states have not reversed a high performance colonial record but, on balance, continued 
one of underperformance with achieved performance on balance higher, but targets even 
more so resulting in a higher ex post shortfall against ex ante targets. That conclusion is of 
but little comfort to ordinary Africans or to their analysts and political decision takers, but it is 
a caution against wholesale acceptance of external models and proposals let alone de 
facto  recolonisation whether by governments, agencies, enterprises or NGOs.
The independence period falls into three broad categories: Multi Year Planning from 1960 
through 1979 with a brief crisis management interregnum in 1974-75; Crisis Coping from 
1980 through the mid-1980s with a substantial number of surviving cases thereafter; 
Structural Adjustment under that rubric building up from 1983 to be dominant in 
perspective by 1985 and in number of countries practising it in one form or another soon 
thereafter. Today, SSA is at another transition point - in the Chinese saying "the mandate of 
heaven has been withdrawn" from SA but, as in 1979-82 with Planning, it is unclear what new 
strategic consensus paradigm will emerge.
Continental reflections - let alone econometric analysis - are hampered because in no period 
have all countries practised the dominant mode and because even among those which did so - 
or at least asserted they did - the degree of coherence and articulation varied tremendously. 
For example, Ghana from the overthrow of the Busia Government until the second Rawlings 
Administration (two decades) lacked any coherent - let alone consistent - economic policy and 
the same can be said of independent Zaire for over a third of a century. Statements existed, 
but without analysed, articulated substantive polices, let alone implementation.
Similar considerations apply to performance - in the first two periods, and to a lesser extent 
during the third as well, trend performance has varied greatly. For example, prior to the 
1990s both the Malagasy Republic and Ethiopia had near stagnant economies for almost 50 
years with growth circling around 2% a year, while from the mid-1960s through the 1970s 
many economies, e.g. Cameroon, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, were on 4% to 5% trends 
with blips related to weather or external crisis and a few - notably Botswana from the late 
1970s to the early 1990s - were on higher trends (10% in Botswana's case).
A parallel problem is the data base in respect to what are now seen as the two key economic 
indicators of performance. GDP Growth and Poverty. The data are weak, not necessarily
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comparable over time and even less comparable among countries. In the case of poverty this 
is compounded because until very recently poverty reduction was rarely highlighted as a 
separate target and even today the interaction of poverty targets and policies is rarely made 
explicit, especially in published documentation. These data issues are explored in more detail 
in the Annex.
A survey of 1960-1995 target rates of overall economic performance indicates that, with 
limited exceptions in the early 1960s and in early structural adjustment periods (taken country 
by country), 6% has been the standard growth target throughout. Sub targets for exports 
and imports are less frequent and less uniform but on balance appear to be slightly lower for 
the first and higher for the second. Except under SA (and not always then) government 
consumption and investment targets have apparently been systematically higher than for 
overall output growth.
Conceptually the overall growth target and the rising share of public sector spending were not 
unsound. 6% is not inherently an unattainable trend and, with 21/2% to 3% population growth, 
is needed to extend basic services, improve infrastructure, raise domestic savings to 20% and 
investment to 25% and have anything left for personal consumption growth. By 1989 in 
Sustainable Development, the Bank advocated doubling state health, education and 
infrastructure spending as a proportion of GDP. How closely these headline numbers were 
tied to project, programme and policy outcome projections is more problematic. The lower 
growth targets for export than for imports do suggest weak conceptualisation. Rising 
investment in SSA (indeed in the South generally) raises the import/GDP ratio more rapidly 
than domestic linkage development reduces it. Thus, unless an open-ended trade gap closed 
by external grants was seriously anticipated, these targets were inconsistent with sustained 
j balance in principle as usually subsequently verified in practice.
Performance has varied more by period - 3.5% to 4% in the 1960s; 1.75% to 2% in the 
1970s (with, however, about 5% over 1975-79); 2% in the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s. Against the backdrop of mid-1920s to mid-1940s near stagnation and average growth 
of perhaps 3% in the late colonial period, that implies an improved performance in the 1960s 
but one significantly below target. Following severe weakening in the early 1970s and falls 
during the 1974-1975 'first oil shock'/global economic environment crisis recovery briefly 
pushed performance to levels near targets but from 1980 it collapsed to one-third of target and 
has since remained stubbornly close to that level. That record does reinforce the modest claim 
(and implicit admission of its limitations) of then WB Vice President Jaycox on the occasion of 
the end of UNPAAERD that SA had halted ffeefall.
Economic Planning has its SA roots more in the colonial era than in Soviet experience. The 
Gold Coast (in the 1920s) and the Belgian Congo (from the late 1920s) had coherent strategic
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plans with key policies, projects and sectors targeted. These did provide a framework for 
overall state resource allocation (briefly prior to cocoa price declines for the Gold Coast and 
for 30 years in the Congo). Late colonial planning after 1945 can be described as "shopping 
list", but in many cases sectoral and policy priorities either shaped or were superimposed on 
the project lists. Macroeconomic frameworks were introduced in Francophone Africa - but 
unlike their analogues in French post-war planning, bore only a tenuous relationship to 
policies and projects because the monetary, fiscal and state enterprise levers used in France 
were much weaker in the colonies.
Early independence planning clearly rested on the colonial base but sought to be more in
four senses:
a. a macroeconomic apparatus was introduced with greater or less iterative articulation 
among macro and sectoral;
b. all key sectors in which state action was intended were covered;
c. policies were given a larger role and - in principle at least - guided project selection, albeit 
they were rarely elaborated in published Plan documents;
d. multi (usually five), years were taken as the basic policy/project/resource allocation frame 
- itself a continuation of the colonial evolution from annual budgeting to three year 
(sometimes in principle rolling) planning.
Whether 5 Year Plans symbolised a more interventionist economic policy perspective is 
problematic. Colonial economic policy, whatever else it might have been, was very rarely 
laissez faire. However, one difference is real - colonial planning was territorial and ultimately 
an extension of metropolitan objectives, whereas independence planning was national and 
accountable primarily to citizens, or at least to those with significant influence within states. 
That distinction is a continuing one: no externally dominated economic strategy can be 
primarily nationally accountable. EFIs, UN Agencies, bilateral aid agencies, external NGOs 
and enterprise investors are accountable to quite different primary constituencies than are 
individual African governments.
Public sector investment dominance was reinforced and extended to directly productive 
enterprises (more specifically industry, mining and - in some cases - plantations) rather than 
created. Because infrastructure (including power) was almost all public sector in colonial 
Africa, the increase in state share of fixed investment turned as much on higher 
investment/GDP ratios as on the sectoral expansion of state owned activities. Indeed, colonial 
era state investment in mining and manufacturing was not uncommon just as independent hard
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line capitalist states (e.g. Rhodesia, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya) often had large to 
dominant shares in many mining, manufacturing, financial and large scale agricultural ventures.
Despite verbal glosses, planning was - with rare, late exceptions, e.g. Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea Bissau, post 1974 Ethiopia - not socialist in the Central and Eastern European sense. 
Material balances planning (or even cross-checks on monetary balances to test physical 
plausibility in key cases) was notable by its near total absence - indeed that was also true of 
Angolan, Mozambican and Bissauan planning. Dominance of large scale production by public 
enterprises was a common outcome, but more in response to perceived (and historic) private 
sector unwillingness to invest in rapid growth and transformation than to ideological concerns. 
Instruments used to influence both public and private enterprise decisions were largely market 
(protection, interest rate, taxation) and shareholder supervision (usually split between 
Treasuries and sectoral parent ministries) ones, not detailed bureaucratic code based 
commands.
The quality of analysis, consistency of articulation and rigour or relating policy to programme 
to project varied widely. Until the early 1970s on balance it improved. Monitoring and 
overall performance evaluation were much weaker and showed little or no trend improvement. 
Indeed, evaluation of performance against plan is a near blank area - neither governments 
(even as part of subsequent plan formulation) nor academicians have given it significant 
priority.
In the case of monitoring, the basic reason is that Planning tended to be handled by separate 
central institutions up to Plan adoption, but its resource allocations and project monitoring 
(plus policy outcome monitoring in some cases) shifted to annual budgets and Ministries of 
Finance (another divergence from the Soviet pattern). Treasury monitoring flowed from 
colonial Audit - primarily propriety of releases and uses - and was rarely analytically or 
physical outcome oriented.
Consecutive Plans did not result in earlier Plan performance evaluation - nor in much 
alteration of the standard 6% growth target. The reasons appear to be threefold:
a. Data on outcomes during the second half of plan periods was not available during 
preparation of the next Plan;
b. Changes in policy - and more particularly chopping and changing in resource allocations 
both from budgetary constraints and from 'unplanned' political priorities, made direct 
relationship rather problematic as did the impact of exogenous events, especially droughts 
and bumper harvest years as well as terms of trade bust and booms;
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c. Plans - like subsequent SA programmes - regularly underestimated time lags from policy 
and programme enunciation to operational articulation through resource deployment to 
project completion and performance impact. This was evident in reviewing results - albeit 
that was at best inadequately included in new Plans - but no systematic way of handling or 
interpreting lags was ever devised during this period or, indeed, subsequently.
Performance on goals beyond overall growth was also mixed and usually below target. Food 
security at national level was rarely an explicit target before the mid to late 1970s because it 
was rarely perceived as a secular problem. In general terms most Plans postulated (rather than 
programmed for) domestic food production to rise slightly faster than population with any 
gaps to be met by commercial imports and/or drought year food aid. Until the mid-1970s this 
approach appeared to work in Eastern, Southern and North Africa. That it did not in West 
Africa which was afflicted by an apparent climatic cycle change (lower and more uneven 
rainfall from the early 1960s) was not evident at the time, even though subsequent data 
evaluation shows a 2% or less 1960s and a still lower 1970s domestic food output trend - a 
situation which generalised to most of SSA from the mid-1970s with the probable exception 
of Southern Africa (including Tanzania whose domestic food production trend from 1961 
onward appears to have been 3% to 3.5% or about 1% to 1.5% per capita when periods are 
chosen to measure average growth across drought cycles). Data remain very poor because 
estimation both of self-provisioning (household produced and consumed food) and of small 
scale local sales is very weak. 'Automatic' increases linked to assumed population growth 
have largely vanished from national accounts, but their successors - formulas to guess total 
commercialised food (usually linked to outdated estimates of urban population and equally 
dated assumptions rural household do not buy staple or other domestic food) and eyeball 
output estimates by district agricultural officers are often not much better.
Poverty reduction has been an implicit - and at overall statement level explicit - theme in 
African planning. However, in many plans its articulation went little beyond assuming 
national output per capita growth, more access to basic services and rural 
infrastructure would have spread and trickle down dynamics benefiting urban (a relatively 
small proportion of total until the 1980s) and rural poor households. Policies and projects 
were not subjected to poverty impact assessment, proportions of absolutely poor households 
set or outcomes monitored. Indeed, formal poverty mapping and poverty reduction 
orientation date - rather oddly - to the SA not the Planning period.
On the fragmentary data available, it would appear that in the 1960s the proportion of 
households in absolute poverty declined moderately to - say - 25% with little change in the 
1970s. In each period there was a wide dispersion of levels and trends. For example, in 
Tanzania the absolutely poor proportion was estimated at 40% in the late 1960s and again in
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the early 1990s - probably with a secular improvement to 1979 and a decline to 1985 hidden 
within the 'stability' and with sharp short term swings related to drought cycles and 
effectiveness of food safety nets (after 1979 closely linked to food aid availability).
However, in general inequality rose - overall, urban/rural, intra-urban and intra-rural. With 
successive, comparable, even vaguely reliable national budget studies about as common as 
unicorns, any generalisations are necessarily built from a few pieces of jigsaw puzzles with 
heavy judgmental and perceptional elements. Two key factors in growing inequality were 
Africanisation and inter-zonal variations. Independence increased the range of African 
occupations. As more politicians, senior public servants and enterprise employees, medium 
and large scale business owners and commercial farmers became African, the African income 
distribution became more unequal even if the territorial remained unchanged. Geographically 
the urban/rural and intra-rural differentiations grew partly because of urban economic 
modernisation and diversification and partly because rural access to markets, infrastructure 
and services became radically more unequal not as a result of absolute worsening in peripheral 
(geographically, economically and/or politically) areas but of very uneven allocation of 
enhanced infrastructure and services.
Apparently poverty reduction and inequality performance (stated in equity and limiting 
inequality not Utopian egalitarian terms except for universal basic service access) were 
strategy and policy influenced. For example, late 1960s and 1970s Tanzania survey analysis 
- while somewhat problematic - suggests:
a. some reduction in absolute poverty;
b. lower overall inequality;
c. lower intra-urban inequality;
d. arguably lower intra-rural inequality.
Neither - weaker - Malawi nor Kenya data suggest similar trends on inequality nor percent of 
households in absolute poverty albeit - like Tanzania - average real consumption per 
household taken nationally rose over the period.
Tanzania had placed great stress on universal primary service access (not least rural water), 
infrastructure build-up in all districts, limits in (then controlled) wage and salary differentials, 
raising producer prices more rapidly than wages and ensuring (indeed subsidising) market 
access in peripheral rural areas. Despite unequal implementation and evident inefficiencies, 
these policies appear to have had an impact - perhaps confirmed by evidence urban 'informal 
sector incomes appeared to track the official minimum wage while secondary and amenity 
food grower prices appeared to rise at least as rapidly as official staple food ones. Arguably
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they related to a tradition of contested (even if one party) elections in which dissatisfied 
constituents did retire about a quarter of MPs (usually including some Ministers) at each 
election.
The crisis coping (or failing to cope) period is, as noted, harder to define temporally. In most 
o f SSA a crisis management mode was adopted, reasonably successfully, in the 1974-75 
period reverting to planning until about 1980. From 1980 until sustained SA programming 
began, crisis coping was (is) dominant. Cross country non-uniformity is illustrated by Zambia. 
Real copper prices never recovered after 1974 so that crisis management slid into continued 
crisis coping. Pre-1991 SA programmes were brief, unsustained and punctuated by attempted 
reversions to planning which quickly dissolved into crisis non-coping. 1991-96 has seen a 
sustained SA strategy but one with sustained 1% to 1.5% real per capita GDP decline so that 
it partakes as much of modified crisis coping as of standard SA which normally (and in intent) 
achieves a halt to per capita decline trends within two years.
In a majority of cases, 1974-75 crisis management involved a package of constraints on 
spending and of financing what were -accurately - perceived as stochastic (e.g. drought) and 
cyclical (terms of trade) deficits that would prove largely self-reversing. The expenditure 
constrictions (relative to previous growth and sometimes absolutely in constant price terms) 
varied in target. Tanzania, for example, sought to maintain fixed investment, basic service 
staff and operating supplies build-up while deferring maintenance and all 'optional' recurrent 
spending while some other countries put the bulk of cuts on capital project spending.
Financing packages included the special IMF 'oil' facility, some enhancement of IDA 
disbursements, food aid, external commercial bank borrowing (eased by the petro dollar 
surplus in Northern financial institutions) and on occasion (and unwisely) building up 
commercial and debt service arrears. Parallel domestic borrowing increases varied widely as a 
proportion of additional financing and - because both interest rate and credit allocation 
policies varied - even more in impact on inflation and enterprise investment. Similarly the mix 
between aid import restrictions, arrears and devaluation varied sharply in respect to external 
account crisis management. For example, Tanzania devalued modestly, financed substantially, 
restricted imports sharply for 18 months followed by another 18 of phased decompression and 
avoided arrears while Zambia's financing was dominated by arrears and eschewed devaluation.
Because of the availability of finance and recovery - for most exports and from drought - the 
majority o f these approaches did not run into sustained high inflation, import strangulation or 
unmanageable deferred expenditure and did lead back into rapid 1975-79 growth. In many 
cases that growth was fuelled by high levels of external borrowing - part of it commercial bank
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borrowing, including by private and state enterprises backed by state or state owned bank 
guarantees. With low initial external debt service commercial banks - awash with petro dollars 
- in some cases virtually took position "if it moves lend to it".
With the 1979-80 "second oil shock" a substantial number of states tried to rerun 1974-75 
crisis management. In a few cases (e.g. Mauritius) this did work because a rapid export 
recovery (in the Mauritius case the take off of labour only enclave manufacturing following a 
decade of gestation) was achieved. In others the sudden caution of banks (especially after 
1982 Mexican debt crisis) and the determination of OECD countries to put inflation squeezing 
ahead of output growth or employment protection - with the consequential absence either of 
special, soft IMF bridging finance or a terms of trade recovery - meant that crisis management 
rapidly unravelled into crisis coping in a constantly deteriorating situation.
Because the goal was (at least at the start) bridging over or riding out, fiscal and forex deficits 
were allowed to rise with lending and import controls used to avert full inflationary or 
capital/intermediate goods scarcity. When expected external soft bridging finance and export 
price recovery failed to materialise, the degree of overvaluation and of money creation (or 
enterprise squeezing) borrowing as well as of unserviceable debt was already out of hand and 
freefall threatened. This was true even of previously fiscally cautious states. For example, 
Tanzania had its first recurrent budget deficit in a decade and a half in 1978-79, its first 
commercial external payments arrears in 1979-80 and its first debt service arrears in 1980-81. 
With the failure of a 1980-81 attempt to secure Fund and Bank backing for a rebalancing 
programme focused on processed export expansion and fiscal correction by expanding the 
revenue base, modest 1979 overvaluation exploded to over 100% by 1982 and inflation from 
i under 10% in 1976-78 to the 25% to 30% range. Successive fiscal and import tightening
(including several small devaluations) averted collapse, but not 7% real output fall over 1979- 
83. Drastic 1984 austerity measures restored 1% to 2% growth but with no real plugging of 
external imbalance and at the price o f 40% inflation. Many countries" crisis coping attempts 
, were notably less 'successful'.
1
For this period (1981-85) African growth averaged below 2%. Flowever, even more than for 
most periods that average is deceptive. Crisis coping economies on balance had -2% to 1% 
growth, i.e. -2% to -5% per capita and were running out of ways to defer payment for imports 
levels often already so low as to strangle output and export recovery.
SSA food production growth was probably negative in several years over 1979-1985,
albeit the extreme results relate to interaction of drought and economic crisis or of those two 
with war in Southern Africa and the Horn. Interact because in the absence of economic crises 
var) prior droughts had been managed with much less severe consequences.
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Income distribution results are unclear. Probably crises narrowed urban/rural gaps because 
of food scarcity, but in an 'all boats sink faster' context that was little comfort. Access to 
manufactured goods and to public services decayed rapidly from the periphery (including the 
ex urban new settlements around cities as well as outlying rural areas) inward to the centre. 
Together with the inability to sustain physical food supplies and in several cases intensified 
war, these clearly increased absolute poverty even if no consecutive survey household studies 
are available to document how much. In addition - taken together with two decades of urban 
drift - they created substantial permanent urban poor groupings which had (with the 
exceptions o f Ethiopia, Egypt and Morocco) been either absent or very small relative to all 
absolutely poor households as late as the mid-1970s.
That was the backdrop to Structural Adjustment. It too has a prehistory. From the late 
1970s the Bank had become uneasy with SSA project lending. Internal reviews suggested 
poor project results often related to poor macro contexts, so that improvement was unlikely to 
be achieved through a focus limited to the projects themselves. Meanwhile African states 
were concerned (as the result of very low pre-oil shock 1970-73 growth) that no 
breakthrough to a 6% growth trend was being achieved and requested the Bank to do a study 
on how to achieve and to sustain such accelerated development. The result was the 1981 
Berg Report Agendas For Action.
Agetidas For Action is not important because it set a permanent new framework for Bank 
policy. Arguably the Togo and Malagasy Republic programmes beginning at the end of the 
1970s were more austere and balance restoration focused than either the Berg Report or 
subsequent SA programmes. Further, by 1985 the Bank had begun to stress that successful 
structural adjustment had to be socio economically positive in impact (with Ghana's 1986 
PAMSCAD the clear symbol), by 1989 that SA was a starting point from which to restart long 
term forward progress (Toward Sustainable Development) and by 1990 that absolute poverty 
reduction was a priority goal (WDR 1990 but also 1992-93 appearance of an implementation 
directive and a "How To" handbook for staff use). Long before then the chief author of 
Agendas, Eliot Berg, had denounced both the evolution and the initial report.
However Agendas was - and is - important.
a it underlined the Bank's determination to re-focus on macroeconomic strategy i
especially fiscal, monetary and trade policy because a deteriorating economic environment : 
made all (or almost all) projects under-perform; i
b. while representing a verbal and - to a much more limited extent actual - conversion to
neo-liberalism as preached in Washington, London and Bonn;
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c. taking the form of calling for reduced state roles, albeit by 1990 this had come to mean 
less intrusive regulation, an enterprise friendly climate, withdrawal from production 
beyond public utilities and focusing more resources on broader and deeper performance of 
priority functions the private sector could or would not provide notably basic services and 
infrastructure;
d. and seeking to create a consensus of official resource providers partly to ensure non­
adjusters could not evade the Bank's views by turning to bilateral sources (a piece of 
interventionist monopsonist cartel building somewhat at odds with its commitment to 
market competition) and partly to assist countries who found multiple, divergent resource 
provider conditionalities frustrated any coherent action.
These elements in the Bank's approach have endured Indeed they are likely to inform its 
views on what strategic approach should follow structural adjustment. The quid pro quo for 
the Bank's remarkably successful consensus building with bilaterals (and in practice UNDP 
and most other UN agencies - resulting in UNICEF becoming the surprising spokesperson for 
unorthodox Structural Adjustment) was - at least until mid-1990s - reluctance to push hard on 
issues such as external debt writedown and the overkill growth in expatriate personnel 
provision. On both Bank views notably diverged from a de facto bilateral (and on the 
technical assistance front UN agency) consensus. A surprising side gain was a willingness - 
especially behind the scenes but increasingly quasi publicly - to diverge from the IMF, always 
in favour of more attention to rapid growth restoration, public service maintenance and 
flexibility on monetary and fiscal policy reform tempo and instruments. The divergence is not 
surprising - macro monetary stabilisation over 18 to 36 months is inherently different from 
, phased real economy imbalance reduction (including by increasing inflows) to manageable 
levels and restoration of growth within 18 months. What is surprising is the Bank's increased 
willingness to push its position up to the point (but not beyond) of near open public dissent.
African country response to SA was initially largely negative. This related in part to tone 
and to rhetoric and to the unfortunate style, characteristic of the Bank, of always knowing 
better even when its new proposals reverse those it - as much as the SSA state - had backed a 
few years earlier. In addition, states were unwilling to accept how much more economically 
unfriendly to SSA the 1980s (and 1990s) were to be than the 1960s and 1970s. The SSA 
states had asked for the study in 1989, after all, to advise how to speed up and deepen growth, 
not to revert to managing low growth following severe austerity. A senior official of a well 
performing economy (which did not then or subsequently need an SA programme) was rather 
typical in saying "We asked for a loaf of bread and they chucked a stone at us!".
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The acceptance of Bank crafted programmes had four interlocking causes:
a. deteriorating crisis coping threatened to collapse into freefall unless more external 
resources could be secured. Given the donor consensus, that was not practicable without 
a Bank/Fund approved SA programme,
b. the clear likelihood of continuation of low Northern growth, stagnant official transfers 
and poor trade results convinced a number of African policy makers and analysts that 
radical austerity was necessary and would be less difficult if Bank backing led to 
augmented external resource provision;
c. some African analysts and economic ministers favoured (or came to favour) a neo­
liberal approach (or its ultra orthodox Marxian cousin) and sought external allies to win 
their domestic dialogues;
d. domestically crafted structural adjustment programmes even if incorporating many of 
the Bank's themes (e.g. Tanzania in 1984 and Zimbabwe 1984-89) were unacceptable 
even as a basis for negotiation and even if successful (e.g. Zimbabwe 84-89). At least until 
the 1990s, this remained the case despite the Bank's increasing (and by no means purely 
verbal) calls for African "ownership" of SAPs.
The last serious African challenge to the Washington consensus on SA was the African 
Priority Programme for Economic Reconstruction (APPER) brokered by ECA. When the 
UN Special Session turned it into a UN programme for Africa (UNPAAERD) and donors 
allocated resources via Bank led consultative groups with little evident relation to APPER's 
strategy let alone component projects that challenge (as well as substantial continuing interest 
in UNPAAERD) died. APPER was a modified version of 1974-75 coping writ large on the 
external and fiscal fronts. Additional net transfers were sought primarily to renovate and 
extend infrastructure (international public works in the short run and productivity raising 
capacity building in the long). However, this strategy was not as clearly spelled out as it might 
have been nor were the country articulated components frilly comparable with each other or 
with the strategy. That led to criticism of APPER as a "beggars wish list". While probably 
fair comment on some country submissions, that is a serious misreading of the overall UNEC4 
thrust. ECA's 1985 African Alternatives (AAFSAP) did up to a point keep discussion alive - 
as did UNICEF s 1987 Adjustment With A Human Face. But AAFSAP in fact overlaps actual 
SAPs in respect to the bulk of us proposals and the balance are largely directed to aspects of 
malgovemance by Africans. There is divergence on market management versus market non­
intervention, but AAFSAP is ill-served by the most prominent concrete example posed - 
multiple exchange rates - and by its root and branch theological objection to altering - let 
alone allowing market forces to alter - the price of foreign exchange (devaluation).
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UNICEF's manifesto was more influential because it was overtly revisionist rather than 
oppositionist, sought to add to SA not to derail or curtail it and was from a source the Bank 
could neither ignore nor patronise as it tended to do with ECA. The main themes were the 
priority economic as well as social need to strengthen basic services (human investment), the
moral economy and market need to combat absolute poverty and the need for strong,
5 .adequately staffed and financed state action to achieve the prior two goals. To a large extent
the Bank (and some bilaterals) accepted these criticisms and did seek to modify their
approaches to SA to include them, albeit with mixed and usually limited results.
The Lagos Plan o f Action and the Abuja (Common Market) Treaty of 1980 and 1990 
respectively are sometimes perceived as alternatives to Structural Adjustment. On the face of 
it that perception appears odd. Since Lagos precedes Agendas, it can be treated as a path not 
followed superseded by crisis coping and then by SA. Because - except for a very detailed 
section on the mechanics of common market crafting - it is a strategic vision with very limited 
articulation and at no point focuses on imbalance reduction or economic good housekeeping
I that interpretation is almost certainly ex post except in the sense that continuing short term 
crisis coping for survival crowds out long term allocations for development. At the time 
Lagos was seen as a twenty year continental exercise in strategic planning - judging by the 
inordinate but rather pedestrian and ill chosen detail - focused on a common market almost in 
a revised Nkrumaist mantra "Seek ye first the Kingdom of the Continental Common Market 
and all else shall be added unto you". Abuja focuses exclusively on sub-regional to continental 
common market building not on overall strategy nor domestic political economy. It can be 
faulted for acontextuality and unrealism as to time tabling - certainly no progress has been 
made at continental level while sub-regional progress has been almost exclusively in Eastern 
and (especially) Southern Africa. But in respect to SA the relevant point is that the Bank has 
never opposed economic integration - in principle quite the contrary. Like the OAU/ECA 
tandem (and the ADB at least on its lending side) it has been unable to devise a coherent set of 
national - Sub Regional policy interactions or a relevant lending programme, but to set up SA 
and regional economic integration as inherently competitive strategic approaches is 
misleading
Given the degree of external prescription - especially Bank but in some sectors (notably 
exchange rate policy sometimes including interest rates on government paper) the Fund - it is 
sometimes argued that SA period performance may be in Africa but is not by African states. 
That view of S A as recolonisation (a view held by some external and not a few domestic 
commentators) appears both overstated and contrary to Bank as well as African government 
ent. ( ertainly the post 1980 period has been characterised by more external designing, less 
willingness to discuss African initiated strategic frameworks nationally (sub-regionally SADC 
has swam successfully against this tide) and more mandated provision of expatriate personnel
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both in separate technical assistance projects and embedded in capital projects. But the shifts 
have not been uniform and it is fair comment that African states had from the early 1980s until 
the 1990s virtually ceased to put up strategic frameworks of their own to set the parameters 
for discussion and - even when energetic in seeking to influence agreed state/donor packages - 
tended to respond reactively to outside (usually Bank) proposals rather than to propose pro­
actively.
Five elements in the unbalanced, external agenda framed dialogue on SA:
1. states who are - or are perceived to be - in broad agreement with the "Washington 
consensus" on SA have had increasing freedom to design their own next tranches and/or 
to incorporate non-standard elements, e.g. Ghana from PAMSCAD onward;
2. but these which bargain hard at the start and are suspected of being less than wholehearted 
have faced what the Bank views as gradual phasing in, and the African states as creeping 
incremental conditionality, e.g. Tanzania and, especially, Kenya;
3. While - up to a point - states with special concerns and articulated positions on them can 
secure their incorporation in Consultative Group submissions. Mozambique illustrates this 
in respect to priority toward mainstreaming poverty reduction (accepted and pushed by the 
Bank) and - as to limits - refocusing overall reconstruction after war on production in rural 
areas largely by small farming households (largely ignored despite articulated proposals 
over eight years);
4. until the 1990s national alternative framework agendas were unacceptable - e.g.
Zimbabwe's successful 1984-89 home-grown SA turning on raising capacity utilisation and 
containing excess demand in the context of a full scale war (a situation which has, 
historically, been inconsistent with either a balanced recurrent budget or full scale 
liberalisation globally, not just in SSA). There has been a subtle shift over the past five 
years. Namibia, Ethiopia and South Africa do not have formal SA programmes and each 
has some unusual medium term poverty reduction and/or public services focused strategic 
thrusts. However, the Bank has accepted their political economic approaches as a basis 
for cooperation and worked as closely with them as with most formal SAP operators. 
Sub-regionally the only case of a strategic agenda posed to the international community as 
a basis for ongoing collaboration/resource allocation is that of SADCC/SADC. In this 
case - partly because of political considerations in the case of bilaterals and partly because j 
there is no operational Washington consensus on sub-regionalism - the bilateral, Bank and j 
international agency response has been positive and largely within the parameters for s 
dialogue put forward by the African side.
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'Ownership' has been and remains a vexed - and vexing - issue. The Bank has consistently, 
and increasingly forcefully, said it wished to see African SA proposals and to act through 
discussions based on these and by supporting elements within them with which it concurred 
rather than by continuing to serve as architect-in-chief. However, most African governments 
(and almost all African intellectuals) view those assertions with substantial to total scepticism. 
Why?
a. unless a country gets a draft Policy Framework paper or a Consultative Group 
presentation draft in early, the Bank will produce one itself thus setting the broad 
negotiating parameters;
b. the time allowed by the Bank for states to put forward amendments to drafts is usually 
i very limited (much less than it allows itself) and transparency (i.e. discussion among a
broad circle of decision takers and analysts let alone public dialogue) is distinctly 
discouraged;
c. while government amendments are read and sometimes incorporated, it is sometimes true 
s that three successive clearly argued requests for alteration result not simply in an
e unchanged text but in no indication by the Bank why it does not wish to change (albeit 
il pure inertia quite often seems to be the reason);
d. Bank professionals - especially less senior ones and consultants - often give the impression 
of massive arrogance and minimal local contextual knowledge (a critique even more 
generally directed at the Fund). While this may often be appearance rather than reality,
d and there have been improvements in style in this respect, the wide resentment resulting 
from the perception is a fact.
Criticising the Bank's (and a fortiori the Fund's) difficulty in giving serious attention to 
non-standard African proposals does not imply all of them have been sound or should have 
been agreed. Indeed, on the basis of substance it can be argued that the Bank has - at least 
since the late 1980s - been middle of the road on speed, toughness, poverty aspects. The 
Fund has always been more 'big bang' oriented and inclined to insist on draconic anti recurrent 
budget deficit or inflation reduction measures whatever their causes and the social or short to 
medium term growth costs of draconic monetary and fiscal compression. The Bank has not.
In at least two cases (Malawi under the former President and Zimbabwe over 1992-95) the 
Bank has (with limited success) pushed for less wage compression and both more secure 
safety nets and larger poverty alleviation programmes. In Zimbabwe it appears to have been
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appalled at treating drought relief (and revenue shortfall) deficit impact as analogous to excess 
demand creation for the purposes of fiscal and monetary austerity and at cutting of Social 
Dimensions Programming in the face of drought linked absolute poverty increases.
In the case of Mozambique the cleavage has been between the Bank, most bilaterals and the 
Government o f Mozambique on the one hand and the Fund on the other. 1995 saw successful 
tight monetary and fiscal policy and - including aid, but also export growth - a sustainable 
external account position. However, the inflation/devaluation cycle did not improve markedly. 
Why is unclear, a) expectations? b) diversification of assets by domestic businesspersons? c) 
use of Maputo (the easiest place in Southern Africa to acquire hard currency notes legally and 
at no premium) to supply illegal economic enterprise elsewhere in the region? The Fund's 
preferred prescription of cutting basic service restoration and physical post-war rehabilitation 
spending even if fully funded by non-inflationary domestic sources plus soft aid was rejected 
by the EU, most bilaterals, the Bank and the GOM- apparently successfully. Certainly the 
initial response (and responsibility) was that of the GOM; the present point is that the Bank 
agreed and said so to both GOM and the bilaterals.
The argument is not that Bank perceptions are always wrong or always more restrictionist 
than African. It is that African states - by being too responsive and too little pro-active - 
and the Bank (as well as EU, bilaterals, the Fund) - by being too ready to put up overall 
proposals and to appear (whatever the reality) unwilling to enter into serious dialogue 
beyond their own agendas - have created a dysfunctional (for all parties) dialogue and 
negotiating framework.
The way out o f that cul-de-sac is assuredly not to criticise SA per se or to launch tirades at the 
Bank. Rather it is to put reasoned redevelopment with good housekeeping proposals on
the table as a basis for strategic and operational dialogue. Helping SSA governments who 
bear the primary responsibility to do so is first and foremost a duty of the ECA, the ADB, 
African intellectuals and domestic social sectors plus national business communities.
Expecting 'like minded' bilaterals, UN agencies or friendly expatriates to do so on behalf of 
Africa and Africans is unlikely to work and is also an abdication of responsibility - these 
should be supporting (or critical) actors responding to proposed strategies and parameters.
Results in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s have improved only 
marginally over the 1970s as a whole and the first half of the 1980s while remaining 
stubbornly below both the second half of the 1970s and SA's own 4%+ overall growth targets 
let alone the 6% generally sought by African decision takers.
The first half of the 1980s probably saw the trough of GDP growth - perhaps 1.5%-1.75% 
with the second half showing some recovery but only 2.25%-2.5%. The first half of the 1990;
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show a fallback to about 2%. All of these rates are below population growth. However, there 
is very considerable scatter by country and by year. The former roughly relates to policy - at 
least in the sense of having implementable policies which in practice has usually meant SA - 
but the latter and to a considerable extent the former, relates to external climates with terms of 
trade and weather better in 1986-90 than in 1981-85 or 1991-95 and the peace gains in 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa in the 1990s at best ameliorating the overall 
terms of trade and debt overhang impact except in the case of Ethiopia which has pushed 
growth to a 4% to 5% trend (about twice any prior period)..
Food production has been erratic. If may have increased to a trend 2% to 2.25% compared 
to 1.75% in the 1970s. That is within the margin of error of the data. First drought cycles are 
unstable (whether secularly worsening or not is unclear) and the second half of the 1980s was 
a relatively benign period overall. Second, some agricultural output estimates are little better 
than randomly selected telephone book numbers as to absolute magnitude and even the best 
appear to be sticky not swinging up or down enough because area estimation is stronger than 
that of output per area unit. That however does not hide two stark realities:
a. population growth averages are probably in the 2.75%-3.00% range (albeit they may 
well be inflated at present because of a comparable stickiness in projection related 
estimation);
b. average shortfall from basic nutritional standards is now about 20% after food imports 
and would - for SSA - be about 30% without them.
To cover the needs of increasing numbers of people and to wipe out the average shortfall over 
15 to 20 years would require 4% growth rates of food production - approximate doubling.
The Bank is brutally honest in concluding that whatever else SA has achieved there has been 
no significant correlation with growth of domestic food production. That is not an entirely 
surprising conclusion. Overall 1970s food production trends bore limited relation to real 
official crop prices (10% explanatory power for agriculture overall and probably 0% for 
domestic food production).
Poverty changes since 1980 are unclear but almost certainly negative both as to proportion 
in absolute poverty (estimated at 30% by the Bank in 1990) and depth of poverty. That 
trend has apparently been worse in countries without coherent policies but the most evident 
and extreme losers are victims of war and those of drought ratchet effects when wiped out 
livelihoods (especially of pastoralists) proved non-restorable with a resultant upsurge in 
landless' (even if the real loss was often the capital stock to use the land) labourers and in 
urban (or ex urban township) absolutely poor households.
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Because the new absolute poor are - wherever now resident - primarily of rural origin their 
increase as a share of population is probably linked to low growth of food production. The 
basic income - including self provisioning - of poor and/or vulnerable (but not initially 
absolutely poor) small family farming households is domestic food. For them grains 
(especially maize), livestock and root crops are the most common main cash crops. Low 
output growth - exacerbated by war and drought but also from population growth reducing 
farm size and/or pushing the cropping and grazing frontiers on to poorer and more drought 
vulnerable land - tends to result in more need to buy food, lower nutritional levels and less 
cash income which beyond some point forces temporary or permanent abandoning of their 
homes with an almost universal and usually permanent descent into absolute poverty.
That pattern suggests that the rather wide scatter of food output growth - from negative to 
3 .5% - is probably paralleled by a similar scatter of absolute poverty proportion charges. To 
the extent SA has revived urban economies (primarily by increasing import access and fiscal 
underpinning), it has widened rural/urban gaps especially as for domestic food there is no 
evidence of systematic terms of trade shifts in favour of food. The probable intra rural 
worsening is dominated by war, drought and land quality elements in a majority of cases so 
cannot reasonably be related to macro economic policy at either continental or at national 
level, except to the extent these fail to build livelihood rehabilitation after the crisis into safety 
net and survival programmes.
To attempt to relate overall SSA out-turns to SA on a time slice basis is inherently futile
- vast as the energy devoted to attempting to do so has been. Comparison between adjusters 
and non-adjusters is very problematic:
a. for no five year slice are the countries with SAPs at opening and closing dates the same, 
i.e. most "adjusters" are that only for part of the period;
b. the degree of seriousness of SAPs has varied - from negligible in Zaire to very high in 
Ghana;
c. the "non adjuster" category is very non-homogenous with one group of economies in no 
need of SAPs, one following largely SAP like policies but not in a formal Bank 
programme and a third practising crisis non-coping.
d. attempts to 'adjust' raw data for weather, terms of trade and war shocks appear logical but, 






e most SAPs have been adopted when growth had become very low or freefall loomed close 
so that early year SA results would, on the face of it, be likely to be below any SSA 
average unless the "non adjuster" group was dominated by "collapsed states" or 
compulsive crisis non-copers which appears not to have been the case until the 1990s.
Attempts to compare pre and post SAP adoption secularly are also perilous:
a. the massive worsening in external economic environment plus war and over 1980'85 and 
1990-93 drought would lead to expectations of post 1980 results significantly poorer than 
those of the late 1970s whatever strategy was adopted;
b. the lag between SAP adoption, implementation and results has never been estimated 
empirically either by country (where it would appear to vary from 1 to over 5 years except 
in some cases for resource transfers) or for SSA overall which would logically be a 
prerequisite for sequential temporal evaluation;
c. the most serious comparison is not between trends before (usually poor, deteriorating and 
vulnerable to catastrophic collapse) and after, but between actual SAP out-tums and the 
hypothetical ones of better designed SAPs and/or potentially feasible alternative strategies. 
That, of course, means estimating one or more counterfactuals which is always a 
subjective and imprecise exercise;
d. in the SA context potentially feasible alternative strategies is a slippery concept. Once the 
Washington Consensus emerged, enhanced (or even constant) external support - with the 
exception of emergency survival support - was not available except in the context of a 
SAP or a pre-SAP preparatory period. Therefore many states had no viable alternative. 
However, that is somewhat different from saying none existed subject to a different 
resource transferor open-mindedness. To argue that is in practice to assert that the neo­
liberal Northern consensus since 1980 has been wrong since SA is in a very real sense a 
secondary, external aspect of that consensus.
A striking aspect of most attempts at SA vs. non SA comparisons for SSA as a whole is the 
absolute poverty, nutrition, basic service access and similar indices to complement GDP.
There has been no lack of assertions about them, but a solid empirical base has not been built 
either by proponents or opponents. The reasons are not far to seek - weak data, often non­
comparable across countries, frequently non-comparable over time in the same country, 
available only for a few widely separated years with reason to suppose straight line 
interpolation would not be a safe way of filling in gap years. However, assuming public 
services, nutrition health, pure water, infant mortality, life expectancy are important 
development indicators more effort to building up such a base - first nationally by censi with
41
smaller sample studies between - would appear justified; not to continue the SA debate after 
the strategy's demise but to have a broader, sounder base for strategy, policy, programme 
monitoring more generally.
The Bank's 1994 evaluations of SA - and especially the country case studies - were more 
serious and sophisticated than most. However, they are subject to several criticisms (or 
limitations):
a. the measures of effort (e.g. reduction of overvaluation, reduction of budget deficit) used 
look rather more like measures of results influenced by exogenous variables as well as
policy;
b. the conclusions are surprisingly volatile in respect to modest changes in ’effort’ 
definitions - e.g. substitution of reduction of domestic bank borrowing for reduction of 
budget financing requirement radically improves assessment of performance in 
Mozambique and Tanzania;
c. while export and overall output correlations with SA effort - as defined - are clear neither 
agricultural output, domestic savings, fixed investment nor - surprisingly - real net external 
transfers per capita are demonstrably correlated for the adjusting group albeit all but 
agricultural output appear to be in some.
The study on the whole supports the assessment that SA as operated: ended freefall and 
restored GDP growth to that of population or above; failed to achieve full turn to sustainable 
fiscal or external balances; achieved neither the human investment nor the fixed investment 
recoveries needed for building to 6% growth; did little to reverse the weakening food output 
per capita secular trend. It is rather doubtful other exercises could add much more precision 
except at a disproportionate research resource opportunity cost (taking transformation 
strategy exploration and building up a better quality and broader development indicator base 
as the alternative uses).
VI.
W h y  Per sisten t  Underperform ance?
Reciting the broad record is enough to demonstrate the existence of underperformance 
relative both to national goals and to other regions in the South. Arguably 4% trend annual 
growth - fairly frequently achieved as five year trends in a majority of countries before 1980 1
but only by Seychelles, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana and Tunisia since - was adequate to avot ‘
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implosion up to 1980 in a majority o f countries. With past erosion of per capita output and of 
infrastructural and direct production capital stock and the escalation of imbalances it is no 
longer likely to be high enough to be sustainable. Reducing the imbalances, rehabilitating the 
capital stock and providing enough room to extend basic services and allow rising personal 
consumption requires a 6% growth trend. By that test underperformance is now massive 
overall (2% average achieved) and severe even for middling 'good' performers (4% achieved 
average).
Recital however does not identify contextual, initial, policy, external and other causes of 
underperformance. It is therefore not adequate to provide guidelines for how to do better. 
Causal factors are disputed - in large part because they have often tended to be sought for 
blame shifting, rather more than for corrective process identifying, reasons. The evidence 
suggests there are several causes in most (probably all) cases, but with quite different 
contextual combinations and weights from case to case and probably period to period.
External Environment - Failure To Restructure
Africa - other than at some periods, oil exporters - has faced a relatively unfavourable 
economic context since 1960 and one which appears in retrospect to have worsened 
decade by decade. With terms of trade and per capita aid (especially excluding emergency 
survival relief) both on downtrends since the late 1980s (and with massive, unpayable debt 
overhangs in a majority of cases) the present situation and prospects are dire. In addition, 
both global (WTO process) and specific SA related trade liberalisation are distinctly 
threatening unless Africa becomes more competitive, i.e. reverses a trend going back at least a 
quarter century.
While some practicable policy priorities - e.g. external debt writedowns linked to varying 
country ability to service - do flow from the present external economic environment and 
prospects, the basic strategic point is rather different. Africa - at least SSA - has failed to 
transform/adapt production and export structures in ways seizing opportunities and 
reducing vulnerability. A majority of Asian and Latin American countries have achieved such 
adaptations/transformations. To assert this may not be to condemn past African actions but 
the underperformance - however caused - is a crippling reality Africa needs to overcome.
SSA traditional exports have fared badly in quantity partly because their real global prices 
have fallen (and producers responded), partly because of gross currency overvaluation, partly 
because of failure to invest in real cost reduction. To restore SSA's 1970 share under present 
market conditions would so erode prices as to produce negligible (or negative) net foreign 
exchange gains for many economies. Transformation - whether by new buoyant primary
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products, pre export value added processing or manufacturing - of export - bases is essential 
to sustaining 3% to 4%, let alone breaking through to 6% growth.
In one sense this is to argue that African states (and enterprises) have failed to adapt to global 
market changes they had no chance of resisting externally nor of halting at their borders. But 
it is not necessarily a prescription for laissez faire. Few economies with reasonable post 1980 
export growth have practised laissez faire. They managed markets and intervened to create 
present incentive patterns for enterprises to adjust to take advantage of projected global 
market changes. African intervention was usually much less market linked (or well analysed) 
and even when it was (Tanzania's stillborn 1974 export transformation component in the 
otherwise implemented and successful 1974-76 crisis management to renewed development 
bridging strategy), it was rarely given actual implementation (policy, personnel and resource 
allocation) priority.
Inadequate external resource flows is a equally complex and problematic causal factor. 
Excluding relatively atypical horror story cases, at any one time more external transfers - 
especially fixed investment in infrastructure and directly productive assets throughout and also 
in basic service consolidation and expansion since 1980 - would have improved performance. 
But in the absence of coherent strategic frameworks and the presence of export unfriendly 
policies (which pushed up net transfer levels needed for any level of growth or development) 
as well as ill-chosen, incompetent or corrupt use of many transfers, the long term impact is 
less clear cut.
Further SSA has not on the whole had less transfers per capita (including both ODA and 
commercial loans/investment) than other regions. Au contraire. Again the situation is 
complex: initially South Korea and Taiwan did have much more aid per capita and 
subsequently much higher commercial lending/foreign investment. Singapore, Hong Kong and 
- to a lesser degree - Taiwan had access to huge pools of low cost flight capital accompanied 
by experienced entrepreneurs. Of the emergent Southeast Asian NICs, Malaysia had high 
ODA but Thailand did not and their 1980s-90s inflows are primarily commercial loans and 
investments pulled in by past and projected high growth and perceived export 
competitiveness. While India and China have accelerated growth on the back of large 
investment inflows, both did relatively better than SSA earlier when investment, as well as 
ODA per capita, was much lower.
If low transfers is a causal factor the two dominant policy points are probably:
a. how to limit declines in real per capita ODA and to transform it to be more effective 
(e.g. cut the 40% typical de jure plus de facto technical assistance component and work
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out a transition to reduce the need for high emergency alleviation and recurrent budget 
support components);
b. identifying conditions (e.g. sustained domestic demand growth, export friendly policies, 
trained labour force, decent infrastructure) necessary to attract significant external 
investment and set out to create them - and to publicise them convincingly where and 
when existing.
Any general request for "more" in respect to aid is likely to bring the same answer as Oliver 
Twist received, or a package of conditions which - however well intentioned - limit strategy to 
marginal reform, not basic adjustment or transformation of structures. Similarly the tax 
concession or wage repression routes to foreign investment are not much use if markets, 
security, infrastructure and qualified labour are absent, especially so when the concessions and 
repressions feed back to erode markets, fiscal bases, public service productivity and the type 
of industrial relations consistent with trend growth of labour productivity..
The 1996 UN Special Initiative is welcome, $2,500 million a year targeted on basic 
education and health services plus peace and security including household and water food 
security could - if well used within national strategic frameworks - yield substantial results 
even if over half was reallocation within existing flows. But the 1960-1995 experience 
(including relatively positive period and country experiences) is that major results require 
African strategic frames within which to utilise the resources and speedy attainment of 
domestic and export performances/potentials seen (with a 2 to 5 year lag) by investors and 
banks as justifying non-official flow increases. Otherwise UNSI will, like UNPAAERD, end 
in tears and recriminations but - unlike UNPAAERD - not in the back to the drafting board to 
try again exercise which has led to UNSI.
Debt overhang is now a reason for underperformance for both payers and non-payers. For 
full payers it usually absorbs 25% to 50% of export earnings - to an aberrational 100% plus in 
Uganda apparently de facto financed by returning flight capital. For partial payers - including 
those de facto servicing Bank and IMF obligations plus special export or other forex flow 
secured commercial bank credits only - e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique - the burden can still be up 
to a third of export earnings. For non-payers the burden is that de facto  defaulted and 
rescheduled, but still outstanding, debt remains at least a potential future burden and 
thereby discourages not simply foreign lending and investment but also domestic investment in 
production which could be compromised by a future debt service squeeze. The same 
deterrence burden rests on part payers and on overstretched full payers. Therefore G. K. 
Helleiner's comment: "Reducing the current external cash flow obligations and payments on 
debt account will thus probably be the most cost - efficient form of official external transfer 
Africa in the 1990s" is correct. In this context the public or private status of the lenders
and borrowers is largely irrelevant. It is the actual and potential fiscal and import capacity 
haemorrhages that matters.
However, with some exceptions dating back to the late 1960s - e.g. Ghana and several smaller 
Francophone West African economies - the debt service burden dates to the mid-1970s so far 
as it relates to rising external debt and to the 1980s as to perceived unserviceability. Until 
mid-1985 the existence of a general excessive SSA debt service burden was not recognised 
even in Africa. Before 1975 it arguably did not exist in a majority of cases. In fact the rapid 
post 1973 debt rise had two sides: a) on that of supply Northern financial institutions were 
awash with Eurodollars they wished to lend at significant margins and the standards o f risk 
assessment slipped (and were very unsophisticated indeed) and the IMF was over 1973-83 
rather in cautious in granting short term de facto commercial terms loans to finance long term 
structural external imbalance, while b) on the demand side sluggish exports and poor 1970-74 
GDP performance (or sometimes still longer stagnation, e.g. under 2% a year trend 1945- 
1975 growth in Madagascar and Ethiopia) led to an equally ill risk tested rush for growth via 
external borrowing. When the 1980s brought general economic and especially export value 
stagnation or decline (and tighter risk assessment ended easy roll over of principal and roll up 
of interest), the situation became unmanageable. In some cases it was made even more so 
when short term near commercial rate IMF drawings were used to try to put debt service on a 
current basis (as in Ghana in the 1983-85 period) before SAF and ESAF were created largely 
to bail the IMF, donors and selected SSA economies out of debt service traps of their own 
making during early SA and Paris Club programmes. But the point remains, neither access to 
external resource flows nor excessive debt service burdens appear to have been a 
general cause of underperformance before the 1980s.
The last exogenous cluster of explanations turn on agricultural natural resource endowment 
and vulnerability to drought. These are - up to a point - valid. Africa has the poorest 
continental person/arable land ratio in the world given land quality and existing or 
known/readily applicable technology. The basis of the last constraint may be lack of value 
for money from research and extension in Africa, which until the 1980s was often near or even 
above typical Asian and Latin American levels as a proportion of GDP but much lower in 
apparent payoff. Whether lack of investment in irrigation is part of the present constraint is 
unclear. Most (not all) past irrigation spending has been low in payoff and irrigation reduces 
drought vulnerability structurally only if a major permanent water source flows through from 
outside the drought vulnerable area.
South Korea s agricultural sector was never dynamic nor was it a source of financing or 
supplying foreign exchange to industry. Up to a point Brazil's has been (with massive changes 
in export crops unparalleled in Africa) but only Malaysia and, again up to a point Taiwan,
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Thailand and Colombia, fit the model of high natural resource endowment leading to import 
capacity, fiscal and savings flows channelled from export agriculture into transforming other 
sectors to launch sustained development. Apparently equally well endowed Cote d'Ivoire 
failed to make any such transition. When agricultural export earnings faltered, the rest of the 
economy was too weak (or too young?) to counterbalance it, much less take over the leading 
role.
Again the question comes back to why Africa has been so slow to transform and to build up 
self sustaining sectors outside the natural resource based ones. Related to this is failure to 
transform agriculture (other than mechanistic efforts to replicate plantation and large state 
farm experience parallel to both coming under growing criticism, and frequently going into 
decline, elsewhere) which is a sub-theme of non-transformation.
Outside agriculture no general statement on natural resource endowment can be made.
Some - by no means all - 200 mile zone fisheries are rich as are some mineral and hydrocarbon 
sectors and some forests. Again while opening up (and world price) booms have been 
triggered by these assets, integrated, buoyant economies have not followed even in the case of 
South Africa. Nigeria for example has had four commodity booms (one tree crop and three 
oil) since 1955. Each has led to unsustainable personal and state consumption growth and to 
industrial sectors unviable without net forex from natural resource exports at boom level. 
Clearly transformation has repeatedly not happened. Kenya has had a parallel record of 
booms laying the foundations for subsequent poor performance. In Indonesia the experience 
is different: the first boom/bust cycle was similar, but thereafter Indonesia did begin to 
achieve, and now is close to having achieved, self sustaining transformation.
War is a clear cause of underperformance. It has also been a growing one at least until the 
early 1990s. Southern Africa (including South Africa), the Horn, Central Africa and - 
increasingly - West Africa have all been hard hit. The least speculative estimates show over 
$60,000 million cumulative GDP loss in the nine original SADC (then SADCC) members over 
the 1980s; twice the achieved actual 1990 GDP. But while Horn experience fully supports 
war as the main cause of underperformance, in the SADC 9 the 1986-1990 growth rates - 
admittedly from severely impacted bases and with great effort - exceeded the SSA average 
and the (then not war afflicted) West African sub-regional one.
Poverty of Acquired Resource Base: Physical, Human, Institutional
Poor resource base is almost certainly a - perhaps the - dominant continuing causal factor.
1 lowever, the resources in question are: physical infrastructure, human infrastructure, 
state capacity to deliver (especially basic services), state (and enterprise) ability to respond 
o-actively to opportunities and shocks and - probably - good governance in the sense of
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transparency and accountability (to an electorate, national objective oriented dictatorial 
decision takers or internalised value structures). Taking SSA as a whole, each of these 
appears to have improved modestly in the 1960s, varied sharply in the 1970s and deteriorated 
(at least relative to the requirements imposed by rising populations and a worsened external 
economic environment) since. SA has slowed or halted the fall in a number of cases, only in 
Mauritius can it be said to have been midwife to a transforming reversal.
Unlike natural resources these Acquired Resources are the result of human decisions and 
especially of resource allocation priorities. However, they (plus the natural resource 
augmenting fields of agricultural research and geological/hydrological explanation and 
technological research) are sectors in which sustained allocations within a long term 
perspective strategy are needed. These can be implemented by rolling or sequential four to 
six year operational plans linked to three year rolling Annual Budgetary Processes. Crisis 
coping is emphatically not an efficient approach. Three year rolling macro resource 
management to reduce or contain imbalances (structural adjustment) is also inadequately 
forward looking and opportunity focused. In principle longer term sectoral strategies can be 
bolted on to an SA frame (as, especially in Education and less uniformly Health, the World 
Bank has indeed advocated), but the relation between core SA and associated longer period 
substantive strategic visions has too often resembled a Christmas tree and its balls or tinsel 
streamers.
In all o f these sectors crisis coping led to deferral of both physical maintenance and
operating input flows (e.g. books, drugs, furniture) with little initial apparent damage. When 
- as was usual after 1980 and not unknown even before - crises continued, longer term 
deferral led to rapid deterioration in serviceability of plant and in quality of services which 
were reversible only over three to five years of massive reconstruction. Even though more 
attuned to renewal, maintenance and operating supplies than pure crisis coping, SAPs have 
often been unable to meet the bill so that while freefall has been halted, recovery and advance 
of infrastructure (physical, knowledge, human) has been very slow with a negative feedback 
via costs (e.g. o f bad roads and productivity (e.g. of ill-trained workers) on output recovery 
and advance, e.g. Tanzania 1986-96.
In this respect the 1970s High Noon of Multi Year Planning did fit better. 10 and 20 year 
Perspective Plans for education/manpower, health and water were moderately - and 
increasingly - common and usually the relevant Five Year Plan sectoral sections did seek to 
articulate them into operational, shorter term chunks. That relationship has rarely been 
regained since.
The physical maintenance debacles of the 1980s exacerbated a longer standing problem. 
New projects have more political sex appeal - e.g. visibility, seen gains to constituents,
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attractive contracts for enterprises - to African governments and to donors than do 
maintenance, or even rehabilitation unless so profound as to be capable of description as a 
new project. SA has not addressed this problem fundamentally. The Bank has stressed 
maintenance (as have a few African Treasuries after deferral, e.g. Tanzania 1975-77, 
Zimbabwe 1980-82) but most bilaterals have in practice focused on new (or total 
reconstruction) projects. There are exceptions - e.g. SAPs in Ghana, EU programmes in some 
countries, the SADCC (now SADC) transport sector strategy and project packages 
(interestingly deliberately described as new projects even though about 75% were renovation 
and modernisation precisely because the new project titling was - apparently correctly - seen 
as more saleable to donors ) - but on balance maintenance remains an under-favoured, 
underfunded stepchild.
If this Acquired Resource Base cluster is key, then either SA needs to be transformed into a 
long term strategy focused on strategic, substantive sector perspectives or to be slotted into a 
substantive goal driven strategy as a good housekeeping parameter. Otherwise SSA costs 
from poor, uncertain and/or costly transport, power, water, communications will remain high 
and competitiveness shrink vis-a-vis other economies while at the same time poor health and 
education levels will hold down the growth of labour productivity with the same negative 
consequences.
Public service access and quality are central to Acquired Resource development. The 
former - except for some aspects of health services - has stagnated in SSA for 15 years. 
Exceptions have usually been post-colonial 'opening up' of human investment e.g. Angola, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe. SA facilitated recoveries (e.g. Ghana and - at least in Health 
Services - Mozambique, Tanzania) offset by falls elsewhere (e.g. Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia, 
Kenya, CAR). Public service quality, quantity and unit cost depend in large part on 
productivity, professionalism and probity of Public Servants. There is near total agreement 
that African public services have deteriorated - but not on why. In most cases high wages and 
rapidly growing numbers leading to high - unsustainable or sustained at the cost of cutting 
maintenance and operating inputs - appear to be either myths or historic problems of the 
1960s and 1970s not the 1990s. On reasonable ratios of servants to services most SSA public 
services are too small (even if not all present posts are needed or incumbents suitable). For 
example in Mali universal primary education alone would require a doubling of the entire 
present public service. They are also too little qualified and too low paid (usually under half 
roughly comparable medium and large scale enterprise sub-sector rates for the job). That 
appears to be the cumulative result of economic crisis coping and structural adjustment. Its 
consequences are public servant coping (not being at workplace or not working on public 
business, collecting privatised 'user fees', acquisition of government goods and services for 
own account' use and corruption proper), low productivity (because of coping - most notable
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in revenue collection where the 'user fees' are by tax evaders for not ’getting on with the job' 
unlike - say - health where they are for doing it for paying clients), lower morale and 
weakening training (with supply constrained by fiscal weakness and demand by the need to 
maximise time for 'outside earnings' and the very low real gains from promotion after training). 
An ironic parallel result is massive reallocation of stagnant official external resource 
flows into provision of expatriates and overseas courses to plug gaps largely caused by 
public service underfunding - a reallocation which de facto reduces resources available for 
domestic payrolls and nationally based educational/training programmes.
To state the problem is not necessarily to provide a clear answer. Certainly cutting numbers 
and real pay are no longer seen as a high road to public service reform. But the apparently 
self-evident answer of rapidly phased-in decent pay paralleled by reprofessionalisation, 
clear and enforced productivity standards (not least being at the workplace and at work) 
with interim finance by reduction of public servant replacement technical assistance is not 
generally accepted, although it is receiving a serious hearing now which it did not in 1990 or 
before. The only state to have embarked on such an approach as a strategic priority to date is 
Ethiopia - out of its fiscal peace dividend.
One sub-area is an exception - tax collection. The clearly sound element in proposals for 
separate revenue collection services is not apolitical policy autonomy (a slightly odd goal on 
even casual reflection), nor is it automatic achievement of probity (existing quasi autonomous 
revenue collection agencies are no advertisement for that and were in some cases set up 
precisely to facilitate selective skimming or non-collection). Rather it is that a separate agency 
can more easily have a clean break to a pay-professionalism-productivity package which is 
much more efficient (in revenue per employee and the ratio of revenue to collection cost as 
well as total take for any given set of taxes and rates). Apparently the links when the service 
has a clear monetary output (collection value) between decent (higher) pay and improved 
efficiency are clearer than when - e.g. road maintenance, learning, health - no such direct and 
independent measure of output value is available.
Good Governance - Unpackaging and Articulating
Another cluster of reasons for underperformance - agreed in broad principle but less so on any 
articulated basis and still less as to strategic objectives and their operational articulation- 
cluster around part of the good governance package:
a. accurate, honest, timely accounts (so that transparency, accountability and economic 
management are practicable);
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b a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  (of public servants and of politicians within the state system as well as to 
the citizenry and to users - or would-be users - of services;
c. transparency (to enable holding to account);
d some concept of public service and public goals (even if with class or geographic biases 
but still antithetical to the perception of public office as primarily a means to personal 
gain).
It is idle to claim that these elements have characterised all African states or to deny that in 
many they have eroded significantly since the 1970s (and sometimes before) with most 
subsequent reversals fragmentary, limited and fragile. That weakness is not limited to 
personalised kleptocracies and collapsed states - in very varying degrees it is general.
To argue that these characteristics are cultural is doubtless correct as to form and detail but 
not if taken to mean that the principles are either not universal ones or are alien to Africans. 
Clearly pre-colonial African states did not have published, audited accounts (a late 19th 
Century development) but accounting in the sense of reporting and accountability (within 
the state structure and to its citizens) and a sense of public service were deeply 
embedded in many (by no means all) African cultures and states.
To question whether they have characterised other poor regions is more problematic. Marcos 
and his coterie ran a personalised kleptocracy (which rotted public sector probity from the top
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down); South Korea's economic miracle was hardly characterised by transparent 
accountability to its citizens nor by overmuch honesty at the top. But the Marcos regime 
(especially its late efflorescence) was not typical of Asia - nor even of the Philippines. And in 
Korea public servants were accountable within the system, accounts (for management and 
internal accountability purposes) were of a high standard, public goals were set first with 
corruption a means to access to public programmes/projects not the driving force in designing 
them.
The most commonly cited reason for chronic underperformance is policy failure (more 
colloquially lousy decision making). This is unfortunately a protean criticism, applied with the 
benefit of 20:20 hindsight, often by institutions or persons who supported (or did not oppose
vehemently) the decisions when made or for a number of years thereafter. Some components
are:
a decisions at least arguably correct when made and on available data (including
projections) but persisted in too long when contexts changed and/or more data (not least 
of unsatisfactory outcomes) became available;
51
b. attempts to replicate past crisis management strategies in radically different contexts
- notably to rerun relatively successful 1973-75 ones over 1979-83 when parallel bridging 
finance was not to hand and (contrary to what the IMF, the Bank and the OECD projected 
at the time) rapid Northern economy and global trade recovery were not about to happen 
again;
c. overextending the range of functions performed by the state - quite possibly inherently 
and certainly in the context of increasing resource scarcity;
d. failing to make strategic - as opposed to 'coping' responses to the first three elements,
e.g. keeping the same range of functions but decreasing resource adequacy of all, allowing 
short term financing and acceptance of initially modest overvaluation in response to 
external shocks to drag on from six to 18 month bridging periods to a year after year 
process o f digging deeper holes;
e. more generally becoming responsive not proactive (to shocks, to Bank SA constructs, to 
multiplying weaknesses and growing imbalances), short term (even at the expense of 
making future coping harder) and unreviewed (accreting a myriad of leak plugging 
actions - not least in forex management - which were increasingly ineffective, self­
contradictory and counterproductive in respect to medium term incentives to enterprises
as well as to fiscal receipts and public service performance); >
1
f. allowing non-maintenance (of human as well as of physical capital and of public services 1 
as well as o f revenue collection) to build up to become an overhang every bit as damaging ; 
as that on external debt account; j
i
g. poor analysis prior to decisions, worse monitoring and review and deteriorating 
accountability and public purpose frameworks. ^
This categorisation of decision taking weaknesses is perhaps more relevant to economic 
performance or to good governance than a market/state division or a catalogue of 
sectoral decisions, because underperformance has been the rule not the exception and has 
deepened at least since the late 1970s across both highly and less interventionist states. (
Clearly if that is a reflection of reality, then the other causal elements of underperformance (
have interacted with it. The tighter the resource constraints the less room for error; the more (
acute the crisis the greater the need for strict scrutiny of coping measures and for charting a {
strategic path out of crisis; the greater the erosion of public servant and decision-taker pay the £
greater the likelihood of deliberately 'poor' (from an overall public interest perspective) 




None of the above points undermines the need for better decision taking but they do suggest 
both that it needs to relate to the addressing prior causal factors and to include gaining some 
room for manoeuvre in respect to resource availability.
vn.
Savings/In v estm en t: Gaps and  Shortfalls
Sub-Saharan African investment rates in the period 1986-1993 were effectively flat, opening 
at 17.4% and closing at 17.5% of GDP with rises in the late 1980s reversed in the 1990s.
On the whole - with some, e.g. Ghana, exceptions - SA has had a relatively low impact on 
investment and possibly a low negative one. By and large the fastest investment result of SA 
is a cutback in state directly productive investment, the slowest a significant rise in general 
external enterprise investment, with state infrastructure investment and domestic private 
investment responses intermediate (and uneven). New export opportunity seeking investment 
rendered attractive by real devaluation (e.g. gold in Ghana) may pick up quickly once 
investors believe SA will last. Overall government investment in SSA has fallen and non­
government risen (7.2% to 5% and 10.3% to 12.0%) respectively. Part o f the explanation for 
the government fall lies with the shift within (falling per capita) external assistance inflows 
toward programme (budget or import support), survival (especially food aid) and technical 
assistance (dominantly expatriate personnel and overseas courses) and away from fixed 
investment projects. Given import and recurrent fiscal strangulation, drought and war the first 
two shifts have usually been prudent in output and human investment terms. Nonetheless, 
they have delayed infrastructural rehabilitation and extension in a context in which substantial 
private investment interest had not - and in most cases (Botswana and South Africa could be 
exceptions) and sub-sectors (external and long distance telecommunications is a probable 
exception) will not soon - be substantial.
The figures are even more stark when converted to net investment. Replacement cost 
depreciation (fixed capital consumption) accounting suggests 10% is a reasonable 
depreciation/GDP ratio - not the 2% to 4% based on historic cost depreciation set against 
current price GDP in many SSA national accounts. That leaves net investment of 7% to 
8%. Assuming an overall capital/output ratio (including infrastructure) of 3 to 3.5 that is 
adequate for a 2% to 2.5% sustained annual growth of output.
I hat the actual growth has been near the apparently sustainable over the period is largely a 
coincidence. Most SSA economies have substantial surplus capacity and deteriorated but 
ot destroyed capital stock on which rehabilitation and modernisation could have low
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capital/output ratios. Zimbabwe's 1984-89 return to a 4.5% to 5.0% growth trend was based 
on a strategy of raising capacity utilisation (from perhaps 75%), fighting a war without 
massive inflationary borrowing or trade gaps and seeking to achieve external investor/donor 
confidence and peace before the capacity bottleneck was hit - estimated to be in 1990. 
Neither event happened, leading to the - through 1995 - most unsuccessful sustained SA 
programme in SSA Capacity utilisation/rehabilitation can launch recovery but (like SA) 
cannot sustain even moderate trend growth without much higher net investment levels to 
take over as capacity nears full use.
High growth economies have typically had 25% to 35% gross investment/GDP ratios. On 
a 10% depreciation rate that translates to 15% to 25% net and at 3:1 capital/output ratio to 
sustainable growth of 5% to 8%. Further, with a very much younger average capital stock, 
high growth/high investment economies tend to have more rapid productivity gains (thus 
lower capital/output ratios) and greater competitiveness (thus less export inadequacy and/or 
devaluation problems).
Domestic savings over the 1981-93 period in SSA were also basically stagnant opening at 
14.0% and ending at 13.5%, again with rises in the late 1980s reversed in the 1990s.
Government savings - surprisingly given common assumptions about SA budget impact - fell 
from 1.1% (excluding grants) to minus 2.6% with the falling trend consistent. In part this 
may relate to war and drought costs but the total war costs probably peaked in 1990-91 and 
fell by 1992-93.
Revenue rose (in real as well as current price terms) but real expenditure recovery rose faster. 
One factor is increased basic service provision and maintenance (relative to GDP) in 
government budgets. That, in itself, is a positive factor. Further - at least in most SA cases - 
1990s government deficits are significantly less inflationary than mid-1980s because of the 
substitution of external loans and grants for domestic bank financing. However, in many cases 
the dominant increase is debt service (external and domestic) which may be necessary but is 
not output enhancing.
Private savings have risen from 12.9% to 16.1% but with the gain early and oscillations 
following. The domestic savings/investment gap has risen slightly from 3.4% in 1986 to 
4.0% in 1993 with narrowing to 1990 (2%) followed by broadening.
The domestic/savings investment gap and the government financing requirement as %'s of 
GDP are not particularly high compared to high growth economies structurally transforming 
from raw material export basis, broadening basic service access and deepening infrastructure
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(e.g. Malaysia, Thailand). But in those cases the overall investment and domestic savings to 
output ratios are much higher.
It can be argued that SSA investment is underestimated:
a. labour and waiting time household investment (e.g. land and tree crop development) is not 
included and user built housing probably grossly underestimated;
b. import ratio based fixed investment estimates will understate investment if the 
import/construction-plant-equipment ratio falls;
c. rehabilitation/deferred maintenance may be classified to recurrent not investment account.
The third factor is not in practice significant - major rehabilitation is taken in the capital 
account on the government side and (for tax reasons) on the private as well. Indeed, if 
anything, it is probable that more routine maintenance is listed as investment than 
rehabilitation as recurrent (consumption).
The second factor probably was significant over 1960-79 when the import content in
I construction declined with initial industrialisation. That did not apply equally to plant and 
equipment except in South Africa and Rhodesia (as it then was). Given the very sluggish to 
negative industrial sector trends since 1979 - and an apparent increase in the use of foreign 
construction firms - it is doubtful that this factor has been significant from 1980.
The household time and labour self-investment factor is significant (including in comparison to 
high growth economies where this sector is less important). It might raise the average 
investment gross level by 3% to 4% (and the net by 2% to 3%) of GDP. Domestic savings 
would rise pari passu. However that is a minor improvement if the overall investment gap 
s between SSA and sustainable 6% to 8% growth is of the order of 15%.
Domestic savings are underestimated because of external investment (not necessarily capital 
flightier se so much as asset portfolio diversification). Because domestic savings and short 
term capital movements are largely residuals in national accounts estimates, high errors and 
omissions in the balance of payments and evident - but usually very hard to quantify - export 
smuggling not matched by private inward remittances strongly suggest extemalisation in 
savings. So too do suggestive evidence implying some officials/politicians receive 'side 
payments abroad and invest them there. Data for a serious estimation do not exist - 5% of 
DI would not appear implausible. However, these are flows not affecting and - in the 
^sence of contextual change - not accessible to finance domestic investment levels. They are 
ant in a strategic sense if, and only if, it is possible to create a context in which they (and
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existing stocks of overseas prudential assets) are switched to domestic investment. Uganda 
seems to have achieved that position from 1992-93 but may be unique.
Possible Causal Factors
There are a number of obvious causal factors - including output per capita - which explain 
much of the low domestic savings. While correlation analysis does not confirm this over
1986-93, it would appear likely that low growth also deters investment - especially foreign, 
but also domestic, private investment since over capacity and low demand growth hardly 
improve incentives. However, these relationships do not help at the strategy level for 
identifying ways to improve results.
Public investment as a proportion of GDP is positively correlated with private. That 
suggests the dominant effect is complementarity (infrastructure) not crowding out. The logic 
of access and of cost reduction (and thus those of competitiveness and of both enterprise 
capital and labour productivity) support this result.
Perhaps surprisingly, ODA per capita is slightly negatively correlated with investment as a 
proportion of GDP. The nature of the link is problematic - very weak economies may receive 
high support levels, especially in respect to survival relief. Given the positive public-private 
linkage, it can hardly be because ODA (for infrastructure, basic services and emergency 
survival relief) crowds out foreign investment. Dividing SA and non-SA economies 
interestingly gives a positive ODA-investment correlation for the former. Whether this 
reflects better use of ODA by the former group, the very heterogeneous nature of the non-SA 
group (not needing as well as deemed ineligible) or the fact that except for Mozambique the 
main war loss cases were not in the SA category over 1986-93 (or some of each depending on 
country) is unclear.
Real interest rate correlation with domestic savings in SSA - as elsewhere - is not 
significant. On the investment side there would appear to be a negative impact for evident 
reasons. This is especially true if enterprises have no access to (lower rate) foreign borrowing 
or are deterred by exchange rate anticipations. Logic - and somewhat sketchy qualitative 
assessment - suggests a worsening of investment quality: long term is riskier and falls 
relative to short term (commerce) except - for reasons which are less evident - luxury housing, 
offices and commercial p; emises. The risk factor may be related as much to a history of 
sudden rises as to absolute levels - any firm borrowing heavily to invest in fixed assets in 
Zimbabwe over 1984-89 (with inflation of 12-15% and real interest rates of 1% to 2%) was 
pushed to the brink of insolvency from 1990 when both inflation and real interest rates soared 
In that respect the initial impact of SA (or any other) elimination of negative or sharp increase 
in positive real interest rates, is likely to have a negative impact on private investment.
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Devaluation is - at least directly and in the short to medium term - negatively correlated with 
investment in SSA. The primary factor - at least if the devaluation is real, i.e. not offset by 
inflation - is the higher absolute and relative cost of fixed investm ent because of its high 
direct and indirect import content (probably about 75% excluding SSA judging by 1980s 
Zimbabwe analysis). A second factor is the disastrous impact of substantial devaluation on 
balance sheets and cash flows if substantial external liabilities exist. On the supply side (except 
for export oriented investment which would also be less impacted on the cost/selling price 
side) external investors and lenders respectively find a context of rapid devaluation likely to 
reduce profitability of their investment and/or serviceability of their loan. Conceivably this is 
not a factor if devaluation is relatively low (e.g. 3% to 8% a year) and predictable (Indonesia 
has been cited as a case) but neither pertains in most of SSA.
Ic Like the interest rate correlation, the devaluation one is problematic as to what to do.
Negative real interest rates are usually associated with generalised price distortions as is gross 
overvaluation and the latter clearly has a direct negative impact on export growth and - 
therefore - the ability to finance the import content of investment. But they do suggest sky 
high real interest rates (sucking in footloose financial capital, crowding out private 
borrowers if the main instruments are Treasury paper and likely to cause overvaluation) are 
unsound as is a spiral of high, variable and apparently unending devaluations Whether 
this argues for a "big bang" (as in the case of the CFA franc) or a phased (but substantial and 
time bounded) adjustment is unclear and probably contextually determined. For example, if 
the exchange rate is overvalued by more than 10:1 massive initial cuts are needed; if under 
1.5:1 perhaps a steady downward float over three years would reduce negative shock impact 
and feedback into an inflation/devaluation spiral.
The case for devaluation is strengthened by the negative correlation of persistent external 
imbalance with investment (and output growth via import constriction and therefore capacity 
under-utilisation and under-maintenance). However, devaluation in that case can only be an 
initial good housekeeping ground clearing - structural transformation of exports, plus 
reasonably efficient import substitution especially in construction and light engineering and 
of their overall growth is the strategic answer. External finance is at best an intermediate 
answer since rising ODA to plug an ever increasing current account gap is implausible and 
whatever the profit rate the prospects o f future non-remittability and/or devaluation losses 
would deter long term private investors and lenders.
tt i nal debt and debt service (relative to exports) are negatively correlated with investment 
savings. This is hardly surprising since they drain otherwise investible surplus and deter 
d enterprise investment. The latter impact - which is cited by actual investors and
-'Kid! institutions - flows from debt overhang (arrears and/or debt rolled over with no
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evident exit route to Rill servicing) and Riture exchange rate, convertibility and domestic 
demand uncertainty. In this case the current Bank/Fund position in respect to general 
writedown of debt service to a manageable level consistent with 6% growth (evidently varying 
contextually on what percentage writedown is appropriate, e.g. 0 ^  for Botswana and 
Mauritius, up to 90% or more for Mozambique, Tanzania and Riture post trauma Zaire, 
Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, would appear the sensible and potentially practicable way forward. 
Appeals for universal writedown levels as opposed to general, objective criteria for 
determining country specific levels are more likely to deter than to facilitate actual 
writedowns.
Intermediation - or rather its low level - is Requently suggested as a cause of low investment 
and savings. Using Broad Money/GDP ratios as a proxy for intermediation, SSAs (excluding 
South Africa's) grew from 17.7% in 1960 to 26.1% in 1980 and then declined to 22.6/o in 
1990 versus 26.2%, 40.2% and 78.6% for East and Southeast Asian developing economies. 
The difficulty with this apparent correlation is that its direction is unclear and that the Asian 
M/GDP ratios in 1990 range Rom 34.4% to 173.9% with no clear correlation among M/GDP 
and I/GDP levels or GDP growth trend.
Increased intermediation increases visible investment - especially in SSA - by switching some 
self-financing to depositing for lending. That is true across the range of producer sizes, albeit 
household enterprises are likely to depend primarily on own cash and labour flows plus 
unrecorded intermediaries ('informal' or 'traditional' credit groups) for the foreseeable future.
Whether the overall levels of saving or the quality of investment would rise appreciably is 
unclear. To the extent contingency savings are now held in goods or pension and insurance 
funds which automatically put cash flows into low yielding government paper, the probable 
answer - at least to the second question - is yes. But the gains in SSA seem unlikely to be 
large. Higher rates of growth and of per capita income plus broader access to insurance and 
Rinded pension schemes are desirable and would require more intermediation, but the linkage 
would appear to be from growth to rising M/GDP ratios more than in the other direction.
However, one major potential imbalance which could be eased by intermediation has received 
little attention. That is financing government infrastructure and public enterprise public 
utility investment. By 1989 the World Bank estimated required levels of 
inffastructure/utilities investment at 15% of GDP, versus actual levels of the order of 5%. 
There is little reason to suppose the orders of magnitude are very different today. Further, 
initial high growth periods in economies like Malaysia and Thailand do appear to have o f the 
order of half of fixed investment in inffastructure/utilities (say 15% of 30%)
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Financing via government sector savings is an implausible goal in most SSA cases - achieving 
ng recurrent budget balance before grants is itself a significant and difficult target for a majority. 
Increased ODA for these projects is likely to be possible only by reducing the need for budget 
support and emergency relief and the donor tendency to raise technical assistance. 
Depreciation plus operating profits o f  utilities could perhaps generate 5% (one third of the
total).
Increased World Bank borrowing on Bank terms and export credit or external commercial 
bank borrowing are prudent for only a handful of countries, at least until external debt 
U writedown is achieved. Private investment is possible in telecommunications, perhaps power, 
g conceivably ports, but is likely to be relatively small at least for a decade. Further, it is likely - 
except in South Africa - to need to be largely foreign given technical requirements and scale of 
individual units.
That leaves a substantial gap - 3% to 5% of GDP on fairly optimistic assumptions as to state 
finance from present sources, utility own resources and new external borrowing/investment. 
The only source available (potentially) is private savings. These would need to be 
s intermediated, e.g. insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds (loan and perhaps 
equity) on a scale which has not (except for South Africa) been attempted.
Small and medium scale business are frequently cited as sectors to benefit from 
intermediation. This is not self-evident. For household and other micro enterprises the 
transaction costs (including risk of investing time and not getting loan for enterprise and to 
banks risk of lending and not being repaid) are likely to be prohibitive for direct lending by 
recorded sector financial institutions. Special smaller, closer to borrower intermediaries 
(borrowing from basic financial intermediaries) may be an option, but one which requires two- 
way data flows and experimentation over time. Replicating Bangladesh's Grameen Bank is 
unlikely to be possible. That model's low cost professional personnel requirements cannot be 
met nor can the massive Grameen 'endowment' of undisbursed capital on deposit at high rates 
of return with commercial banks. Subject to the personnel bottleneck, Grameen's approach 
may be suitable for improving the quality, user friendliness and ability to retail wholesale 
borrowings from mainline institutions by 'traditional' (existing) credit societies and tontines.
For medium size businesses there would appear to be more short term scope for enhanced 
use of intermediation. One issue is the reduction of both side's transaction costs. African 
financial institutions tend to be rigid, slow moving and over papered (without being able 
thereby to improve assessment of borrowers or minimise bad loans). Another is improvement 
financial sectoral personnel - so low in the case of Mozambique that a national commercial 
ank with about 150 branches allows only 10 to handle working capital advances and two to 
process term credits. As the example illustrates, access to finance suitable for fixed
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investment is much less available for medium (especially successful small seeking to become 
medium) scale enterprises than is working capital.
Specialised construction lenders (possibly as wings of housing banks) and leasing/hire 
purchase companies to finance machinery, plant and vehicles (again free-standing or linked to 
commercial banks not least to pool borrower assessments) do appear to be serious gaps - 
especially for medium scale enterprises. Such institutions could secure funds wholesale from 
pension funds, insurance companies and - perhaps - individual and company term depositors. 
Again a serious problem of professional personnel and how to train them arises as well as of 
setting up low transaction costs/high borrower suitability assessment systems.
Past bad debts are sometimes listed as a savings problem. They are a problem, but not 
primarily as to current savings (unless allowed to cause massive losses to depositors) and 
certainly not to current real resource use - except insofar as they result in external payments.
New investment by existing shareholders (public or private, external or domestic) can hardly 
be expected to cover more than a small fraction of loss hangover in badly impacted financial 
institutions and systems, nor can deposit insurance funds do so even where - as in Kenya - 
they exist at all. The overhang does need to be cleared (parallel to introduction of personnel 
and systems to ensure it does not recur). Probably the most practicable route is that of setting 
up Asset Realisation Trusts to take over bad loans in return for government paper - probably 
low interest paper to create pressure for efficient handling of new lending. The alternative 
would be transfers to Central Banks, but as these usually have large phantom 'revaluation 
assets' to offset real devaluation losses, that would merely transfer the problem. The logic of 
the transaction (which protects deposits, relates to past real resource use and - if the paper is 
low interest rate - does not allow shifting out of it into new domestic credit formation) means 
it should not be charged to the government accounts (or the IMF credit ceiling) in the year of 
transfer/issue. Rather the cost to government should be taken over time in interest paid and 
principal amortised.
VIII.
B u sin e ss /S t r u c tu r e: M issing M iddle
Discussions o f Africa's sustained underperformance, of its low savings and investment ratios 
and o f its business structures do discuss enterprise weakness and entrepreneurial problems.
But few stress one striking feature. SSA in enterprise patterns - as in personnel - is 
weakest in the middle
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There are a number of large enterprises - private as well as public, domestic as well as foreign. 
A few at least of all four (even excluding South Africa) are at or near world class (e.g. Ashanti 
Goldfields which in many respects really is Ghanaian even if majority of ownership is external 
tt and it may gravitate into Anglo-American group) and a growing proportion are competent. 
This sub-set of enterprises has at least as high a share of output and employment as in 
industrial economies and only somewhat less than in the very concentrated East and South 
Asian ones.
At the small, household micro and household end of the spectrum there are myriads of 
enterprises. Most (notably small family farming and petty trading) are sustenance or 
livelihood enterprises. Others are more dynamic (usually in commerce, transport, services, 
plus artisanal construction and manufacturing). There is no evidence that - given a high 
cost/low infrastructure context - they are notably less efficient than in other countries. With 
weaker infrastructure, less education and lower capital they are, of course, less productive per 
employee/self-employee than those in richer economies. There is also no evidence Africans 
are "natural entrepreneurs" in any meaningfully unique sense. Most sustenance enterprises 
never achieve much expansion and most other small enterprises do not do all that much better 
and have high failure rates. Those are the characteristics of small enterprises in Ghana or 
Germany, Burkina Faso or Bangladesh, Tanzania or Taiwan, Nigeria or the Netherlands,
South Africa or Sweden, Mali or Malaysia.
At this small scale level, both the employment and output proportions are much higher in SSA 
economies than in industrialised or in high growth lower to middle income economies. That is 
a distinctive feature of low income economies with large self-provisioning sectors which are 
much more prevalent in SSA than in any other sub-region.
What is most notable - sketchily on employment and sectoral establishment survey data, but 
also from more micro case studies and qualitative observation - is that medium sized 
enterprises are relatively few, especially as sub-contractors or service providers to large 
enterprises and government. This is in marked contrast to Eastern and Southern Asia.
The least implausible interpretation is that there are barriers to transformation from small to 
medium scale. The existence of successful smaller African businesses plus a handful of big 
ones and rather more senior African managers and professionals employed by large enterprises 
weighs against cultural explanations. The commonest one - extended family links - cuts two 
ways. It is often adduced as a reason for the success of Asian (Indian and Chinese) small 
businesses in achieving transformation to medium and sometimes subsequently to large scale.
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The exceptions to the low proportion of medium enterprises and apparent blockage of 
successful transformation from small to medium are largely minority community (citizen or 
resident alien not in and out expatriate) based.
A particularly clear-cut case is light engineering including heavy maintenance and niche plant 
and equipment fabrication - substantial in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia (and, 
to a much lesser extent, Kenya). It appears to have several unusual characteristics - high 
linkage to large enterprises as customers, sources of entrepreneurs and often promoters, better 
access to semi-professional, artisanal and skilled manual personnel (usually either from the 
owners' communities including their external clusters or from large enterprise) and less 
apparent difficulty in coping with the paper filling and accounting aspects of banks and 
governments, which can readily be avoided by small but much less so by medium scale 
enterprises. Africanisation of this sub-sector has been relatively slow and the impact of pre- 
SA crises and depression apparently particularly severe. In part that relates to public 
enterprises and new external investors - and perhaps larger African businesses - being more 
inclined to carry on such activities in-house and/or to assume they cannot be purchased 
locally.
Part of the problem is that import allocations are skewed - almost inevitably - to the large 
scale sub-sector. For both licence seekers and providers, the economies of scale in transaction 
costs are very high and specialist production input wholesalers/importers catering to bulking 
up medium scale enterprises' applications very rare. That has adversely affected the whole 
medium scale sub-sector. The medium scale large enterprise suppliers may have suffered 
because in-house units could perform better precisely because their import needs could be 
catered for in the overall import allocation request of the whole enterprise or enterprise group 
and they did not think of importing the inputs on their behalf. To that extent foreign 
exchange liberalisation and especially no paper work forex shops (whether free-standing 
bureaux de changes or bank "second market" operations) should have been disproportionately 
beneficial to medium and small enterprises.
Five barriers to transformation can be identified fairly easily. More may well exist.
1. Paperwork both internal and external shifts from relatively rare and largely optional for 
the small to much heavier and necessary at medium scale. Back of head accounts and 
back of envelope (or no) trade tax preparation can work until a firm is large, complex and 
visible enough to require physical and financial records for its own purposes and written 
analogues for business transaction and tax purposes. Small African entrepreneurs have 
little or no experience with such paper work and no very evident way to gain it except by 
trial and error.
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2 Specialised skills also pose problems when requirements go beyond those of the 
enterprise head and (perhaps) his (or her) immediate family. The obstacle is both 
quantitative and qualitative. A vehicle repair artisan wishing to expand his garage needs to 
hire more artisans (not just apprentices and journeymen supervised by himself). At the 
1, same time he is likely to need to add a bookkeeper. The only reliable route is often to bid 
away from large enterprises - e g. for maintenance foremen and artisans - who can train for 
»r themselves. This is relatively expensive - large enterprises attempt to protect their training 
investment by holding on to graduands.
3. Financial requirements go beyond what own and family cash flow plus traditional credit 
market institutions can supply. But without written records and a multi year operating 
record, banks are reluctant to extend even working capital finance and often do not have 
term finance for building construction nor plant and equipment hire purchase facilities. 
Further, the typical small scale enterprise has little or no experience with banks - and vice 
versa - so that learning about each other renders initial transaction costs high for each side.
4. Market access (and to a lesser degree input access) also face barriers when the market 
scope needed is beyond what the proprietor and a salesman can handle (usually locally)
 ^ and below what is needed to justify in-house wholesaling and distribution capacity. 
Specialist promoter, distributor, stockholder enterprises serving a range of middle 
producers and linking them to regional and national markets are rare. Large enterprises 
tend either to import, to buy via generalist importers or to prefer large domestic producer 
sources. This applies to vehicle repairs, construction and maintenance as well as to 
manufacturing and food processing and to government purchasers as well as to enterprise. 
In part this is habit and in part paper/rule book rigidity, but in part it represents perceived 
higher transaction costs per unit o f expenditure from more/smaller purchases.
! 5. Limited large/middle enterprise links flow from and exacerbate the previous
constraints. Term contracts with given minimum purchase (and supply) levels would 
facilitate access to bank credit and parallel input supply contracts (e.g. spares for a vehicle 
maintenance contract), could reduce uncertainties and working capita requirements. In 
some cases large unit training programmes could include some personnel (skilled manual, 
foremen, bookkeepers) for medium sized business associates and in others provision of 
specialist advice (e.g. stock management, accounts format) and/or services (e.g. auditing) 
could be mutually beneficial. Examples of this do exist in SSA but appear limited relative 
to Asia - notably, but not only, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong - or 
South Europe - e.g. Cyprus, Italy.
is correct to point out that these obstacles to expansion are not unique to SSA. Most small 
■puses anywhere never become large and in most countries the majority beyond the
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household livelihood level fail. However, there are - as noted - contextual reasons increasing 
barriers in SSA and, at least on the face of it, the medium scale sector is unusually small 
relative to the overall economy and also relatively weak.
Does It Matter? Why
To point to a missing middle and to probable causal factors is one thing. To argue that these 
contextual, structural factors have macroeconomic consequences which may help explain 
persistent underperformance is quite another. The former has been done on occasion, the 
latter has not been attempted systematically to date.
How - if at all - does the weakness of the medium sized sector raise costs or limit 
opportunities for production and exchange by small and large enterprises? Three possible 
clusters of such costs and constraints can be identified:
a. lack of medium enterprises forces large to engage in a plethora of peripheral 
activities - probably at relatively high cost and certainly distracting from focus on 
necessary core activities. At the same time it may limit or prevent market (sales and 
sources, goods and services) access for small and other medium scale (or would-be 
medium scale) enterprises.
b. a 'natural' ladder from small to medium to large is barred at the small/medium 
transition stage. Arguably this limits entrepreneurial learning, labour force skills 
development, enterprise capital accumulation (domestic savings/investment). That may 
constrain overall savings and investment growth over time and bias it toward large scale 
(dominantly foreign) enterprises.
c. If expanding a given business is perceived as impossible or very risky, either 
extemalisation of capital or a proliferation of parallel small scale enterprises (micro 
conglomerates) may be encouraged beyond levels prudent (for the asset holder) portfolio 
diversification would suggest were expansion a live option. Of the proliferation only 
investment in education and training (including on-the-job in the added businesses) of 
children and other relatives would appear likely to have external economics.
The lack of strong middle scale enterprises creates gaps. These limit market access for 
small (and especially small seeking to expand to medium) enterprises and raise costs and 
capital requirements for large enterprises. The Ghanaian commercial sector illustrates
these effects.
On the face o f it Ghana is a hive of commercial activity. Up to a point this is valid From stall 
traders through bout.ques, small supermarkets and small hotels there are large numbers o f
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competent enterprises. Wholesalers in the sense of bulkers and bulk breakers are also 
plentiful. But at wholesale level there are gaps. Wholesalers willing and able to enter into 
annual contracts for given quantities either on the buying or selling side are few and far 
between especially for domestic products. For example, at the end of the 1980s Ashanti 
Goldfields could not find any wholesalers willing and able to enter into a contract to supply 
250 tonnes of rice a month to its core establishment in a secondary town on a main highway 
which is an arterial trade link. That is not unrelated to perennial difficulties in getting the 
domestic rice crop to market exacerbated because the marginally profitable, 5% to 10% of 
market flow public sector food buyer-wholesaler-retailer has been virtually wound up in an ill- 
advised part of SA. Similar problems affect palm oil. The implications for domestic food 
processors and for manufacturers are clear. Either they must be small enough to sell from the 
plant to nearby retailers or large enough to operate de facto in-house wholesaling and 
distribution functions including stock holding.
Ashanti Goldfields exemplifies the economic activity sprawl resulting from the missing middle. 
It builds, owns, operates and maintains: retail stores, housing estates, canteens and bars, a 
piggery, a dairy and vegetable production. When asked why, at the end of the 1980s, the 
management's response was that no satisfactory alternative could be found. As it had 
withdrawn from the Accra hotel business (where it had opened an establishment to guarantee 
quality accommodation for its business visitors) when an array of reasonable quality middle 
size domestic hotels emerged, this response is probably accurate both as to belief and as to 
reality. In general large companies in SSA operate far more peripheral activities than 
elsewhere precisely because they cannot - or believe they cannot - hire-in medium scale 
contractors/suppliers. Both overt answers to queries and the way the units are run suggest 
they are not seen as useful secondary profit centres but as rather tedious service departments 
run to underpin key production operations (including worker morale).
The broken ladder (or stairway) impact is evident for owners. If small enterprises cannot 
readily become medium, then medium and large scale management whether entrepreneurial or 
employee can only be developed in the managerial cadres of large enterprises (including the 
state). Those are logical routes (and ones which have produced many successful 
businessmen), the question is whether it is desirable that they be the only ones.
The skills issue is less clear-cut. Certainly a more dynamic and larger middle would build up 
larger para-professional s, foremen, artisanal and skilled manual worker pools. In that way it 
could be expected to improve overall labour force quality and productivity. That would lower 
labour cost per unit of output (at present often high in Africa especially in comparison to Asia) 
and reduce the initial recruitment and training costs of new enterprises - especially large and 
other middle ones. The question is how quantitatively significant this would be.
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If at any one time and cumulatively over time the total operating surpluses of enterprises are 
smaller that constrains domestic savings and investment growth - by large and small 
enterprises and overall as well as by middle. The savings-investment-growth impact over 
time depends in large part on what successful small businesses do with their present surpluses 
different from what would occur were there not severe constraints on expansion. This factor 
also pertains to large if they have to tie up capital in low return peripheral activities instead of 
contracting them out and concentrating on core production areas.
If many successful small enterprises try to expand, lose their way and go bust, the cost in 
savings and employed entrepreneurial capacity is evident. If capital externalisation to safe, 
low return foreign holdings is common, that evidently has negative externalities as to 
domestically available savings and investment and (given the relative unlikelihood of external 
middle venture inflow) to lower employment and output growth rates. Somewhat similar 
considerations may apply to investment in domestic luxury rental housing.
Of special interest is the micro conglomerate. In Ghana for example, this may include three 
or more of a commercial farm (usually but not always cocoa), a rural to urban transport 
company, a town shop and urban rental premises. Certainly this diversifies assets in a risk 
lowering way. But it clearly loses opportunities for specialisation and dilutes the 
entrepreneur's attention to any one business. Partly because of the latter, most household 
micro conglomerates invest in younger members (especially, but not only, the entrepreneur's 
children). That adds new management personnel and/or diversifies revenue sources by adding 
salaried employment to the family portfolio. As the new businesses provide learning 
opportunities and ladders (up to a point) for the younger entrepreneurs as well as a more 
general labour force quality enhancing impact from the education, such investment 
diversification has positive externalities, but ones equally accessible via expansion of the 
existing enterprise.
The same is unlikely to be true of the horizontal proliferation itself. Micro conglomerates are 
usually - as is often true of macro - less than the sum of their parts. That they proliferate in 
SSA is probably a result not of inaccurate investor perceptives but of market failure - 
expanding a single business faces severe constraints and high risks.
What Might Be Done?
If the case is made out that there is a missing middle in African enterprise structures and that 
this pattern contributes to low investible surplus, slow skills development and lower 
investment efficiency, the question of what might be done by whom, arises.
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Once that question is accepted onto the agenda there will need to be more targeted data 
c o l l e c t i o n .  More research - no matter how applied - is (rightly) never a popular policy 
■s proposal, but it can avoid throwing substantial resources at non-problems or allocating them in 
ways quite unfriendly to intended users. One set of data needed is a micro sample survey 
f (probably on a zonal basis) allowing knowledge of key parameters of medium enterprises, 
what problems their proprietors see as key constraints on success and what action by whom 
they believe could relax those constraints.
Among the candidates for action are:
a. the overseas African Diaspora members with assets plus goodwill toward their home 
countries but no evident routes for using the first productively (and safely) in the service of 
the second;
b. large enterprises in respect of their business relations with middle ones;
c. states in terms of influencing/facilitating the first two lines of action, of removing 
unnecessary and streamlining appropriate registration, information and data collection and 
of providing services which target specific constraints.
The concept of harnessing overseas African resources - especially of finance but also of 
g skills - to enterprise development has been raised. Most recent ideas turn on investment
trusts. While appropriate to buying stakes in large enterprises, it is somewhat doubtfully 
appropriate to middle sized enterprise investment.
Two actual linkage patterns in Africa may offer clues to more contextually relevant 
approaches. The first is the Lebanese ("Syrian" in Francophone African terminology) 
community. Enterprises are largely medium scale having evolved from decades earlier small 
, scale beginnings. Finance and trained personnel from Lebanon - and more particularly from
enterprise specific extended families and villages - are regularly imported. From an African 
territorial perspective there are resource flow problems, because profits are largely remitted 
and successful businessmen retire to home areas in Lebanon with sons and nephews replacing 
them. But the key to success appears to be the supporting linkages to finance/experience/skill 
pulls not any specific non-African cultural trait.
An African parallel is the Somali trading and transport community. It too features cross 
investment and skilled personnel links among enterprises operated by lineage group or sub­
clan members. These include enterprises in East African states, Djibouti and Ethiopia as well 
as in Somalia/Somaliland plus trade and transport links to the Arabian Peninsular and some 
)uth European countries. Here most enterprises (at home and abroad) are small, but 
es ’ful small ones do make the transfer to successful medium sized, e.g. from 1 or 2 lorries
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to 10 or 20 plus a couple of small planes and an Antonov or 707 and occasionally to large 
scale (at least $25 million turnover in one case). That they have adapted to war and are able 
to maintain exchange and transport across/between up to four mutually hostile zones, as well 
as direct links to the Arabian Peninsula, Ethiopia and East Africa says a good deal about their 
resilience. Again there is the problem of net flows and retirement (at least until recently) home 
to Somalia and also that of a macro economically and socially unattractive key sub-trade 
(khatt, a narcotic leaf which is costly in user money, time and diligence). But the fact of a 
dynamic system based on evolved historic group linkages stands out clearly.
What might more general African parallels be? One element would seem likely to be an 
extended family or home village definition of the enterprise base group. The point is affinity 
not that the enterprises necessarily, or even necessarily largely, would be in the home base 
area. The affinity would give a foundation of trust and of established willingness to work 
together which an investment trust with no non-economic bonding of members (and 
borrowers) would find hard to replicate.
Structures such as tontines and village support schemes already have structures which do 
communicate among far flung members and - at least in the successful cases - manage fund 
flows. Therefore, these aspects should not in themselves be problems. Nor - if a reasonable 
overall rate o f return is achieved so overseas 'funding members' can and do get at least 6% to 
10% interest and/or profit share return on capital - should resource mobilisation pose 
insuperable problems. The business links and skills injection elements may be harder to 
supply. Overseas African are not as business based as Lebanese or Somali communities and 
do not necessarily have relatives who have acquired relevant skills to send home. However, it 
would appear worthwhile that both African business groups and concerned governments and 
research bodies look into the potential and the possible structures of home base-urban 
resettlers-overseas Diaspora groupings to pool and exchange capital, skilled personnel, 
experience and business contacts.
The second area in which relevant action must be taken is by large enterprises and 
government purchasing units. Here - at least for the enterprises - mutual interest needs to 
be demonstrated. Government (especially local and regional government purchasing units 
might consider a 5 /o preference for small and middle enterprises. However, this is probably 
much less important than redesigning tenders in manageable sized chunks with phased delivery 
related to supplier capacity and actual date of use requirements (as opposed to delivering a 
whole year's supply at one go) and progress payments on all orders which are large relative to 
the size o f the supplier. The latter payments would be analogous to ihose which are standard 
in the case o f construction contracts.
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Large enterprise links with medium which are frequent and mutually strengthening in much o f 
I the world, but less common in SSA, include:-
r a Purchases by large producers of:
ne
i ancillary services from data processing through canteen management to repair and 
maintenance;
ii. tools, heavy repairs, fabricated plant (e.g. vats, tanks, tubes, frames);
iii. components for products (e.g. bicycle tyres, saddle covers, handle grips, lights).
b Purchases by wholesalers and retail chains of medium scale producer products which 
then go into their regional or national distribution nets;
k
c. Provision of training, specialised services, quality control, perhaps credit guarantees to 
lenders or progress payments toward working capital requirements and other services to 
medium scale partners to improve their products' quality and timeliness of delivery.
At present the horizontal agglomeration of activities and limited buying in of components by 
large producers and the concentration on imports or domestic large scale producers in 
wholesaler sourcing create a vicious circle. There are few satisfactory medium scale 
enterprises with whom to deal. Therefore, large enterprises take the activities in-house. As a 
result, opportunities for relevant middle business suppliers-contractors-distributors to develop 
are limited and they do not develop. That apparently justifies the initial in-house 
t agglomeration decision.
From a short term market forces (more accurately structures) perspective this may well be 
prudent for large businesses. However, as Unilever's United Africa Company found when it 
began specialising out of retailing and sub-wholesaling, the speed with which competent 
African entrants occupied the open spaces was high and the gains in terms of UAC profit per 
unit of capital employed were significant. That process continues with its latest phase 
conversion of West African department stores into specialist boutique arcades with most units 
leased to middle (or 'large small') businesses.
What large businesses need to do is to analyse what goods, services and distribution channels 
they would - given satisfactory businesses with whom to deal - wish to 'spin off. The next 
step is to explore whether it is already possible to do so (which it may be - not looking 
guarantees not finding) and if not what capabilities potential suppliers/distributors would need 
° add (Timeliness of delivery? Guaranteed volume? Quality control?). From that the issue 
ai ises of what particular personnel, facility or working capital constraints on achieving the 
idciitions may be and how - if at all - constraint easing could be made part of an ongoing
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business relationship. And finally - would such a strategic shift to 'spin off pay, under
what conditions/assumptions and how fast?
Certainly working capital (e.g. by progress payments), quality control (by manuals, 
demonstrations, training), volume/delivery date reliability (by setting mutually manageable 
schedules and guarantees) and other items (e.g. auditing at viable - to both sides - charges, use 
of large company skill training programmes) can be included in contracts. To attempt cross 
country, cross sectoral, timeless rule books would be folly. However, potentially fruitful 
approaches are reasonably general and widely applicable as exemplified by UAC in commerce 
in West Africa, Sears Roebuck in sourcing in Latin America, most major Japanese 
manufacturers in sourcing and distribution.
Business associations - e.g. Chambers of Commerce or of Mines, Business Federations - also 
need to review their procedures, services and fees to see whether these are user friendly (or 
even user intelligible) for middle business. For example, fixed membership fees as opposed to 
turnover related ones are discriminatory; the data from a rapid referral business opportunities 
system needed by a large business with specialist personnel and external contacts are different 
from those of a middle sized enterprise with neither.
The split-offs from long running business groups in Africa are usually explained in terms of 
public/private or communal (new black versus old line external and/or minority community) 
differences. This is frequently only part of the story. The specific interests as well as the 
forms of dialogue and conducting relations with government or trade unions with which they 
are happy of a $50,000,000 turnover, 2,500 employee integrated textile manufacturer and of a 
$1,000,000 turnover, 100 employees, school and employer uniform maker are by no means 
identical irrespective of the citizenship and/or cultural lineage of owners/managers. If an 
association is to represent both, it must be user friendly to both. In some cases this may point 
to federated sub-associations or special committees; more generally it requires recognition of 
and addressing the problems.
Government action will probably not be very effective if conducted unilaterally. Com- 
munity/"home base links and large/middle business relationships cannot be introduced by fiat. 
Useful government action can go little beyond pointing out potentials, perhaps financing 
studies and pilot training schemes and ensuring legislation and administration do not include 
needless barriers. Contrary perhaps to popular impression, most large businesses prefer 
harmonious relationships with government and are willing to consider well argued, factually 
grounded proposals so that - at least sometimes - the kilometerage in such actions may be not
inconsiderable.
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Beyond that potentially useful government actions fall into five clusters:
a developing two-way information flow channels with middle businesses;
b following business practices friendly to middle enterprises. - e.g. in purchasing policy
se and supplier advising - similar to those appropriate for large enterprises;
is
c. streamlining regulations with a view to decreasing the number and complexity of 
e contacts needed by any enterprise;
d. removing policies which appear to be size neutral but are in fact anti middle 
business, e.g. 40% or 50% profit tax rates on profits of unincorporated businesses when
o the comparable personal income tax rate would be 20% or 25%;
e. perhaps launching (or revising) some programmes, e.g. in training, facilities/premises 
hire, allowances for initial promotional activity in new markets, particularly useful to 
medium sized businesses.
t
The communication channel cluster is listed first because without its results efficient 
government action on the other four will be much less likely. In general SSA governments 
(and not only SSA ones) are not well informed on middle business problems, constraints 
criticisms, potentials and especially not on how actual middle sized businesses perceive them. 
The simple solution - ask them - is also a correct one. The advantages of facilitating contact 
by representatives of these businesses - either as part of overall business groups or via 
chambers of their own - should be apparent.
It is sometimes argued that large businesses lobby for "rents" (e.g. protection and subsidies 
and/or monopoly positions) whereas medium, because greater in number, are less rent seeking 
and likely to make proposals more in the public interest. When the proposition is put in that 
form there is little substance to it, except for pro-competition legislation in respect to which 
the self-interest of the medium scale is parallel to the public interest and usually at least in 
tension with that of large scale enterprises.
Assuming a forum representative o f medium business is effective, its proposals will be for 
actions favourable to its members. On protection and low taxes these are not inherently less 
(nor more) rent seeking than those of large enterprises and on safety regulations and 
enforcement of fair employment practices they are likely to be much worse because there are 
economies of scale in complying with such standards.
However, spokesmen for middle businesses can call attention to apparently uniform 
gulations which in practice introduce biases against middle (and sometimes small) firms:
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a. business taxes at 40% or 50% on unincorporated business incomes of any size
without reference to what the comparable (often lower) personal income tax rate for 
proprietor (or proprietors) would be. A strong case exists either for taxing all 
unincorporated business profits as personal income of owners or offering an option for 
personal income treatment or taxation at an enterprise rate (say 30%) to the extent profits 
are reinvested - evidently whichever is lower;
b. multiple regulations requiring multiple applications to different offices are very 
confusing and user unfriendly to medium scale (and to newly arrived foreign) businesses. 
They are less of a nuisance to larger (and longer established) ones. "One stop shops" 
with a single form handed in at one office (even if processed in parallel by relevant health 
and safety, labour, town planning and Treasury units) and dealt with promptly in dialogue 
with a single contact officer are likely to raise efficiency for all enterprises (and quite 
possibly government units as well) but the user friendliness gains will be proportionately 
largest for middle businesses;
c. health, safety, industrial relations and environmental regulations designed - and 
suitable - for large enterprises may be unnecessary as well as burdensome for small scale. 
(For example, in the Philippines a one washroom for each shop rule's alteration to one per 
floor area unit was disproportionately beneficial to arcades of small shops and restaurants.) 
However, care needs to be taken to identify public interest costs which may introduce a 
trade-off. (For example, unsafe passenger vehicles are not less against the public interest 
because individual fleet sizes are lower; medium scale mining and ore processing cannot be 
freed from pollution controls simply because the economies of scale on non-polluting 
technologies are often very large.)
On the face of it, each of these sets of biased uniformities would appear to be anti small even 
more than anti middle business. This is in practice not so because the small can usually 
avoid (or evade) them while the more visible middle cannot.
The experience of state intervention in respect to enterprise development - especially in SSA - 
is at best mixed and at worst disastrous. This is in part because it has tended to throw capital 
(subsidised loans and industrial estates) at the problem (often without defining it) and to 
provide generalised training programmes with neither prior consultation with proposed users 
as to priorities nor ongoing monitoring of results to allow prompt adaptation. But another 
cause is probably seeking to see state support as free-standing rather than linked to parallel 
"home base" and large enterprise (including state purchasing units) action.
There are at least four areas in which state action - if based on prior data as to user needs and 
monitoring o f  results - might be useful:
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First, improving access to credit - preferably via financial institutions or windows run on an 
enterprise basis, perhaps with partial (not full) government guarantees. For example, a hire 
purchase company owned jointly by a bank and several vehicle-plant-equipment wholesalers 
would have access to multiple data sources on prospective clients and certainly a greater 
ability to keep track of them than a government. Similarly, an office-industrial-commercial 
building lender owned by insurance companies and pension funds should do a better job of 
credit assessment and collection than a Treasury. In respect to lending by banks (or other 
financial institutions) as wholesalers to 'traditional' tontines or credit societies, state 
regulatory, licensing and technical assistance (e.g. in accounting and record keeping) actions in 
respect to the latter could make them more acceptable clients and a partial guarantee phased 
out over a few years might encourage initial financial institution exploration of lending 
opportunities and risks.
Facilities provision is an area in which most supposedly small enterprise oriented estates have 
been better suited to medium sized and, in any case, frequently provided too much (and often 
ill-chosen items) in the way of buildings, plant and equipment. The middle size point is 
predictable - the most common model is Indian industrial estates which are primarily middle 
enterprise serving.
The case for site and service schemes - cleared, levelled, plotted land with access to 
transport, communications, electricity, water and customers/suppliers is often strong. 
Economies of scale do exist at that level (as do possibilities of closed ended subsidies by initial 
period rent deferral) and requirements are relatively homogenous assuming flexibility as to 
plot size.
The case for providing buildings - where needs vary much more - is low and that for standard 
machinery provision near nil. If the access to mortgage and hire purchase bottlenecks can be 
cleared, the enterprises can finance their own - more appropriate - buildings, plant and 
equipment. If an estate based maintenance and repair facility is commercially needed by other 
firms located there, it is quite practicable to induce a middle scale foundry and light 
engineering company to locate on the estate - precisely because it will thereby attract 
additional business.
Training is an activity with economies of scale and external economies - thus one in which 
state action has potential. On the other hand, experience is on average poor. Middle 
enterprises are not much interested in tertiary (university or technical college) graduates 
because they are used to higher levels of technology/plant availability and of accounting 
systems as well as perceived as very expensive and footloose. On the other hand, most 
vocational high schools are perceived as training inappropriately and to a low quality either in 
skills or work habits.
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Exceptions do exist Some are craftsmen certificate related vocational training 
institutions run by Ministries of Labour or parallel ones in secretarial and bookkeeping skills 
run either commercially or quasi autonomously with professional association plus user 
dominated boards. This group of institutions in Tanzania do appear to be relatively well 
regarded by employers and (as a result one supposes) by potential students even though they 
have low perceived status with political, official or business elites. How many of their 
graduates go to large enterprises or self-employment as opposed to middle is unclear and 
would be worth checking.
Middle (and small) businesses do carry out some apprenticeship training. It is virtually all 
learning by observing and doing and is hard to evaluate (not least by a potential next 
employer). There could be linkages between the applied vocational programmes and these 
apprenticeships. The programme (in consultation with employers) would provide conceptual 
and explanatory teaching plus some demonstration and the employer the on-the-job element. 
The combined programme would lead to vocational certificates. If such a programme was 
serving a purpose, middle enterprises should be willing to provide "released time" to 
employees to participate and to pay fees contributing toward costs.
The debate over whether entrepreneurship can be taught is somewhat beside the point. 
Enterprise accounting, marketing, procuring, financial management, inventory control, 
personnel management, etc., can be taught. The new (or more usually small becoming 
middle) business head does have (and usually perceives he or she has) needs which can be met 
by fairly brief modular courses on these topics. To be user friendly, they probably need to be 
evenings and/or weekends or perhaps in part by distance learning (radio and post) - 
owner/managers can rarely take two weeks, let alone six months, off Also they need to be 
based on surveys of perceived middle enterprise proprietor/manager needs not 'scaling down' 
courses originally intended for top management at large enterprises nor assuming the needs of 
senior managers in terms of range of skills scale down with firm size.
Supporting initial learning costs is in principle a fourth appropriate area for state support. 
The problem is in getting value for money and avoiding permanent subsidisation of non­
learning by the same groups of enterprises.
Market access development is a possible area. The most usual programmes relate to external 
export market development travel and attendance at international trade fairs, which are 
probably primarily relevant either to large or well established middle enterprises. Similar 
domestic schemes are more likely to help emerging middle sized. Whether national and 
regional product exhibitions/sales should be linked to permanent sales sites is unclear - leaving 
such facilities vacant most of the year does seem pointless.
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However, the state should not go into the wholesale distribution or procurement business 
for middle (or small) businesses. That is a task for commercial enterprises - especially 
wholesalers or urban multi line retail stores.
The urban retail outlet issue is one raised by middle enterprises in a number of African cities. 
In general their premises are both far from retail customer concentrations and scattered.
Estates - with a commercial building in which each enterprise could have a stall - might help 
remedy the second problem. In principle downtown (or market area) premises leased to 
several enterprises as a group might be useful. Given the decline of departmental stores in 
much of SSA in the face o f boutique competition, it is possible some commercial operators 
would be interested in leasing all or part of such stores in this way.
The approach sketched above is clearly not laissez faire but interventionist. It is based on the 
contention that specific market failures - or at any rate barriers - impede the development of 
middle sized enterprises in SSA with consequential macroeconomic external diseconomies.
The approach is not primarily regulatory and is initial entry cost reducing rather than 
subsidising. Its success - or otherwise - will depend on convincing the large scale enterprise 
sector (as sources of finance and markets) to increase commercial links with the middle. The 
elements do fall within the rubric of creating a favourable climate for enterprises not of 
building a permanently protected hothouse.
I X .
I m p l i c a t i o n s  F o r  S t r a t e g i c  B u i l d i n g  B l o c k s
This study is not an exercise in building strategies - continental, sub-regional or national - but 
rather one of ground clearing to identify structural problems and to review past strategic 
options in respect to successes, limitations and present relevance - or otherwise. That said it 
shoul d seek to offer a set of stones useful for laying foundations as well as a short list of 
obstacles which strategies needed to overcome or to find ways around.
The or is important - some obstacles are irremovable at least by Africa. It is one thing to 
lobby for external debt writedowns - the debt overhang is a removable obstacle. Equally 
rundown of - say - copper mining by failing to invest in cost reduction and proving/opening of 
new sources to sustain output is bad economic housekeeping. But to seek to reverse the 
technical substitution of fibre optics for copper cable or to compete out of existence or to lock 
■nto production ceilings the lower cost Latin American and Asian producers, whether by 
export subsidisation or attempts to create either a producer or a producer/user cartel, is 
Un vor^able under present or any likely global balance of economic power and policy. African
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economies do suffer from adverse terms of trade trends in oligopsomstic markets. That is a 
problem. But since Africa lacks the power to restructure global markets or to establish 
countervailing oligopolistic power and the record and prospects of attempts to create 
producer-consumer groups to smooth - let alone block - price trends are remarkably 
unpromising, the problem can only be avoided by developing new export structures with 
higher pre-export value added and a product mix with more buoyant income, technological 
and learning elasticities.
Five abiding obstacles to sustained development - however defined - stand out in SSA.
1 economic growth underperformance at least since the mid-1920s with the fleeting 
general exception of the second half of the 1970s and a number of initial export economy 
or export price boom exceptions in up to half the individual countries;
2. An export quality deficit and a growing quantity one, i.e. concentration on increasingly 
low income, use, learning - as well as price - elasticity goods with a growing gap between 
attainable exports and minimum import levels consistent with sustained growth;
3. human investment/basic services inadequacy quantitatively, qualitatively and equitably 
(bias against females, rural areas in general and pastoralists in particular) with severe long 
term productivity, competitiveness, growth and poverty consequences;
4. parallel physical infrastructure gaps which limit (and over-concentrate) production and 
raise enterprise unit costs rendering them less competitive domestically as well as in export 
markets, while also forcing down employee productivity (and pay) and worsening rural 
incomes and rural/transport terms of trade;
5. law and order deficits in an increasing number of cases leading either to total breakdown 
o f predictable security for ordinary household and enterprise activities or/and to war.
The post colonial record on growth may be slightly less bad than the colonial, but at 2% 
annual growth versus 6% needed for political and socio economic stability and development 
(without which disorder is likely to choke output growth) it is now grossly inadequate. Even 
1980s and 1990s success stories seem to be stalled in the 3.5% to 5% range. The argument 
that growth is not enough is valid but is only tangentially relevant. Without sustained, 
buoyant overall resource availability growth no qualitative, structural or moral 
economy goals are likely to be both achievable and sustainable
The export growth record has on balance been poorer since independence. Opening up and 
terms o f trade booms excluded, it has rarely been over 2% a year in real terms. Since 1980 
that is probably below the annual terms of trade loss. The point at issue is not an export
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oriented strategy or not, but that no strategy can survive without real external resource 
growth of 5% to 7% (broadly comparable to output growth). Since ODA is unlikely to rise at 
all in overall real levels and enterprise investment will not hasten into import capacity 
strangled economies, that implies the need for 5% to 7% post terms of trade loss export 
growth trends. That in turn requires structural transformation of exports, dominantly by 
addition, toward greater pre-export value added, buoyancy and diversity of products and 
markets.
Human investment did boom over 1995-1979, the colonial twilight and initial independence 
period. But these gains never achieved Universal Access to Basic Services (except in some 
cases for education) and have since been severely eroded at least in per capita and in 
qualitative terms.
Similarly, the infrastructural deficit was also reduced over the 1955-1979 period. 'Deferred' 
maintenance and population growth have resulted in severe subsequent backsliding in a 
majority of cases (not excluding less poor economies such as South Africa).
Law and order - never adequate by itself to cause development, but necessary for much else 
to be achieved - on balance improved up to the 1970s. Totally collapsed states and sub­
regional epidemics of wars are later developments albeit some have earlier roots (the Horn 
from the early 1970s, Central Africa - with lulls - from the 1960s, West Africa flaring up in the
1990s).
Two additional performance deficits may be basic or may derive from the five listed:
a. net domestic investment of about half the levels needed to sustain 6% annual overall 
output growth paralleled by lower still domestic savings rates;
b. a missing middle in the enterprise sector which appears likely to raise costs (and disperse 
energies) of large enterprises, to limit organic growth of domestic employment-skills- 
savings-enterprise development and entrepreneurship.
The investment deficit appears roughly evenly split - half public (water, power, 
communications, transport) and half enterprise. It has worsened sharply since 1979. Even in 
the 1970s it is doubtful net fixed investment to overall production ratios were consistent with 
much above 4% sustained growth (as indeed achieved over 1975-79). The saving deficit 
appears to have worsened sharply with the protracted 1980s and 1990s recession albeit part of 
this fall may represent asset diversification abroad (capital flight) and, therefore, be more 
readily recoverable were sustained forward motion to be - and to be seen by savers and asset 
holders to be - achieved.
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The missing middle is readily observable, but systematic measurement is, to date, not 
practicable. Its results are fairly clearly negative - the issue is their size. This deficit is one 
which has existed since the initial colonial era growth of African business and African senior 
professionals and public servants was smashed at the turn of the last century. In practise, 
ventures (and not infrequently expatriate state firms or state-private joint ventures) were 
diversified after independence to external private, domestic state, joint domestic state/external 
private and - less commonly outside South Africa - private joint venture large enterprise. 
Medium scale remained subordinate and constricted by severe obstacles to entering medium 
from small.
Three further structural barriers arise from these five areas of sustained underperformance: 
food shortages at national and household levels, external debt service overhangs and rising 
absolute poverty (effective exclusion from production as well as human development)
Food output has grown less rapidly than population since the late 1950s in West Africa. A 
parallel trend in Madagascar and in Ethiopia may have been stabilised in the 1990s. Since 
1979 drought cycles may or may not have become more severe. They have become more 
extended which increases the problematic nature of national or household evening out of year 
to year deficits or surpluses. In respect to famine, however, the key factor is war which - as 
conducted in SSA - simultaneously destroys household capacity to produce food, to earn 
income to buy food and to transport either commercial or relief food. Indeed, reduced 
malnutrition and near ending of famine are the most immediate and least uncertain aspects of 
peace dividends, e.g. post 1992 Mozambique and Ethiopia, in contrast to Angola and Sudan, 
and in Somaliland contrasted to Somalia since 1991. The underlying low trend production 
growth exacerbates ability to handle output instability as well as household level deficits of 
entitlements because drought wipes out both self-provisioning and cash income leaving little 
capacity to buy grain. National capacity to transport and to finance free emergency supplies is 
also constricted by past low growth of fiscal revenues (in any event negatively impacted in 
drought years) and deterioration of infrastructure. Tanzania in 1992-93 (1991-92 drought) 
illustrated this point. Nationally food output and stocks were adequate, but at least 500,000 
households had lost much or all of their entitlements while the Treasury had the grim choice of 
either not supplying the standard maize/beans rations to senior female members of non-waged 
households in drought afflicted districts or of breaching IMF "trigger clauses" and running the 
risk o f aid suspension. In the end, human and political priorities (and perhaps inertia - the 
famine prevention programme was over a third of a century old and had been needed in two or 
more of 130 odd districts virtually every year) won, and donors de facto accepted the 
'excessive' borrowing.
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E x t e r n a l  debt service overhangs flow primarily from low export growth, failed attempts to 
kick-start high growth by heavy plant and machinery investment financed by borrowing and 
persistence in seeking to operate crisis non-coping strategies. As the Fund, the Bank, the UK 
and the USA agree, up to 30 SSA economies cannot possibly pay the full present value of 
their external debt service obligations or cannot do so consistent with significant growth.
Absolute poverty has afflicted a growing proportion of households because of the 
interlocking output growth - access to basic services - rural infrastructure capacity. While the 
largest single source of increase is war, the reversal process (which, as opposed to survival 
support, is rarely possible to start before the end of the war) is not dissimilar in broad outline 
to that where the output, services and infrastructure deficits have other causes. No more than 
rains bring dead camels back to life does peace restore burnt out lorries, blown up bridges, 
gutted hospitals or mine sabotaged tree groves. The food growth deficit dominates the rural 
75% to 80% of absolutely poor households income plight as on average 50% to 60% of their 
income is from self-provisioning and 20% to 30% from sale of food. (Contrary to popular 
impression, domestic food is the main "cash crop" cluster in rural Africa both as to total value 
and to number of households dependent on it as the primary cash income source). The 
absolute poverty challenge affects how to tackle the basic deficits - e.g. 6% growth might not 
provide employment, production opportunities, basic services access or infrastructure relevant 
to poor households. It does not alter the need to redress them, because unless not so poor 
household markets, export opportunities, urban above absolute poverty line wages and state 
fiscal capacity grow rapidly there is no way absolutely poor households (rural or urban) can be 
assisted in climbing out of that status.
Structural Adjustment, Stabilisation, or Better Crisis Management?
What structural adjustment usually has achieved is an end to freefall in respect to growth, 
exports, basic services and infrastructure. Less uniformly it has led to their sustained growth 
recovery to rates equal to population growth and to halting the rise of absolutely poor as a 
proportion of all households. Whether this can be categorised as sustainable stabilisation is 
less clear. The initial imbalances and external debt overhangs, the continued growth deficits 
and the declining trend of ODA (with no comparable magnitude offsetting enterprise 
investment growth trend) mean that many relatively successful - or at any rate sustained - SA 
programmes really amount to more organised, less inefficient crisis management which may 
or may not win through to economic macro stabilisation before collapsing in the face of 
domestic political and social economic deficits.
In respect to the five primary performance deficits, SA has not achieved structural adjustment, 
let alone transformation because it was not designed to do so. Halting freefall, restoring 
output growth to levels equal to that of population, reducing imbalances to manageable levels
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- i.e. structural adjustment from crisis non-coping to a stabilised basis for renewing 
development - was SA's strategy and the intended time frame was initially 3 to 4 years for
any one country. With those goals and that time frame, medium term structural 
transformation strategies were neither a necessary nor a practicable component.
The problem that has emerged (perhaps in large part because SA was based on what turned 
out to be wildly over-optimistic global trade volume and SSA terms of trade projections as 
well as of ODA projections net of non-survival and technical assistance) is that SA has 
produced lesser, slower results than anticipated and therefore been transmuted over time 
into a 10 to 15 year per country medium term strategy. What is acceptable in giving 
overriding priority to economic good housekeeping in the short run is totally inconsistent with 
moral economy, political economy and production structural adjustment needs over the 
medium term.
Structural Adjustment Plus - No Through Road?
SA - at least in its Bank version and that of some bilaterals, NGOs and SSA governments - 
has sought to adjust in one of two ways:
a. taking substantive issues: absolute poverty, basic services, external debt on board;
b. operating a 'two track' approach with countries graduating form 'SA-I' to 'SA and 
Transformation II' at which stage doubling per capita investment in basic services 
(especially health, education, nutrition) and physical infrastructure took top priority.
The first approach arose partly form outside pressure spearheaded by UNICEF and NGOs and 
partly from claw-backs by Bank division vested interests in health, education and 
infrastructure. Parallel external influence lay behind addition of environment and gender to the 
checklists. Once in train the shift was generalised and bolstered by surviving Macnamarans 
counterattacking to restore "absolute poverty alleviation" as a watered down successor to 
"absolute poverty eradication".
Adding these - basically structural - goals to the initial - basically macroeconomic balance or 
sustainable imbalance SA core - appeared to work moderately well in its initial 1985-90 
phase. But it came to a dead end so far as being a route into transformation or a strategy 
toward reduction of either underlying performance deficits or underpinning domestic political 
and social economic sustainability. The reasons are not entirely clear but appear to include:
a. continued dominance by the macro management core - e.g. PER teams - even when the 
broader/longer term transformation approach indicated divergent priorities, sequences and 
time paths;
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b. leading to reduction of the substantive elements to marginalised add-ons (or less 
charitably, Christmas tree baubles unsteadily affixed to the macro management tree of SA 
proper);
c. a side-tracking partly parallel to enhancement of IMF influence on SA in some SSA 
programmes;
d. growing fatigue by African governments and peoples, external funders and eventually by 
the World Bank with 'structural adjustment without end' as a process or a strategy; and
e. a - perhaps, but not necessarily, naive - belief that a new headline would be of major value 
in launching any new strategic initiative.
The graduation approach has encountered similar problems. Only Mauritius (actually prior 
to the conceptualisation of the two-stage approach in 1989) has graduated. It is of some 
interest to explore why it has done so. In Mauritius, stabilisation - basically on external and 
fiscal accounts - was paralleled by overcoming the export and output growth 
underperformance trends through accelerating export of semi-skilled labour embodied in 
manufactured exports and tourism. That not only overcame macroeconomic non­
sustainability; it generated growth of employment at decent wages and reduction of absolute 
poverty while yielding the fiscal flows to deepen already broad access basic services in 
education and health. In that context, reversion to lower overall levels of ODA focused on 
improving already above average and largely undeteriorated transport and communications 
infrastructure was readily attainable while the basic services (educated productive labour 
force) and enterprise-friendly infrastructure spending pulled in external enterprise investment 
to the export-led manufacturing sector. Mauritius' achievement deserves credit - it does 
include a viable transformation with post SA economic good housekeeping. Mauritius' 
strategy was not stabilisation alone, which would probably not have been sustainable - 
certainly not in an untransformed sugar centric, nor in an import substitution, mode. But what 
is viable for a million person island with a relatively high quality labour force and relatively 
good transport, communications, water, power, health and education is not readily adaptable - 
much less replicable - elsewhere. That is perhaps best illustrated by the successes and 
limitations of Botswana which has pursued a not dissimilar strategy from a stronger initial 
fiscal and growth but a much weaker human and physical infrastructure (and geographic and 
geopolitical location) base.
Beyond Mauritius (Botswana never needed an SA programme as economic good 
housekeeping was built in from independence and never collapsed) there have been no 
graduations. As o f  1989, Ghana, Tanzania and perhaps Uganda were perceived as likely
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candidates. But in no case has the 'graduation ceremony' ever been scheduled and in the first 
two, the basic SA exercise has at times come under very severe pressure.
Problems To Building Blocks For Transforming Structures
The record of 1979-1995 suggests seven general foundation requirements for transformation 
strategies:
a. they must be African owned and led for contextual efficiency as well as political
sustainability;
b. while being saleable internationally (almost literally Bankable) because of SSA's continued 
need for net official and unofficial resource inflows;
c. and to a substantial extent depend on short run resource reallocation - with military the 
most hopeful domestic source and expatriate personnel costs and debt service the external 
ones - to institute more rapid growth and more effective tax collection for medium and 
long term sustainability;
d. which in turn implies a high priority to attaining peace and low levels of social disorder 
(including massive criminal activity) as well as rehabilitation (livelihoods), reconstruction 
(infrastructure), revival (public services) to sustain them;
e. requiring more professional and more productive - and therefore more adequately 
paid - public servants in most cases and more of them dominantly in health, education, 
water extension services, constabulary and judiciary (magistracy), infrastructure 
maintenance and tax allocation;
f. articulating and implementing a user friendly pragmatic interventionist strategy and in 
most countries hands on provision, as well as financing, of the bulk of basic services and 
infrastructure.
g. tied to a UABS (universal access to basic services), PPP (production by poor people), 
SNAP (safety net access provision) triangle to tackle absolute poverty reduction, human 
investment/productivity enhancement and political sustainability.
This is a somewhat economistic formulation - especially in respect to peace and 
UABS/PPP/SNAP. That is deliberate because the risk of seeing peace and poverty reduction 
as somehow divorced from macroeconomics, 'out there' and somehow secondary or 
postponeable has been a very real one in the SA period. It is crucial to see that peace/law and 
order/production by poor people are closely interlocked with failure on those fronts virtually 
guaranteeing a poor macroeconomic outturn. Similarly, UABS is not an optional extra or
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'merely' a 'social' desideratum - it is the foundation for medium term increases in labour quality 
and productivity and therefore for growth and competitiveness.
The African leadership issue is probably self-evident - but not self-activating - within SSA. 
External experts - especially brief stay and/or one shot ones - lack the historical, social, 
political, economic and institutional foundations of contextual knowledge necessary to 
conceptualise - let alone articulate - operational strategies. That many Africans lack any 
serious historical contextual knowledge is a more readily remediable weakness. Further, the 
fact that - with exceptions in both directions - Africans are more committed to their contexts 
(not least because they have to live in and with them which - literally - high flying consultants 
do not) is a logical efficiency desideratum. Finally, while a foreign coercive hand (real or 
purported) may be a useful cover reason to institute changes, it cannot provide a stable 
political basis or an enduring foundation of confidence for the long haul.
To argue for African leadership and strategic initiatives is not to argue for isolationism. No 
country or continent has a monopoly either on insights into its own issues or on specialist 
technical knowledge. Furthermore, in a quasi global economy of which it is the weakest 
region, SSA has to take the opinions, interests and actions of others into account. There is no 
way to avoid dialogue and compromise - nor was there in the 1960s or 1970s and nor have 
more self-confident and successful African economy governments, e.g. those of Botswana and 
Mauritius - sought to do so. The issue is dialogue and compromise versus dictation and 
imposition both at the level of style and at that of substance.
Moving from a 2% to 5% range of trend annual growth rates to a 5% to 9% one requires both 
more resources allocated to priority purposes and their more effective use. In the short run 
this does require reallocation of both domestic and external resources and particularly those 
within the public sector. That assertion is not misplaced.
The real questions are from what to what. Cutting hospitals which are already near 
qualitative and quantitative collapse to expand clinics or raising fees on absolutely poor people 
to improve the quality of primary education and health care to which they then have no access 
(and pay no fees!) are not self-evidently the wisest reallocations. A different short list could 
include:
a. reduced military spending - especially on arms, heavy equipment, vehicles, ammunition 
and fuel - tied to achievement of peace and only partially reallocated to civil policy and
magistracy;
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b. achieving external debt service writedowns in part to lessen actual payments but even 
more to end the confidence destroying overhangs of - at least nominal - future payment 
upsurges;
c. cutting expatriate personnel and external course elements in technical assistance by up 
to 50% with reallocation to allow pay adequate to keep citizen personnel on the job and - 
initially perhaps via joint ventures - to build up domestic (or sub-regional focal point) 
education, training and research capacities.
These reallocations can have a kick-start impact. To be sustainable they need to lead into:
a. collecting taxes due (of which one-third or more are usually evaded largely because low 
pay contributes to for many tax collectors ffom the field to the ministerial suite working 
for (non) tax payers);
b. achieving a growth dividend from accelerated growth by ensuring the tax system is 
income elastic and eschewing tax holiday windfalls (cloudbursts to the Treasury) which are 
usually neither necessary nor cost efficient;
c. using success (plus better human and infrastructural quality) to pull in more external and 
domestic enterprise savings/investment.
The 'what you don't pay for, you don't get' point - taken together with massively higher large 
and middle scale enterprise pay for comparable posts - should demonstrate the need to pay 
basic service providers as well as analysts more to lower unit output costs and to improve 
quality.
No even potentially viable post structural adjustment strategy can be laissez faire. This is not 
a matter o f ideology but of contextual reality:
a. mass provision of basic services - health, education, water - will be by the state
(including local government), perhaps in partnership with domestic social sector bodies, or 
not at all. Without it neither social stability, rising labour productivity nor 
competitiveness can be attained;
b. the same holds for basic - especially rural - infrastructure including railways, airports, 
highways and - in most countries, domestic communications, parts and power distribution. 
Power generation and wholesale transmission as well as international telecommunications 
are the only sectors likely to be attractive to enterprise investors in a majority of SSA 
countries,
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c g o o d  h o u s e k e e p i n g  requires pro-active monetary and exchange rate policies and - given 
the necessary share of GDP (25% on Bank recommendations) for basic services and 
infrastructure plus even minimum security, general administration and debt service cost - 
fiscal policy. Even if the budget is in surplus on current account and domestic bank 
borrowing low, taxing and spending of that proportion of output are interventionist simply 
by being purchasing power's biggest battalion both overall and allocationally;
d reducing barriers to entry into middle business and "levelling playing fields" to make 
them domestic (and resident foreign) enterprise friendly is not merely a matter of getting 
out of the way of market forces. SSA has very imperfect and gap ridden markets (ranging 
from lack of reliable term contract wholesalers of food in Ghana to interlocking oligopoly 
domination in South Africa). The need to remove policies intended to redress market 
failures which have proven even more costly than the failure were, does not solve the 
original problem - one is back to market failures (external economies and diseconomies, 
oligopoly/oligopsony, simple absence, high transaction costs). The need is not to avoid 
intervening but to intervene on a reasoned basis in ways intended to improve market 
functioning. For example a break-even or maximum cost targeted last resort buyer/seller 
of storable staple basic foods which rotates stocks can meet this test, but not a monopoly 
buyer/wholesaler which 'achieves' open ended losses and thwarts commercial sector 
development especially in rural areas. For that matter "food for work" or "free food" on a 
permanent basis are equally rural commerce and transport and producer/consumer rational 
choice constraining whereas labour intensive local infrastructure building financed by 
needed food imports wholesaled into the commercial system on entry can be market 
developing. Interventions need to be reviewed regularly to identify unintended negative 
effects and changes in markets rapidly lead to prompt removal or restructuring;
e. recognising that enterprises need a frame of law, order, rational incentives, healthy and 
educated workers and functioning infrastructure, i.e. state spending on these (within the 
limits of good housekeeping) pulls in rather than crowds out enterprise investment and 
raises rather than lowers overall (after tax) investible and amenity consumable surpluses.
Nothing is more damaging to strategy construction, let alone operation, than a 
ritualised cold war dialogue of the deaf setting up states and markets as inherently 
antagonistic.
By the same token the case for very limited state involvement in direct production,
‘ ommercialisation an<* distribution is overwhelming on a pragmatic basis today although - 
even in retrospect - it arguably was not in the 1960s. The basic services/infrastructure/peace 
and security requirements add up to minimum expenditures which will press heavily on
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prudent taxation and prudent borrowing limits in most SSA economies for decades. The 
higher the share of directly productive expansion the enterprise, the better in virtually all cases.
In the case of public utilities - telecommunications, power and, perhaps, ports - more 
enterprise investment would be desirable. The problem is achieving it at reasonable cost. 
Enterprises currently are either not interested at all or factor in such a high risk premium as to 
make user costs development unfriendly. Contracts also pose problems - once investors are 
interested, take or pay electricity generation putting all the risk on the users or the state can 
readily lead to over-capacity and excess tariff levels. That is a very real danger not a 
hypothetical one as illustrated by the Philippine scenario from 1993 blackouts to 1996 excess 
capacity overhang even with a 6% overall domestic growth rate and a higher one for 
electricity sales.
Mineral sector joint ventures may be another exception. The basic challenge is to 
achieve:
a. enterprise financing of risk at the prospecting, exploration and design phases, because it is 
too large and lumpy for an African economy (or fiscal system) to sustain;
b. providing an adequate (to secure "a") rate of return (say 25% annual cumulatively on 
equity for the investor) rate of return on successes within normal tax and regulation 
parameters;
c. ensuring state involvement in strategic decisions with major economic consequences 
internal to the domestic economy but external to the investor;
d. securing the bulk of the rents on bonanza successes for the domestic economy via the 
state (whether by profit share, "additional profits tax" after 'an adequate comulative return 
rate to investors' or a combination).
Joint ventures can do this. In Botswana they have worked efficiently as - subject to greater 
personnel constraints - also in Angola. In the first case near UABS and SNAP (now including 
old age security as well as public works and drought mitigation employment) have been 
financed. In the second the core of the state - however battered - has been preserved and 
South Africa forced to sue for peace in a hi-tech war financed by the revenues garnered by the 
national oil company. In both cases a national strategic approach to the sector has been 
relatively effectively maintained.
But a badly run joint venture can lead to massive leakages - of funds and of environmental 
pollutants. The available data suggest that these criticisms do apply to - for example - 
Nigeria's National Oil Corporation.
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However, it is not clear a joint venture approach is necessary The first two and last goals 
could be achieved purely by a low royalty plus normal company tax plus additional profits 
(economic rents) tax regime and the strategic one by a single 'golden share' providing for pre- 
agreement on a limited range of key decisions and for a minority of government named 
directors plus an external auditor responsible to both to the Board and to the ‘golden share 
holder'.
Privatisation is not central to creating an enterprise friendly climate - albeit removal of 
market access barriers is. However, because many public enterprises are starved of funds 
for renovation and expansion and of knowledge to improve productivity and competitiveness 
at home and to capitalise on niche export opportunities (not least in SSA), the pragmatic case 
is to sell off (perhaps on an interim joint venture basis) with the new owner or managing 
partner guaranteeing rehabilitation, expansion, pursuit of export markets (not on that of 
maximum cash down) and of evaluating 'bidders' in terms of capacity to deliver these. The 
problem is that such contracts are less transparent than open auctions with highest bidder 
winning, but the investment, production and export inefficiency of pure auctions is likely to 
outweigh any transparency gains.
The case for state ownership is further weakened by the scarcity of adequate public sector 
personnel and the policy o f paying them much less than even the domestic private sector.
This is true not merely at the public enterprise but also at the government level. It makes little 
sense to own a group of enterprises to maximise revenue and generation of external 
economies unless analysis on targets, costs, gains, outcomes is possible. The near universal 
absence of that capacity leads to autarchic public enterprise 'autonomy' by managers, and all 
too often for their personal benefit. Regulation - while subject to severe limitations - does 
require less personnel, has lower downside risks and lessens the danger of dishonest, private 
purpose oriented collusion between politicians and managers (even if it creates risks of a 
somewhat different set of collusive arrangements).
The need for competition, or an analogue to it, for 'the market' (more accurately the actual, 
existing markets) to function in the interests of small users and macro growth and 
development does require intervention and regulation. The "invisible hand" in Adam Smith 
is not any market but a competitive set of markets in none of which is any player large 
enough to have significant market power.
Unfortunately -as lucidly set out in his pin factory case of multiple task specialisation at a large 
scale versus small scale hand hammering an iron bar into pins - Adam Smith's analysis of the 
cost efficiency gains o f specialisation and division of labour demonstrated prophetically why 
the very visible hands of - say - Anglo American or Tanesco (Tanzania's electricity 
corporation) would ubiquitously replace the invisible ones.
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Even when several enterprises would be viable on scale grounds, collusion (sometimes among 
surprisingly large and apparently unstructured groups as in many West African urban stall 
markets) is near ubiquitous. The somewhat fundamentalist concept of providing global 
competition - by near universal tariff removal - also has limitations. In many sub-sectors the 
number of even global alternatives is limited and their degree of non-collusion suspect. In 
others - e.g. medium and small scale construction, public utilities, much of retail commerce - it 
is not practicable to introduce external competitors. Even on strict classical and neo-classical 
grounds initial protection to allow "learning by doing" are frequently justified (as exemplified 
by the Asian NICs and to a substantial extent the Brazilian, Colombian and Mexican 
manufacturing sectors) or 'rehabilitation' in the case of debilitated SSA enterprises. So are 
anti-predation measures to block 'competition' designed to take out competitors and institute 
monopoly or collusive oligopoly. The extent (and sophistication) of public utility regulation 
and anti-cartel/pro-competition activity in the USA and the EU counsels against assuming 'the 
market' will achieve efficient competition by itself.
Unfortunately to demonstrate the need for and uses of intervention and regulation does not 
lead directly to answers to "How?". Much of 1960-95 experience in SSA (not least South 
Africa) is more relevant to "How not" to do it. Even what worked in some contexts often 
looks rather dated and probably overtaken by changing contexts. For example, to argue that 
import control to maintain a positive trade balance, positive real interest rates to incentivate 
enterprise savings and channel them to the state and fuller capacity utilisation focused output 
encouragement were appropriate in Zimbabwe over 1984-89 because exports, terms of trade, 
revenue and expenditure were all severely impacted by a near full scale war and there was an 
initial 25% capacity under-utilisation is also to argue that since neither condition pertains in 
1996 straight reversion to the 1984 patterns of intervention would be unwise.
Nor is it all that helpful to look at East and Southeast Asian experiences as blueprints. They 
do demonstrate the uses of intervention, of selective support of efficient (or rapidly learning) 
enterprises, of using education and infrastructure (the latter financed in large part by external 
borrowing) to pull in enterprise investment. In general - as even the Bank concedes - these 
approaches were fairly well chosen and on balance at least marginally development/trans­
formation enhancing. (The domestic and Japanese perspective is more enthusiastic than the 
Bank's rather grudging endorsement.) Clearly allocational decisions were made on an 
analytical basis and primarily to further broad public policy purposes. But the methods were 
non-transparent, did not level key playing fields so much as build ramps to them for anointed 
enterprises and did lead to substantial payment o f ’rents' to decision takers, even if these 
payments seem to have been more 'privatised taxation' of enterprises chosen on a more 
analytical basis than pure bribes to bypass criteria.
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Reflecting on the severe problems arising from lack of transparency and accountability 
(within as well as outside of government) and the ubiquity of corrupt practices which do 
determine decisions (not just 'tax' winners chosen on other grounds as practised in several 
Asian tigers, albeit not Hong Kong and Singapore)) it is hard to be optimistic about direct 
transplantation of a Korean, a Thai or a Malaysian system.
The UABS (basic services), PPP (market and infrastructure access for poor producers), 
SNAP (survival support to make possible household livelihood rehabilitation and child 
development as well as dignity for aged and incapacitated persons) theme could be termed 
"absolute poverty reduction" (not just alleviation or pain of poverty). The reason for not 
doing so here is to stress its household, sectoral and macroeconomic significance and, 
therefore, the need to see all three strands as interlocked and to mainstream each into major 
line and central economic ministry thinking, prioritising and acting. The same principles apply 
in respect to gender and environmental issues which are important and are not readily 
accessible from (or reached by) highly generalised macroeconomic formulations, but unless 
mainstreamed into political economy and overall macro strategy end (inefficiently) as 
underfunded, over marginalised nurseries and fig leaves.
To accept UABS-PPP-SNAP as a key strategic cluster underlines the need for a large, strong, 
pro-active, interventionist state. No one else will or can provide UABS; market 
imperfections/failures weigh especially heavily on poor producers; safety nets are - by 
definition - not 'profitable' except at the macro (state) and human affinity group (especially 
household and family) ends of the spectrum.
Notes On Building Blocks
The performance record, the challenges it poses plus some building blocks and broad 
implications for strategy have been set out above. What follow are some notes on often 
overlooked macroeconomic - political economic -household economic and moral economy 
interactions.
Good housekeeping is the child of structural adjustment and grandchild of the pre-1979 crisis 
early warning and response systems of some African Treasuries. It is different from its parent 
(though not its grandparent) in:
a. being intended to avert and contain crisis rather than to seek to alleviate and reduce them 
once full blown (an option rarely open to SA);
b as a result being a necessary supporting (and secondarily parametric limit setting) element 
in a substantive goal oriented strategy;
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c. and more articulated to the real economy down to household level and to the social 
stability and long term productivity aspects o f  poverty reduction than is practicable in a 
shorter term, macro imbalance reduction focused approach like SA.
In respect to its grandparents the needed difference is survival which may depend on clearer 
realisation that the tactics used to cope with, limit and ride out one crisis may well be 
inappropriate for the next - as brutally illustrated by many SSA 1989-92 attempts to rerun 
1974-75 crisis management. Rapid appraisal of results with rapid feedback to short term 
policy if the initial results are inadequate - and a fortiori if they are in the wrong direction is 
crucial. S A itself is uneven on incorporating these insights with a tendency to repeat cutting 
mantras long past the date substantial gains were available by that route - except ffom 
defence, debt service and expatriate salaries.
Three external agenda items fall under good housekeeping:
a. securing external debt service writedown (not just deferral) to levels consistent with 6% 
growth and external balance (including reasonable aid and investment projections) i.e. a 
uniform set of criteria applied case by case. This is, at last, squarely on the agenda of the 
Bank, Fund, Development Committee and both ECA and ADB would do well to analyse 
for and to organise a clear, articulated African position. Because such writedowns reduce 
uncertainty/remove overhang they are crucial to investor confidence. Because they free 
earned foreign exchange they are more efficient and market friendly than most tied and use 
designated aid;
b. putting sustained pressure on the IMF to fulfil its charter obligations and go back into the 
"lender of first resort" business - i.e. bridging finance rapidly available to ride out or to 
adjust to unexpected stochastic shocks. These shocks are no less likely for poor, 
constrained economies than for others and their option for reallocating or borrowing to 
meet them are few and weak. The locking out of SA economies from "first resort" IMF 
finance in return for a mini IDA (ESAF) is unsound. Both EDA and IMF are needed and 
there is at least something to be said for the Fund specialising on short term monetary 
issues and IDA on longer term strategic and structural ones. The revised ESAF of 1995 
does open the door toward return to short term shock coping facilities. ECA, ADB and 
AACB should prepare positions on levels of funding, criteria for drawing and 
terms/modalities to capitalise on that shift;
c. improving quality of ODA (which is unlikely to increase quantitatively whatever SSA 
does) by an "envelope" approach in which the country proposed a total package of 
project, programme, personnel and technical aid linked to its strategic priorities and to 
particular performance targets and subject to provision of overall propriety audit and
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specific real performance (e.g. enrolment, vaccination, road maintenance) target auditing 
results. In particular this should allow a domestic strategy driven/partially donor 
fuelled approach to replace a dominantly donor driven/partly domestically financed 
one. One result should be radical reduction of expatriate personnel and overseas courses 
in favour of programme support to civil service reform (including pay) and domestic 
education/training institution capacity building. Within capital projects, some countries 
need to alter the balance in favour of decentralised, rural, labour intensive infrastructure 
and of rehabilitation/deferred maintenance. This is a more problematic area than the first 
two. Donors - except some elements of the Bank - do not perceive how PER 
enforcement o f sub-market public service pay (technically oligopsonistic pay 
repression) and increases in expatriate provision create an economically inefficient 
and decapacitating vicious circle even if all intentions are for the best and all technical 
assistance personnel micro competent. It is for Africans and African institutions to take 
the lead to demonstrate that interaction rationally, analytically and soberly. Since donors 
really do not wish to reinstate colonial rule over and concomitant responsibility for Africa, 
there is no basic contradiction of interests (even if there are secondary ones) but rather a 
very faulty donor perception of the present debilitating dynamic.
In respect of budgetary balance SA - necessarily as a crisis reduction set of tactics - has not
been able to focus on long term good housekeeping and has been forced to seek (and often to
resile from) quick fixes. Key long (and often short) term elements under the good
housekeeping rubric include:
a. collecting taxes due under existing legislation. Somewhat incomplete evidence suggests a 
typical shortfall in the 25% to 50% of present collections range. Exceptions - e.g. 
Botswana, Mauritius - are characterised by transparency of tax concessions, honesty from 
field to decision taker levels, a properly paid (by salary not tax share), professionally 
organised, proud tax service cadre and a limited number of broad based taxes which are 
reasonably straightforward to assess. Requiring publication of all exemptions and waivers 
(once standard practice in Anglophone Africa and now making a comeback in some cases,
e.g. Tanzania) is low cost/high gain. Streamlining assessment and concentrating on at 
most half a dozen key taxes is collection cost, personnel and communication system 
friendly. Professionalism in tax services turns largely on training, a belief that the top of 
the system is honest and adequate pay (to avert 'tax sharing' by collection and pocketing of 
a proportion of tax due while collecting and transmitting little or none). Logically this is 
part of overall civil service reform, but initially it may be easier to handle via a separate tax 
service under a quasi autonomous assessment and collection (not policy, rate setting or 
review and analysis) agency.
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b. achieving efficiency in expenditure including increases (e.g. basic drugs and mobility so 
that health personnel can earn their salaries) and reallocations/restructurings (especially 
out o f incremental funding) as well as cuts. The prime candidates for cuts are military 
(post peace) and debt service (external debt writedowns, prudent macro policy to reduce 
domestic interest rates). Across the board cuts are usually inefficient, unchecked 
pressurised cuts usually either savage maintenance and training provisions or lead to 
(cleverly planned in some cases) hidden shortfalls which in the event have to be covered by 
supplementaries to avoid sudden shutdown of key services (in one extreme case making a 
'mistake' o f over a third in estimating the salary bill for nurses and in another 'forgetting' 
army vehicles use fuel). Minor ("candle end collecting") cuts are worth having but rarely 
add up to more than a low single figure per cent of spending so cannot be a substitute for 
strategy.
These comments assume an SA programme or its analogue has ended ffeefall, broadly 
overcome gross incoherence and gaps (including incoherent accounting) and restored a broad 
framework of public purpose and honesty. In the absence of these preconditions, neither 
economic analysis nor applied economists have much relevance. (For example, in one actual 
case 10% of billed manufacturer level sales tax was actually collected, and in another over 
50% of initial expenditure entries were so poor as to be 'unallocable' by use.)
Peace and security are accepted by development practitioners and up to a point by 
economists as important. However, macroeconomic applied analysis (not least, but not only, 
SA) has treated them either as 'noises offstage' or as the objects parallel (and specially funded) 
programmes not as an integral part of macroeconomic strategy. On the other hand, peace- 
security-reconstruction practitioners and analysts have tended to view macro economists (of 
whom there are very few among their own ranks) as tiresome naysayers far removed from 
reality and have failed to work through household through regional and sectoral to national 
linkages (as well as their plausible sequencing and phasing) in their own terms. Both are 
serious errors, not merely intellectually, but even more in resultant policy and resource 
allocation inefficiency.
While calculations o f lives and output lost are unlikely by themselves to end a war they do 
have a salutary shock value both for outsiders potentially able to contribute as mediators and 
also for convincing participants that 'victory' will be more costly (in human and in economic 
terms) than compromise. Southern Africa is an example as it is of the fact that fiscal 
exhaustion can help end a war.
It is now fashionable to analyse gainers from war - with arms manufacturers and 'self-help' 
informal sector accumulators (whether armed elements or merchants of adversity) targeted. 
These are factors in war dragging on - especially when state collapse makes non-professional
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armed bands the least bad livelihood option as in Liberia, perhaps Sierra Leone, parts of 
Somalia and Sudan 'militias' - but rarely dominant ones. Most Somali merchants do not 
perceive "warlords" (literally because their powers are for the duration and would revert to 
more senior elders were there to be peace) as necessary to their continued success, but as an 
obstacle to it. External actors can help exacerbate a war, but can rarely foment it out o f clean 
cloth (Rhodesian and South African created Renamo was very unusual) nor keep it going if 
main domestic fractions want peace.
There is calculation in continuing war but usually one based on the marginal cost of "holding 
on" to "victory" versus the losses (including sunk war costs) of accepting defeat. To the 
extent this calculation is a misperception, analysis of costs can at least marginally strengthen 
the hands of advocates of a speedy bargained resolution.
Another use of such analysis is to articulate what can be done to alleviate war costs during and 
to rehabilitate out of them after the conflict. As with the costings UNICEF's Children On The 
Front Line did address these issues as did 1990 and subsequent Mozambican secure area, and 
later overall, rehabilitation strategy.
Further, the costs do underline three economic imperatives:
a. however unattractive, buying out opponents - at least by treating ex-combatants equally 
between 'sides' - is likely to be a good investment;
b. substantial expenditure to achieve reintegration into society and economy for ex­
combatants is - in addition to its moral economy rationale - likely to be prudent to avert 
either flaring up of war or substitution of privatised, decentralised war (usually termed 
armed banditry in the standard, not the Mozambican, sense);
c. substantial preventative expenditure to strengthen peacemakers (e.g. by enabling them 
to offer more services and infrastructure to potential insurgents) may seem expensive but 
is likely to be very much less than the cost of war - even to donors, let alone to the people 
of the afflicted territory.
The maintenance, negotiation and sustaining of peace is not a cluster of issues on which 
external initiatives in SSA have a very good track record. The apparent relative successes - 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Eritrea, Somaliland, were - in the first four 
cases ones in which international action supported (sometimes accidentally) domestic and 
regional initiatives or - the last two - ones in which initial international interventions were 
against the dynamics that led to relatively peaceful resolution but were unable to thwart them.
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Neighbouring and sub-regional African states are often more aware of the historical and 
contextual roots of conflict and more cultural similar to participants than outsiders and thus 
better able to design proactive conflict avoidance or speedy resolution strategies than anyone 
else. Tanzania - OAU led negotiation probably would have averted the horror of 1994 
Rwanda and re-stabilised Burundi had not extremists (ironically probably Hutu ones) 
assassinated the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi as they flew back from a potential 
breakthrough meeting. SADC State continued recognition of the lawful government of 
Lesotho and in alliance with their social sectors (especially trade unions) using the threat of 
economic and military force both strengthened domestic resistance to the 1994 Lesotho coup 
attempt and led to its peaceful demise. The contrast with the initially similar Gambia coup as 
to ability of the illegitimate regime to consolidate and to survive could hardly be more stark.
Evidently not all neighbours are viewed as disinterested (as partisans of peace for both 
humanitarian and self-interest reasons - Tanzania can ill afford to keep 20,000 troops on its 
western border nor the loss of not insignificant markets, while still less can it allow Rwanda- 
Burundi-Zaire conflicts and combatants to roll across the borders). Nor are their armies 
automatically logical peace keepers (in Rwanda both Uganda and Zaire forces would - rightly 
or wrongly - be viewed as partisan). But these issues are among those more easily identified 
sub-regionally than globally. Further, Africans have a more robust view of peacekeeping than 
does the UN - basically the constabulary one of stamping out disorder fast before its gets out 
of hand, of saving lives and property and in extremis calling in the analogue to riot police. 
Whatever the West African Force's limitations, it did drive the war out of Monrovia and 
Buchanan until the truce and incomplete demobilisation let militias back in and renewed 
conflict unleashed them. And it was a handful of ill-armed Ghanaian troops who saved up to 
10,000 lives in Kigali's stadium by throwing a safety cordon around it in the teeth of contrary 
orders by their UN Force's Canadian commander-in-chief.
However, if the OAU, Sub-Regional Organisations and neighbours are to take a lead 
strategically and in articulation and operation of negotiations and of conflict averting or ending 
resource injections (e.g. primary health care in Rwanda where a politically potent minister who 
is a committed doctor clearly does see a two-way division, but one between people needing 
primary and preventative health services and health personnel able to provide them not 
between Hutu and Tutsi), they need outside support. Support for African peacekeeping 
ventures is needed not primarily in military manpower (albeit possibly in logistics and 
engineering) but in terms of funds, material inputs (e.g. food, pharmaceuticals) and specialised 
personnel (preferably to work with, not substitute for, the weak domestic official and social 
sector structures). As a successful operation on these lines would cost much less than the 
globally orchestrated disasters in, e.g. Rwanda and Somalia, self-interest and Treasury
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'prudence' (as well as avoiding risking their own citizens' lives) might lead to outside 
acceptance.
Similarly, refugee policy as now operated is frequently ill-designed to reduce tensions or to 
provide a road back in cases in which refugees are or have been partisan (e.g. Rwanda 
though not, on the whole, Mozambique). First, refugees who grow food and build new lives 
(genuine community structures and service self-provision) in small villages are both better off 
and better able to return and to be accepted than those who grow hate and build plots rotting 
in huge camps controlled (with the acquiescence of the international community) by those who 
led the acts resulting in their being exiles and who plan a violent return. In at least some 
cases, African ideas, on how to provide 'temporary homes', a chance for new lives and 
leadership and a phased non-threatening/non-threatened return are much more creative than 
the 'global consensus' on cost and stay abroad minimisation. In the case of Rwanda that 
'consensus' greatly exacerbates tensions in Rwanda and locks in place the Interhamwe 
domination over two million people whatever host state or actual refugee views may be.
Post-war or post 'sustained', debilitating crisis recovery requires an economic strategy 
ffom household to national level to be efficient (either in macro or poverty reduction 
economic terms). Assuming analysis of costs during the war and a post-war baseline study 
plus data on refugee return intentions and flows - reasonably practicable judging ffom 
Mozambique Planning Commission and UNOMOZ results - are obtained, this involves 
reasonably standard disaggregated economic policy and programme design.
Requirements - basically UABS-PPP-SNAP including heavy initial rural infrastructure 
rebuilding (preferably on a labour intensive basis to bolster initial household income recovery) 
and access to term and working capital finance for rural commerce/transport - are subject to 
rational estimation and costing. So are probable direct outputs, multiplier effects and overall 
fiscal (including UABS and infrastructure maintenance), external account and food balance 
impact magnitudes. To say these are not precise in amount or timing is correct, but the same 
observation applies to all SSA (and most other) real economy focused initiatives.
Effectiveness both of articulation and of implementation probably requires planning 
decentralisation - technically to regional or provincial level and to district level on user input 
and project implementation. The quickest way to get reasonably correct micro data is to ask 
present and returning residents (including small farming family and commercial households) 
and field level service providers and administrators. District level technical capacity may not 
be up to analysis, programme design and finance management level. For example, it is in war 
refugee afflicted Districts in Tanzania with selective Regional backup, but is not in 
Mozambique where even Provincial technical and professional capacity needs bolstering to 
perform these tasks - not entirely surprisingly as Mozambique's total resident stock of tertiary
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graduates is about Tanzania's annual entry flow and perhaps a twenty-fifth of its stock so that 
an average Tanzania District has over 20 tertiary graduates (excluding teachers) and a similar 
Mozambican less than half as many secondary or equivalent completers.
Interestingly, this examination suggests that rural, labour intensive, decentralised, service- 
infrastructure-household production strategies are a general type of which post-war 
rehabilitation is a special case. That should facilitate transition from rehabilitation to
further transformation.
Security maintenance has two aspects.
a. adequate numbers of adequately professional constabulary and magistracy to provide 
security for ordinary people to go about their daily lives with low risk of any violent 
interference and high probability of violators being stopped;
b. linking military, police, food, water and livelihood security to reduce tensions and to 
attack basic causes early not symptoms when they become explosive.
Interestingly, it is the SADC group's evaluation toward a security system (including parallel 
regional social sector consultations) which has the potential to focus on the second element.
At least conceptually (and, in respect to food and water security, operationally) it is more 
oriented to this cluster of household needs approach than any other grouping North or South. 
Potential because resources are slim and, not surprisingly, traditional army and police officers 
wish to secure the lion's share for traditional uses they have now at least verbally redesignated 
as for new uses (e.g. a South African blue seas fleet capacity to avert Indian Ocean coups 
instead of to defend apartheid from USSR submarines).
Investment and savings underperformance relates in large measure to output growth 
underperformance. However, to say that is somewhat unhelpful in identifying how to break 
the circle. Fairly clearly policies intended to be enterprise friendly cannot have growth payoff 
if investors "wait to see" and by doing so 'sustain' low growth of output and demand thereby 
'validating' not investing. That problem applies to domestic and a fortiori to external 
investors.
The elements in a breakout strategy include:
a. infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion to lower costs and to raise demand for 
enterprise (and household) production;
b. basic service revival and expansion to improve present and future quality and morale of 
employees;
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c. standard tax rates which are not radically out of line with global levels;
d. relatively easy prompt and regulation free access to imports for use in production and 
commerce,
e. rates of inflation (including inflation of the price of foreign exchange) which are 
relatively low (preferably single digit) and are either relatively stable or on a downward 
trend;
f. both analytical projection evidence and business expectations the preceding climate can be 
expected to continue - i.e. business confidence in a stable as well as a currently favourable 
business environment.
The expectations element is crucial because its absence is likely to make the other five 
elements unsustainable. Keynes' remark that the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs were 
crucial to investment decisions is especially true when these are gloomy. SA period 
experience suggests a 3 to 5 year lag between an improved policy and allocational pattern and 
significant enterprise investment response. The negative impact of non-confidence has been 
especially dire in Zimbabwe. Similarly it could block South African transition to a sustainable 
6% growth path.
How to influence expectations is not subject to detailed general answers. However, 
observation suggests five useful rules of thumb. First, avoid language most businesses 
perceive as threatening and second, provide channels and fora for dialogue with enterprises 
(even if not for agreeing with all their proposals); third, be prepared to argue the case for 
policy and prospects based on hard evidence and projections in terms understandable to 
enterprises; while fourth avoid repetitive major policy shifts and fifth, do not allow policy 
promulgation and implementation actions to appear to reflect panic and incoherence. 
The fourth point poses difficulties. It can support a "big bang" - e.g. removal of all import and 
exchange controls at one go - as a basis for subsequent policy stability. But in many cases - 
usually including the one cited - that shift would be so doubtfully sustainable, the uncertainties 
and traumas of transition so great and - for some businesses - the worsening of competitive 
pressures so rapid and high that ffeefall of confidence would be the most likely result.
However, a gradual policy - to be confidence building - needs some early indication of 
approximate intended destination, phasing and commitment/ability to keep with it. The last 
point (appearing to know what one is doing) should be self-evident but is regularly violated 
(not only in SS A). Frank admissions of problems (and even of past mistakes) linked to 
relevant set of actions and plausible projections of results can reassure; implausible denials 
plus random acts plus statements all will soon be well are usually highly counterproductive.
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The stability/confidence factor explains the negative impact massive, rapid liberalisation can 
have. As noted, enterprises believe their own subsidies, protection and special treatment are 
'special cases' amid a sea of unjustified ones for others. Therefore, they may well see any 
actual liberalisation - especially if not pre-explained and with transitional provisions - as a 
reason to seek to block change and to contract not to transform.
Tossing resources (e.g. tax cuts, trade union constraints, cheap money) at the confidence 
problem is no cure. First, resources are scarce. Second, expectations are not easily bought - 
especially if the handouts look unsustainable. Third, a government perceived as worker, 
consumer, small farmer unfriendly will (deservedly) face growing social stability and crime 
problems, themselves corrosive of business confidence.
Savings, even more than investment, under-perform whenever growth (and therefore 
profits/investible surpluses) does. It is not quite true to say achieve growth and then profits 
and savings will look after themselves. That is, however, a large part of reality. One main 
caveat is that government recurrent expenditure should (including if necessary a portion of 
external grants) be in balance or surplus. This is a useful rule of thumb to avoid open ended 
diversion of private savings to public recurrent expenditure.
Visible/domestically invested savings are highly volatile with respect to confidence/expect­
ations as well as to investible surplus flows. A business investor can normally expect higher 
returns on savings invested in his own enterprise and an individual saver normally has a 
preference for investments/investment institutions which are intelligible and offer easy access. 
But if the economy is stagnant or declining and expected to remain so and/or if war and 
exchange rate risks are perceived as very high, assets (both flows and stocks) will be 
diversified abroad to reduce risks with negative consequences for actual domestic investment 
and visible domestic savings. Opening lip the economy - useful or even necessary as it is for 
other reasons - makes preventing such flows when expectations are poor rather like carrying 
water in a sieve or a badly rusted petrol tin.
Missing Middle/Avoiding Muddle
This area is an example of the case for joint state/enterprise action and of policy by 
education/persuasion. Except in respect to its own purchases, the state cannot directly build 
up the large-middle enterprise linkages which characterise Asian and European economies. In 
the absence of these, training plus site and service schemes will be of limited impact. Similarly 
in respect to credit access, devising methods to lower transaction costs - perhaps by links 
among 'informal' credit bodies (e.g. tontines, credit societies) and financial institutions - the 
only practicable route to implementation is persuading banks to experiment with them 
(perhaps backed by partial, limited period guarantees).
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It also illustrates the need to acquire data - including the user friendliness of proposed 
approaches - before acting. Data on middle scale enterprises, on 'informal' credit providers 
and on middle/large enterprise links are at best scrappy. Further, they rarely rest on in depth 
interviews designed to identify ways forward, still less on selected working groups including 
large enterprise (including banks), middle enterprise (including credit societies) and 
government personnel
Exports - Earned Foreign Exchange Source Transformation
Exports are in certain respects like middle enterprises. Action needs to be predominately 
by enterprises; is unlikely to happen automatically and could benefit from selective state 
action - e.g. in education and infrastructure provision. But if transformation of exports is 
needed, more data and analysis are required before existing enterprises can take decisions or 
before new ones (especially new foreign ones) will recognise opportunities to which to come 
in. Information and analysis does have economies of scale and is more attractive to bodies 
with a long time perspective which suggests a leading state role so long as it is based on 
securing and analysing in forms useful (and convincing to prospective producers/investors).
The case for enhanced export earnings (including tourism and overseas citizen remittances) 
is straightforward and has no necessary link to an export led growth strategy:
a. the only foreign exchange truly subject primarily to national allocation decisions is earned 
foreign exchange - exports;
b. economic expansion requires net additional imports - even if it is primarily domestic 
market centred,
c. this is especially true in SSA in which (except for South Africa) the direct plus indirect 
content of fixed investment is usually in the 60% to 75% range and in which a key to 
sustainable rapid growth is a sharply high ratio of fixed investment to GDP;
d. economically smaller economies are more likely than larger to benefit from specialising 
into some products and out of others to achieve scale advantages (an effect reinforced by 
specialised natural resources) with resultant import requirements and thus required export
earnings;
e. even if not based solely or primarily on cross border trade, regionalism implies more trade 
- in power, transport and communications/transport/commerce as well as goods. 
Production coordination requires trade to validate it,, even if the production not the trade 
is the underlying goal.
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It is equally straightforward to demonstrate that present export bases - even if adequate 
quantitatively now, which is the exception not the rule - are not structurally satisfactory over a 
20 year perspective and urgently need to enter into a transformation phase:
a. the bulk of African exports are in a handful of raw materials (petroleum, diamonds, 
gold, copper, coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton, tobacco) all with low short term price 
elasticities and histories of unstable prices;
b. in several cases the elasticities are so low enhanced export volumes for SSA (and in cocoa 
for Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana nationally) reduce export earnings (the price decline more 
than balancing the quantity gain);
c. further many of these products have low income and time (net new uses/users) 
elasticities. Only petroleum is an evident exception (at the SSA or All Africa level - 
nationally it is attractive) and that probably only after 2000;
d. in general SSA is composed of high cost producers of most of its own main exports and
SSA economies are weak financially. A free for all to shove the weakest to the wall by 
very low prices for several years would be catastrophic - no exports are hardly an 
improvement on quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate ones.
Two standard (if contrasting) mantras are misleading in more cases than not in achieving 
export diversification/transformation:
a. "industrialise" at least with no specification how or into what or assuming that free trade 
zones (a low proportion of total industrial exports except in Singapore, Hong Kong,
Puerto Rico and Mauritius) are a generally accessible high road;
b. "diversify" into somebody else's raw material exports - as the Bank (often rather 
absentmindedly failing to look at producer wide results of country specific policies) has 
been advocating off and on since 1947. That approach does limited good on volatility 
(raw material price swings are fairly highly correlated) and is disastrous if it unleashes a 
production surge of low price and income elasticity commodities - though it may benefit a 
new entrant seeking only a small share of the global market.
In actual contexts a much more country specific - and usually a mixed - approach is likely to 
be appropriate:
1. engage in cost reduction and supply sustainability enhancement oriented research on
traditional exports, e.g. coffee - tea and tropical timber respectively, and encourage (or in 
some sustainability cases enforce) enterprise and household adoption. Malaysia on rubber
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(and enterprises there on cocoa) is an example. This does not do much for demand 
elasticity but it defends competitiveness and raises net producer earnings at any given 
output level;
2. identify suitable new natural resource (including soil and climate) linked exports with at 
least medium term high income elasticities as Brazil did with orange juice concentrate;
3. study new uses or markets which would either sustain weak existing exports (e.g. sisal 
use in high grade paper production) or allow a switch from low volume/high price to huge 
volume/lower price target users (as has happened in the cases of bauxite and 
bananas/pineapples and may be fairly widely applicable on a smaller scale to other tropical 
fruits and to horticulture),
4. identify cost efficient pre-export value added industries and, where appropriate, protect 
them for a limited period by an export tax on the raw product (e.g. logs-wood products, 
sisal fibre-sisal twine, hides and skins-leather or leather products, cacao-cocoa butter, 
paste, power, mass);
5. explore other manufactured export potential including specialised niche products (e.g. 
identifiably African style cloth and garments);
6. in the case of very small countries with few raw materials and relatively well educated 
labour forces, explore embodied labour exports via manufactures (e.g. garments in 
Mauritius) or services (e.g. tourism in Seychelles; computer punch card processing in 
Barbados);
7. as well as 'invisible' goods (e.g. electric power from Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania) 
and services (transit commerce and transport and also in tourism which is - in respect to 
SSA - an embodied labour export consumed by the importers in the exporting country);
8 practising market as well as product diversification SSA has remarkable geographic, 
and in some cases enterprise concentration of markets. As these largely exclude the more 
rapidly growing Pacific Basin, the disadvantages over time are likely to grow. Similarly 
some established buyers - notably on pyrethrum which should have enjoyed a boom 
because it is ultra environmentally friendly - have proven very weak in adjusting to/taking 
advantage of market shifts.
In theory overseas workers could be added to the list (and their remittances are significant m
several countries, e.g. Senegal, Mali, Sudan, Somalia), out it is doubtful that this is a growth
sector given unemployment fuelled rises in Northern labour market protectionism. That
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caveat probably applies pari passu to sub-regional labour exports/im ports in W estern, East 
Central and Southern  Africa.
None o f the above implies the desirability of letting traditional exports die - especially before 
alternatives are in place. (Indeed sustainability and cost reduction research cut in the opposite 
direction ) Ghana's 1966-83 collapse as a cacao exporter stabilised real global cocoa bean 
prices for about 15 years because its export fall made space for Cote d'Ivoire, Malaysia and 
other SE Asian countries to raise exports without putting pressure on a market with low price, 
income and time elasticities. This was worth up to $5,000 million over the period to the 
other exporters but Ghana could ill afford to provide them with that level of grant aid. Pari 
passu, rapid 1984-90 revival of Ghanaian production wreaked havoc on global prices but 
as Ghana could hardly continue to practice export abstinence to subsidise its fellow producers, 
and had no short term alternatives to cacao, and timber products and gold, it was a realistic 
policy for Ghana.
Macro economic good housekeeping is highly relevant to exports and in the 1970s and - a 
fortiori the 1980s - existing weaknesses were exacerbated to crisis proportions. A checklist of 
export friendly policies includes:
1. avoiding severe (say over the 10% to 20% range) overvaluation which - especially for 
high cost producers - can be export liquidating and is certainly new export preventing;
2. having no general export taxes (infant value added industry protection by limited, limited 
period export taxes on raw forms may be justifiable on a case by case bases) using 
additional profits taxes for windfall rent producers (e.g. diamonds, petroleum) which have 
the additional advantage of not penalising marginal producers;
3. encouraging competition - e.g. by auctions and domestic export houses and by providing 
adequate data to enable sellers to have a level playing field vis-a-vis buyers. Where 
buyers are oligopsonist (e.g. cashew kernels, tea) some intervention to create 
countervailing market power may be appropriate;
4. providing simple, speedy means for exporters to reclaim import and domestic indirect 
taxes embodied in their exports whether by bonding systems or formulae providing for 
fixed recovery per unit for standard exports (with the list and sums regularly updated);
5. avoiding non-market real interest rate inflation (as often practised on IMF advice) which 
both cripples domestic exporters on the cost side and reduces their revenues by promoting 
overvaluation;
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6. ensuring adequate levels of general infrastructure - transport, communications, elasticity 
water, financial institutions whether public or private sector provided.
More specific policies - like export products and markets - are likely to be very contextual:
1. infrastructure oriented to product needs (e.g. chilled lorries and airport or port stores 
for fruit and horticulture),
2. commercial information access (via Chambers of Exporters or specialist service 
enterprises where possible);
3. research and analysis to identify possibilities plus effective passing on of that 
information to existing producers and potential investors. Modes of passing on need to 
be user tailored - e.g. extension advice on tree cover for cocoa plantation to farming 
families; spot mailings and follow-ups to quality paper producers and users on sisal pulp as 
a paper input.
Regionalism: Multi Purpose Means
In the African context it is important to recognise what regionalism (or more immediately sub­
regionalism) is not:
a. a movement to creeping executive supra-nationalism which is counterproductive either by 
creating "we"/"they" clashes between Member States and their own regional officials; or
b. a road to federalism. African states have demonstrated surprising resilience within pre­
independence territorial boundaries. Colonial deathbed or early independence mergers 
have uniformly proven unsuccessful. Mali Federation, Federation of Rhodesias- 
Nyasaland, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia-Somaliland, Cape Verde-Guinea Bissau have broken 
up (as has Egypt-Syria across the African/Middle Eastern regions) while Tanganyika- 
Zanzibar barely survives with majorities hostile to union in each component. However 
desirable it may be by 2050, federalism is not on the African agenda for at least one decade 
and probably longer, nor is
c. rapid across the board confederation is also not realistic - a pooling of sovereignties in 
selected areas in which the whole can be seen to be greater than the sum of its parts 
and in which acceptable distribution of gains is practicable is a viable way forward 
and can logically add an elected sub-regional legislative element to Ministerial and Heads 
of State albeit only in Southern Africa would this seem to be a likely short run prospect, 
but
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d. a common market is not, by itself, a viable model because it does not have adequate 
political economic or political mobilising forces and because it conflicts (when free 
standing) with the nationally perceived need for state activism of each and every member, 
thereby setting up a destructive dynamic of erosion by rising tensions; while
e. regionalism will not go far if it is purely a government concern - it gathers force in 
Southern Africa because the social and enterprise sectors have parallel feelings of common 
concerns and, increasingly common institutional coordination bodies. To a degree a 
similar - but weaker - broader base lingers in East Africa (narrowly defined, not as in 
COMESA) despite a nearly twenty year absence of meaningful interstate bodies.
Viable regionalism is, therefore, a means for promoting commonly perceived common 
interests which either require or are facilitated by coordinated or unified action. Which 
areas and how pursued in common are highly contextual and those appropriate for West 
Africa are unlikely to replicate the evolving SADC set. For example, for the water short 
SADC states achieving multi state river water use conventions and more efficient water use in 
each state is quite literally crucial to future household security and the avoidance of interstate 
hostilities not excluding war in the early years of the next century. It is very doubtful any 
similar priority exists in West Africa. The one potentially broadly analogous case - the Nile 
Basin - is quiescent until Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda begin 
serious irrigation and/or urban/industrial extraction expansion. When that happens, major 
modernisation of the increasingly archaic Nile Water Agreements will be needed, but probably 
on a free standing basis as an Alexandria to Kigali multi purpose sub-regional community 
seems unlikely and SADC is realistic enough to have no foreseeable Cape to Cairo ambitions.
The two clusters o f common interests are likely to be:
a. macro and sectoral economic growth; and
b. security broadly defined.
By broadening free or easy markets and sources (both legally and institutionally as well as by 
coordinated infrastructure, power supply and water utilisation networks) national enterprises 
and the regional economy can become lower cost, more secure in market access, higher 
volume (of output, of exports, of employment) and more competitive. The gains apply to 
growth of existing enterprises and to the potential for new.
Security from household to regional and from livelihood to external (to the region) military 
are the second cluster. Only SADC with food security and a programme in progress on water 
as well as a Foreign-Police-Immigration-Military associated council has actually begun 
systematic work in this field. ECOWAS has tried on an ad hoc basis (preventative diplomacy
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plus peace protection) in Liberia and IGAD has attempted reconciliation in Somalia and Sudan 
but the first is bogged down (by global and intra-regional as well as domestic Liberian factors) 
and the latter has been to date nugatory. As is evident in the SADC case, a tension exists 
between basic causes (household Iivelihood-food-water), intermediate issues (immigration, 
domestic law and order and cross border crime) and the conventional military themes. 
Avoiding marginalisation by peace is a clear concern of the South African and Zimbabwean 
military (and for that matter the Mozambican). Food security-water-livelihood are central to 
parallel non-state regional concerns which - interestingly - have influenced the regional 
security process conceptualisation as well as to some Ministerial perceptions.
A highly contentious area is enforcement o f minimum regional standards of acceptable 
governance. Liberia, The Gambia (by inaction) and Lesotho are the test cases to date. Liberia 
has proven such an appalling and apparently endless burden that ECOWAS was unable to 
respond to the initially potentially easily reversible overthrow of SSA's longest functioning 
multi party democracy in The Gambia by a junior officers' cowboy coup.
In Lesotho the SADC states (especially South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana) - with active 
trade union support - did continue to recognise the legitimate government and were thus 
legally able to use mild, and threaten more vigorous, economic and potentially military 
sanctions. The coup attempt was thus reversed. More problems arise when a legitimate 
government is seen as beyond regional minimum standards. Lesotho under Leabua Jonathan 
and Malawi under Hastings Banda were perceived as "not one of us" and cold shouldered, but 
not excluded. The fraught transition to a more modem state in Swaziland is a challenge to 
regional mediation and non-pugnacious use o f influence.
External relations are perhaps best seen as an arm of security broadly defined. For example, 
SADC as a unit can have more influence in WTO - or negotiations with EU - than any one 
member (even South Africa) separately. Both are arenas in which common interests in 
economic security (and growth) are at stake. On a joint state-enterprise basis the same applies 
to strategic expansion of coal exports from South Africa, Swaziland and potentially Botswana, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. On a more narrowly defined security theme, 
Tanzania's efforts to protect its borders against spill-overs of violence from its western 
neighbours and to put more authority behind its mediation and preventative diplomacy efforts 
in Burundi and Rwanda could potentially be enhanced by a joint SADC State stance.
Continental regionalism is special purpose focusing on ECA, ADB, OAU in the economic 
strategy conceptualisation and coordination, economic macro and sectoral strategy and policy 
advice and finance and political mediation and standard setting and external position 
advancing respectively. At present each needs a clearer self-definition of its role, a lessened
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tendency to seek to copy supposed external parallels and both more and more efficiently 
allocated resources.
X.
S t a t e  C a p a c i t y : P u b l i c  P o l i c y / P u b l i c  S e r v i c e s
All o f the general and articulated building blocks require states with greater - not less - 
capacity. To be user, including enterprise and market, friendly and to be weak is a 
contradiction in terms. To a degree capacity enhancement in key areas can be achieved in part 
by refocusing, but in varying degrees more (and different) public servants and greater (and 
better allocated) resource flows are needed.
Public policy requires data, analysis, clear (and reasonably accurate) presentation of 
choices and their probable consequences to decision takers. Statistical, analytical and 
decision advisory levels of African public services are uniformly weak, even if in wildly 
varying degrees. Except in the case of statistics - and of extreme cases of war damage or state 
disintegration - training and motivation are more serious weaknesses than pure numbers. Cost 
cutting - imprudent so-called economies in domestic training institutions and on salaries - has 
been a large part of the problem. So too has demotivation via technical assistance and 
external strategy design which has led to a widespread belief domestic analysis and advice is 
disregarded or treated as inherently third rate, unless and until taken up by an expatriate or an 
external agency. This area - albeit not the last motivation eroding factor - has been extensively 
studied.
But capacity to implement depends not only on top public servants but also, indeed primarily, 
on front line basic service providers - up to 80% of the non-armed forces public servants of 
most SSA states. These are dominantly nurses and medical aides, primary and adult education 
teachers, extension personnel, water and road maintenance foremen, artisans and technicians, 
constables and magistrates and field level tax collection officers. Unless these services are 
adequate in numbers, training and performance neither UABS, PPP nor SNAP can be built up.





The purported cultural barriers are largely bogus - either implicit racist or self-serving 
exculpation in origin and purpose. Certainly an appropriate African civil service will differ in 
specific tasks, training, procedures and relationships from that of the UK but UK, French, 
German, Japanese and Singaporian institutional patterns differ widely too. The case for 
contextual design and evolution is very real, but sweeping assertions that dishonesty, 
authoritarianism and self or affine serving overriding public service are African cultural traits 
(as opposed to universal problems with very serious eruptions in Africa) is both wrong and 
racist.
The three challenges need to be tackled promptly and in parallel - as slow moving Ghanaian 
and Tanzanian Civil Service Reform studies are now concluding and as Ethiopia's and 
Somaliland's new governments decided very early and have begun to implement on a broad 
brush overall and more focused initial steps basis.
Unless monthly basic service provider pay is of the order of two-thirds of household 
absolute poverty line budget needs ($40-50 in lower cost o f living and up to $100-125 in 
higher cost of living states, e.g. Ethiopia through Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa) there is little 
hope of recreating professionalism, restoring productivity or reducing coping devices which 
lower effective time at work and lead via decentralised, privatised user fees to corruption (not 
least by tax non-collectors).
Professionalism requires career structures, known procedures (routinising and decentralising 
the 90% of functions which are routine and providing guides to how to cope with the others) 
and training. These are not particularly hard to prepare (Ethiopia has a well advanced exercise 
as do some Ministries in both Mozambique and Tanzania), but without decent pay 
implementing is unlikely to go very far.
Productivity - at least for the first stages is relatively straightforward so far as standards
go:
a being at the workplace;
b. working on government business;
c accepting needed refresher and broadening training;
d. meeting unit specific targets (e.g. pumps kept functional 90% of the time, children 
vaccinated, kilometres of road of specified grades maintained).
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Beyond that, productivity measurement and improvement can be very complex but with pay 
and a professional framework these relatively simple standards could yield dramatic qualitative 
and quantitative gains in virtually all SSA countries.
There is a danger of overstating the case for basic services. Contentions that they can, by 
themselves, preserve legitimacy and/or restore it are - at best - simplistic.
State disintegration by implosion - notably Sierra Leone - may well relate to capacity 
weakness. But - as in Liberia - what was perceived as systemic corruption and extended 
kinship/ethnic group bias in allocation was the bottom line for lack of perceived legitimacy 
and for capacity disintegration.
In Mozambique RENAMO from 1980 (or its South African and Israeli manipulators and 
advisers) clearly saw provision of health-education-water-market access and emergency food 
security as the achievements of independent Mozambique which gave its government popular 
legitimacy. These (and their personnel) were systematically and effectively targeted as part of 
a mass terrorism strategy which also targeted civil law and order to make large areas 
uninhabitable with literally military or eco-strategic targets either parallel or even secondary. 
This did erode government support - as seen in the rural vote in 1994 (in contrast to the urban 
where civil law and order and basic services had been substantially preserved). However, no 
amount o f basic services would have deflected RENAMO's external organisers nor did 
Mozambique have the means to defend their services.
In Ethiopia inability (and low priority) to cope with averting famine after drought led directly 
to the fall of Emperor Hailie Selassie and - much less catalytically - to that o f his successor, 
Mengistu Hailie Mariam. However, repression and continuation of the "New Empire's" 
ethnic and aristocratic near exclusivity were much more basic to the Mengistu regime's 
demise and to the reversal of the Ethiopian-Eritrean union.
No one could realistically argue that basic services extension would have averted the long 
descent into fragmented chaos of Zaire, the explosive ethnic violence of Rwanda and Burundi, 
the movements to overthrow repressive dictatorships in - e.g. - the Central African Empire (as 
it then was), Mali, Uganda, Somalia/Somaliland nor the wars to overcome apartheid and its 
Portuguese colonial buffer zones.
The classic case o f basic services (including, in addition to health-education-water, famine 
prevention and law and order plus border security provision) cited as preserving legitimacy 
is Tanzania. It is a very poor state with an unusually strong national identity and a general 
belief the state and local government are large parts of basic answers. Its brief 1992-94 
legitimacy crisis turned on a perceived move toward top level systemic corruption but, as this
108
was linked to a specific coterie and opposed by most senior politicians and public servants, the 
result was an internal reform within the largest Party which then won a competitive multi­
party election and the lasting strains are to the union with Zanzibar, not to central - or 
mainland local - government perceived legitimacy.
Basic service provision has been central to Tanzanian politics - a de facto social contract 
between leaders and constituents. It has received priority allocations of resources - especially 
defined as including security and market access - even if efficiency in their use is less clear.
But underlying this has been a relatively strong perception that the purpose of public office 
(political or public servant) was to serve public interests (not private) and an ability of the 
public to call notable violators of that principle to account. That ethos has created the basic 
service focus more than the reverse. Further, Tanzania had a shorter, lesser late 70s/early 
80s decline (1978-1984/85, 15% fall per capita in constant domestic price GDP) than most 
states and is the "classic success" of SA (per capita fall halted and over two-thirds clawed 
back over a decade so 1996 constant price GDP per capita is within 5% of the 1978 high). 
Nonetheless, basic service provision and protection have been integral to Tanzania's relative 
socio political success and household economic survival since 1978 and especially so during 
the frustratingly slow and shaky 1984-1995 clawback (and 1986-1995 SA programme era).
Basic services as healer and reconciler can also be over stressed. In Rwanda it is true that 
the Minister/Ministry o f Health's stress on driving toward universal primary health care with 
the perceived dichotomy being between service providers and patients/pupils can represent a 
political and social healing element (if donors will finance it) but in a key supporting, not a 
potential lead, role. In Mozambique basic service expansion was, and hopes for its renewal 
are, central to state legitimacy. Therefore, rehabilitation and reconciliation turn on service re­
establishment in rural areas. If this is halted by externally imposed monetary restraint so 
reductionist as to amount to monetary terrorism, economic as well as political and social 
recovery will fail.
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland have given central roles to public service and public 
services renewal in their political and - less clearly - economic strategies. In Ethiopia this 
is seen as integral to creating a nation of decentralised, federated peoples out of the ruins of 
the centralised, ethnically structured New Empire era ending in Mengistu's flight. Averting 
famine is a top priority backed by resource mobilisation and personnel deployment. In Eritrea 
service provision is stressed at least in part to preserve the unity - of highlander and 
lowlander, urban and rural, Muslim and Christian - which has been the ground rock of 
Eritrea's improbable success in attaining and beginning to consolidate statehood. In 
Somaliland it is seen as central to regaining the legitimacy and relative well-being of the 
transitional Republic o f Somaliland and the autonomous late colonial Somaliland Protectorate
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and thereby giving flesh to the politically mobilising "Somaliland idea Interestingly, in each 
case, decent ($40-250 a month) public service pay has been seen as a bottom line for public 
service recreation and public services delivery strengthening. Initially, funding been provided 
from domestic reallocations albeit further progress from that source alone is problematic.
Mali may be the potential classic case of basic services as reconciler. Only at one level is its 
domestic conflict Tuareg-Bamako. More basically it is semi-nomadic pastoralist versus 
sedentary cropping social groups. Underlying the pastoralist bitterness is a brutally simple 
(to them) model:
a. Pastoral lands are  not protected ffom incursion by croppers - notably the loss o f  virtually 
all d rough t year reserve pastures - creating a marginalising and risk exacerbating dynamic;
b. water point creation has not been user friendly and has in fact worsened drought impact;
c. pastoralist long distance trade has been taxed, licensed and generally hampered to the 
benefit o f urban based quasi oligopsonist traders who snap up herds at distressed prices in 
droughts and set pauperised ex-pastoralists to herd them in better times,
d. pastoralists pay substantial indirect, fee and licence taxes but receive next to no user 
friendly (moving with the households) primary education or health services so become 
more and more at a disadvantage in access to commerce, public service posts or other 
waged employment.
To present this dynamic of grievance rhetorically as a Bamako-Paris-Washington Institution- 
SIILS plot is an unhelpful misperception. But the elements cited and their dynamic are 
veridical. So long as they continue, negotiated settlements and hiring some pastoralist ex­
combatants can only buy time (unless all adult male Tuareg are to become soldiers which 
would pose its own political, social and fiscal problematics). Here the basic services needed 
are:
a. mobile primary health (relatively easy) and primary education (much harder) services;
b. restored access to drought year reserve pastures - presumably as a focus o f anti- 
desertification and rural water programming since expelling croppers ffom 'lost' pastures is 
not feasible;
c. better market access and less discretionary' and nuisance taxes on pastoralist merchants;
d. preferential access to 'late' education/training for public service posts so state employees 
are a less alien cadre in pastoralist areas.
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But even here it is clear that public service provision while probably vital (and cost efficient 
compared to  recurrent insurgency) is consequential on analysis, political conceptualisation 
and a political Weltanschauung focusing on reconciliation and inclusion Important, yes 
free-standing deus ex machina, no.
These examples do not detract from the legitimacy, solidarity and reconciliation cases for 
UABS. They do caution that here - as in general - easy, simple, universal answers are likely to 
be easily, simply, generally wrong ones in the absence of historical, social and economic 
analysis o f actual contexts and dynamics and of an actual commitment by political leaders (and 
in elected government cases by the majority of social and zonal groups backing them) to 
inclusiveness, public service and reconciliation. Capacity matters, but so do the uses to which 
it is put and the underlying outlooks resulting in prioritising those particular uses.
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A N N E X
OUTPUT AND POVERTY/HUMAN CONDITION INDICATORS: Some Problems 
GDP - F r o m  H e g e m o n y  T o  W h e r e ?
The main performance indicator in SSA - as elsewhere - has been Gross Domestic Product. 
As an estimate o f  total marketed or - at least theoretically - marketable output at market prices 
(current or constant base year) GD P is useful and has no evident rival.
H ow ever it has a number o f  limitations:
a. G D P covers a country (or a territory) and GDP per capita is an average which abstracts 
from income distribution,
b. Because it converts all outputs to prices to  achieve com m on values GDP abstracts from 
makeup as well as distribution, e.g. per capita levels o f  basic services and basic food 
production are not always closely correlated with GDP;
c. Serious estimation problems exist at conceptual and - even more - at operational level, 
especially but not only in SSA. Handling of non-marketed outputs and of outputs usually 
measured indirectly via input cost pose particularly serious problems;
d. The case against single index o f  performance as opposed to  a family o f  complementary 
indices applies to G D P as much as to  any other single index.
In the period prior to  1970 these objections to the hegemony o f  G D P per capita growth as a 
performance index w ere  usually treated as fairly minor at intellectual and as trivial at 
operational level. To the extent they were recognised, the problems tended to be viewed as 
technical - largely soluble by improvement o f  estimation procedures. Since then the 
limitations have becom e much m ore broadly recognised and perceived as conceptual, 
normative and operational not only technical. No widely accepted single alternative to GDP 
has emerged, nor has any simple, operational group o f  indices. In practice, therefore, GDP 
remains dominant but no xk faute cie mieux rather than from conviction.
Alternative/complement crafting has moved in two rather different ways:
a. constructing single indices blending GDP/capita and other indicators. UNDP's Human 
Development Index averages GDP/capita, life expectancy at birth and percentage of adult 
literacy. M ore complex indices seek measures o f  welfare including specific basic needs 
performance. In all such indices problems o f  weighting arise - is average personal
consumption per capita more or less important than average literacy rates? Can one 
rationally weight a basic needs index by using cost o f  achieving specified standards (which 
gives very' different weights by country for - e.g. - w ater depending on rainfall and 
geo logy)0 Further these composite numbers may be good for catching attention but black 
box experts judgem ents in ways neither central decision takers nor ordinary people can 
easily understand. Finally, it is hard to work out a continuum from the index to  strategy to 
policy to  project to achieve improvements.
b. setting up families of complementary indicators deliberately chosen so that it is 
practicable to iterate from indicator through operational programme and - via result 
monitoring - back. The major example is the use of indices (education, health, water, 
nutrition, personal consumption, etc.) and sub-indices (e.g. percentage of girls in primary 
school, proportions of total and substantial Extended Programme of Immunisation 
completions) to link the goals of the Child Summit to specific articulated global and 
national child oriented programmes. The objection to this particular set is that UNICEF, 
by mandate, focuses primarily on children and works out in conceptive circles - mother, 
household, community, country - as their welfare/poverty influences child welfare. 
However, the evident answer to that objection is for a broader mandate agency - UNDP - 
to develop a parallel dynamic. A concentric argument is that multiple index presentation 
does not readily allow unique overall rankings (or even judgements on change if some 
indices improve and others worsen). However, the answer to that objection may very well 
be that the world - and human development - are too complex to be represented by single 
numbers and that decision takers (from household through national level) are in fact used 
to the need to balance progress toward several objectives not to make binary decisions 
about one.
GDP a n d  A l l  T h a t
All national accounts  are - in part - estimates; none is a complete census. SSA GDP data have 
very high estimate proportions but their real limitation is the weakness o f  estimates.
O ne w eakness  relates to non-marketed (household self-provisioning or so called subsistence) 
output I f  agricultural estimates are physical ones from district officers no special volume 
problem arises. How ever, such problems do arise for housing and for embodied labour and 
time investment - e.g. in land improvements and tree crops. Pricing is usually 'nominal1 farm 
ga te  - as if  sold - except for housing usually valued in terms o f  a depreciation rate times non­
purchased inputs.
Farm gate prices are appropriate for GDP purposes - total market value o f  domestic 
production. However, they are not suitable for poverty or nutrition estimation nor for 
measuring urban/rural differentials. For that purpose a kilo o f  maize grown on a farm, 
processed there and eaten there is equivalent to a kilo o f  processed meal bought at retail in a 
town even though in GD P the latter is valued at 3 to 5 times as much. The problem is serious 
but one o f  using bases appropriate to the intended purpose, not with GDP per se.
Government 'valued added' in GDP is primarily the payroll or the employment roll. That 
poses problems because a) what is valued is an input not the actual output and b) the estimate 
of productivity change is 0 (rather unlikely) if the number o f  employees is used as an index and 
varies with real w ages (conceivable) if deflated payroll is used. The logical solution is to use a 
weighted average o f  key physical indicators, e.g. wells in operation, miles o f  roads o f  different 
categories maintained, primary school completions, etc. but this approach is very rare in 
Africa.
Agricultural output data are very weak. The worst are probably Mozambique's for the small 
farming household sector based on a 1972 Portuguese survey projected for population growth 
o f  2.6% (versus negative for households actually able to farm from 1980 through 1990) and 
no change in output per household (either cyclically with weather or secularly with changed 
crop patterns). M ozam bique will soon m ount an agricultural census, but until then its 
agricultural 'data' are little better than random numbers. M ost SSA estimates for main crops 
are now based on district agricultural officer area and output per hectare data. Their reliability 
(in the absence o f  crop cutting samples) is unequal and probably low, and as area is easier to 
estimate than output per spatial unit, they tend to be sticky near an assumed trend growth rate 
except in years o f  obvious bumper or disaster harvests. Secondary crop estimates are either 
projected from Agricultural Census data or simply guessed and are probably systematically too 
low. Commercialised crop/beast data are taken from exports, large scale enterprises and rules 
of thumb (e.g. 5%  o f  the population are urban; urban households grow  and rural buy no food; 
per capita consum ption is similar; therefore 5% o f  food is marketed).
The result in some cases - e.g. Tanzania - has been a growing underestimation o f  marketed 
output - urban population is now 30%, a significant proportion o f  rural households do buy 
food, som e ex urban ones grow for self-provisioning or sale, average per capita consumption 
is higher in urban areas. Similarly systematic, cumulative errors have arisen when 
liberalisation has replaced single channel marketing making data harder to collect.
1 he problems o f  using employee numbers as proxies is not limited to the public service - it is 
widespread in respect to commerce, transport and manufacturing. Nor are formula estimates 
ot marketed food the only ones to go haywire if rules o f  thumb set up at one point in time are 
not regularly updated as contexts change. Many industrial and construction output estimates
are formula linked to imports - as are many fixed investment estimates If domestic content 
rises, or  the proportion o f  smuggled goods increases, then these formulae underestimate real 
domestic output In one extreme cases the overall manufacturing output estimate minus 
surveyed large enterprises left a negative figure for small scale industry when casual 
observation and small industry surveys showed it had expanded.
Investment and domestic savings estimates are also fragile. Import linked fixed investment 
ratios at best approximate reality if neither the makeup of investment, the import content of 
each type nor the proportion of smuggled goods vary significantly. Except for highly artificial 
estimates in the case of housing they do not cover the labour and time investment analogue to 
consumption self-provisioning.
Net investment figures are - virtually without exception - meaningless because they are 
estimated by computing depreciation at historic cost. That procedure usually yields 1% to 
2% of GDP. However an updated capital stock at replacement cost valuation exercise in 
Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s suggested 10% as the current price depreciation ratio to GDP 
near full capacity utilisation with higher levels if capacity under-utilisation exceeded 10%. 
Correcting net fixed investment figures on that basis lowers them dramatically - often into the 
red as in the case of mid 1960s to mid 1970s Ghana. Observation of infrastructure, plant and 
equipment, building and vehicle fleet deterioration in many African countries strongly suggests 
the lower estimates are the correct ones.
Domestic savings figures are usually estimated from gross fixed investment (or fixed 
investment plus or minus inventory/goods in process/livestock herd changes) less identified 
foreign transfer inflow. In principle this is a reasonable route, but given the size and volatility 
of errors and omissions in many Balance of Payments estimates including unrecorded 
commercial and footloose financial capital flows (in and out) it may not be a very accurate 
one.
Finally tw o  serious price problems arise:
a. if terms of trade change, constant price GDP growth does not represent real domestic 
purchasing power because those price changes have a real positive (or more usually 
negative) impact on producers and consumers;
b. if the  degree o f  over (or under) valuation varies then conversion to dollars at official 
rates (even on a moving average basis as used by the Bank) is an inaccurate guide to  real 
ou tpu t change (at constant domestic prices or such prices adjusted for terms o f  trade 
change). Growing overvaluation (as in the late 1970s through mid 1980s) gives spuriously 
high - and falling overvaluation spuriously low constant dollar price growth
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rates. Nationally this poses no problem - constant domestic price indices can be used 
Regionally or globally a simple average o f  the national constant domestic price ones can be 
taken but not a convenient weighted one.
Improvements in estimation cause their own problems - they make previous year estimates 
non-comparable unless the previous years can be and are recalculated on the new basis which 
is rarely done for more than five years. Non-comparability also affects regional and global 
comparisons.
Given the caveats one might be tempted to abandon GDP - and its components. However, 
some index o f  overall ou tput level and change is needed Further, in practice no alternative 
single index is markedly better in terms o f  freedom from severe estimation problems and any 
cluster o f  indices both requires an overall output one and will include some indices which are 
at least as problematic and non-comparable as GDP.
P o v er ty /H u m a n  C o n d it io n  In d ic e s  a s  C o m p lem en ts  
If poverty reduction is a strategic goal data on poverty are needed. Among them are 
indices relevant to designing, articulating and monitoring poverty reduction policy.
In the context o f  SSA - with over 30%  absolutely poor people (and 20% to 50% the main 
range o f  country estimates) a standard absolute personal poverty measure is needed. 
Reasonably objective definitions are possible (which is not the case with relative poverty). 
They are not the same when converted into S (or any other standard accounting unit) 
because o f  purchasing pow er parity differences, e.g. for a household o f  six they appear to be 
of the order o f  $60 in urban Ethiopia, $75 in M ozambique and Tanzania, $100 in Rwanda and 
$125 in Mali.
While the relevant basic unit is the household and the most practicable data collection route 
Household Surveys (not limited to household budgets) proper comparison requires at the least 
dealing in per capita consumption (or specifying household size for any $ amount). Optimally 
household size would be in terms o f  adult equivalents but in practice that is rarely a possible 
adjustment to  make in SSA.
Other indices which can be available from a Household Survey include %  effective access to 
prim ary  school, % effective access to (and also actual utilisation of) basic health services 
and p u re  water with some uniform distance to facility/standpipe used to define effective 
ccess Life expectancy at birth as well as infant and under 5 mortality can be estimated 
'''om Censuses and indices on small family farming household production from Agricultural
Censuses. Nutrition data - for adults as well as Under 5's - should be available from Ministry 
o f  Health "censuses" or monitoring services albeit that is currently more the exception than the 
rule Ministry o f  Transport and o f  Commerce data should allow indices on access to roads 
and to markets/merchants.
A basket o f  indices including GDP, food production, access to and use o f  basic services, 
health and nutrition and access to transport and markets could be produced in most SSA 
states w ere  it to be given priority - which to date it rarely is That priority, however would 
only be sustainable if professional analysts and decision takers used the indices in strategic 
design, articulation and monitoring.
To achieve global or regional backing the indices would need to be relatively uniform - a task 
presumably in which U N E C A  and/or the ADB could and should take a lead and in which they 
should enlist the political support o f  the OAU. Whether such an initiative could be globalised 
probably depends on the evolution o f  UNDP and UNICEF thinking and prioritisation as to 
human developm ent assessing statistical priorities.
Statistics are not inexpensive - in either fiscal or personnel terms. In most o f  Africa their 
quality and quantity have been among the victims of crisis non coping. Censuses and 
similar major surveys such as Agricultural Censuses and Household Surveys are not taken at 
regular decennial intervals (whereas before 1980 they appeared to  be increasingly establishing 
themselves as regularly calendared events). When they are taken the quantity and quality o f  
analysis is usually lower than twenty years ago. For example, in a number o f  cases implausible 
rises in population growth rates have appeared because comparability was low. The apparent 
2 .75% -3 .25% -2 .75%  population growth shift in Tanzania 'shown' by the last three Censuses 
almost certainly relates to very limited adjustment o f  the 1977 one to deal with comparability 
problems.
One side effect o f  Structural Adjustment has been the rehabilitation o f  Statistical Services and 
the renewal o f  Censuses and Household Surveys. Given the gap between the emerging ones 
and the last previous ones (in one extreme case over 25 years, assuming Mozambique's 
Agricultural Census is held in 1997 or 1998), improving empirical knowledge o f  the recent 
past may not be practical but setting baselines and beginning a strengthening o f  indices and 
their use is.
To  optimise such a rehabilitation and development process has at least three requirements 
which are easily overlooked:
a identifying m ain  po ten t ia l  users and involving them  in m ain  C ensus  a n d  Surv ey
design There is no reason to suppose that statisticians are experts on what questions and
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what data are relevant to - say - a Poverty Reduction Unit, just as the latter may not be 
expert at designing or operating large Surveys let alone Censuses;
identifying existing non-coordinated (in house) sectoral data streams which could be 
brought into mainstream statistical presentations, possibly with technical advice on design, 
collection and presentation;
supplementing Censuses and Household Surveys, which cannot be more frequent than 
over fifth year and probably every tenth for personnel and fiscal cost reasons, with much 
smaller annual follow-up surveys to avoid having to extrapolate for up to ten years on 
the basis o f  past structures and trends which may be changing;
setting sample size on the basis o f  the trade-offs among accuracy, cost and having 
breakdowns for most indices to District and urban quarter or zone level The last is a 
major desiderata for applied use - especially if planning is intended to become more 
flexible, contextual and decentralised.
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